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Abstract 
The health system in Australia delivers safe and effective health care to millions of 
patients each year. However, health care is not as safe as it could be with research 
indicating that errors involving medications are a leading cause of unintended harm 
to patients both in Australia and internationally. Historically, hospital authorities 
have attempted to reduce incidents by focusing on the actions of individuals. 
However, the health system is now taking advantage of research carried out in other 
complex industries which indicates that error is inevitable and that identifying 
individuals as the ultimate cause of adverse incidents is of limited value unless the 
context in which the incident occurred is well understood.  
 This series of studies used Reason’s (1990) model of accident causation as 
the basis for the search into possible contributing factors to unsafe behaviour by 
nurses during medication administration. Structural equation modelling was used to 
operationalise Reason’s theory by developing a model linking organisational and 
individual factors to unsafe behaviour in the hospital system. Study 1 in this series 
was a preliminary investigation of the role of organisational factors in contributing to 
violations by nurses in rural and remote areas in Queensland, Australia. Data were 
collected using a self-report questionnaire with this instrument being used to develop 
a structural model wherein organisational variables predicted 23% of the variance in 
self-reported violations. Study 2 extended the number of organisational factors 
measured by using a validated instrument that is widely used in public sector 
hospitals in Queensland. This instrument measures organisational climate and also a 
number of individual factors. In addition to the outcome variable, violation 
behaviour, a measure of errors was included. Data were collected from nurses 
working in two rural health service districts. A structural model was developed from 
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this instrument wherein organisational variables predicted 7% of the variance in self-
reported violations and 24% of the variance in errors. The hypothesised relationships 
between the individual factors and errors were not supported in this study. Study 3 
investigated the impact of individual factors and a specific type of organisational 
climate, that is, safety climate on unsafe behaviour. The violation behaviour and 
error scales were extended and improved in this study, for example, the error scale 
was expanded to include near misses. In addition, a new scale measuring reporting 
behaviour was developed and included. Data were collected from nurses working in 
a large rural centre. The structural model developed from the instrument indicated 
that safety climate predicted 27% of the variance in violation behaviour, 61% of the 
variance in errors and near misses, and 20% of the variance in willingness to report.  
 This series of studies identified underlying contributing factors to unsafe 
behaviour during medication administration, indicated the strength of the 
relationships among the various elements, and illustrated how the various parts of the 
system link together to influence safety outcomes. By identifying which elements are 
important by the use of structural equation modelling, this research provides the basis 
for predicting unsafe organisational conditions and leads to suggestions for suitably 
targeted interventions to reduce unsafe behaviour and adverse incidents.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
The health system in Australia delivers safe and effective health care to 
millions of patients each year (Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health 
Care [ACSQHC], 2001c). However, health care delivery involves complex and 
dynamic processes and systems, and health care is not as safe as it could be. 
Research indicates that adverse events involving medical error are a leading cause of 
death and injury both in Australia and internationally (Brennan et al., 1991; Kohn, 
Corrigan, & Donaldson, 1999; Thomas et al., 2000; Vincent, Neale, & 
Woloshynowych, 2001; Wilson et al., 1995). An adverse event is defined as an 
unintended injury or complication that results in disability, death, or prolongation of 
hospital stay and is caused by health care management rather than the patient’s 
disease (ACSQHC, 2001a).  
The extent of the problem of hospital-based errors was highlighted in the 
United States of America (US) when the Institute of Medicine (IOM) released a 
report on patient safety in November, 1999 (Kohn et al., 1999). The IOM report cited 
two studies of large samples of hospital admissions, one in New York using 1984 
data (Brennan et al., 1991) and another in Colorado and Utah using 1992 data  
(Thomas et al., 2000). These studies found that the proportion of hospital admissions 
experiencing an adverse event was 3.7% and 2.9%, respectively. The results of these 
two studies imply that the number of deaths resulting from medical error in US 
hospitals is at least 44,000 and perhaps as many as 98,000 each year (Kohn et al.). 
The annual toll exceeds the combined number of deaths and injuries from motor and 
air crashes, suicides, falls, poisonings, and drownings (Barach & Small, 2000). 
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The most comprehensive study of this type in Australia was the Quality in 
Australian Health Care Study, which involved the retrospective review of over 
14,000 medical records from 28 hospitals in 1992 (Wilson, Harrison, Gibberd, & 
Hamilton, 1999; Wilson et al., 1995). This study suggested that Australia had a 
relatively high rate of adverse events (16.6% of hospital admissions) when compared 
to the US research. However, reanalysis of the Australian data found that this 
percentage would drop to 10.6% of hospital admissions being associated with an 
adverse event if the US methodology had been applied in Australia (ACSQHC, 
2001c). Further review of the adverse events recorded and of the methods used 
suggested that most of these events were minor in nature, and that both the 
Australian and US studies had a virtually identical rate of serious adverse events 
comprising about 2% of cases, with 1.7% of admissions being associated with 
serious disability and 0.3% with death (ACSQHC, 2001c). Apart from the heavy toll 
in human costs, it has been estimated that the direct medical costs of these events in 
Australia exceed $2 billion per year and that the total life-time cost of such 
preventable injury may be twice that amount (Runciman & Moller, 2001). 
Although there has been some debate over the reliability of the figures quoted 
in the above studies (Adams, 2001; Leape, 2000; McDonald, Weiner, & Hui, 2000; 
McNeil & Leeder, 1995), it is well accepted that modern health care is increasingly 
complex with inevitable risks for patients as a result of this complexity (ACSQHC, 
2001b). Available international data suggest that probably about 10% of admissions 
to hospitals are associated with some form of adverse event and that this is likely to 
be similar in health systems in most developed countries (ACSQHC, 2001c; Neale, 
Woloshynowych, & Vincent, 2001; Vincent et al., 2001).   
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1.2 Objectives of the Current Research Project 
Health-care delivery involves complex and dynamic processes and systems, 
and therefore, it is unrealistic to expect perfect performance in all situations. 
However, every patient hurt by the system matters and, as the research discussed in 
the previous section indicates, safety concerns are real (ACSQHC, 2001a). 
Historically, hospital authorities have attempted to reduce adverse events by focusing 
on the actions of individuals (Leape, 1994). However, the health care system is now 
taking advantage of the research carried out in other complex industries which 
indicates that error is inevitable and that identifying individuals as the ultimate cause 
of adverse incidents is of limited value unless the context in which the incident 
occurred is well understood (McCarthy, Healey, Wright, & Harrison, 1997; Reason, 
1997). Unfortunately, most studies in this area report only the extent and cost of the 
problem rather than identifying why errors are happening (Roughead, 1999; Vincent, 
Taylor-Adams, & Stanhope, 1998). Research is required to investigate and identify 
the underlying contributing factors as this lack of knowledge limits efforts to 
improve the current situation (ACSQHC, 2001c).  
The aim of the current project was to examine organisational and individual 
factors considered likely to impact on medication administration performance in the 
hospital system; explore the relations among these variables; and develop a model 
for predicting unsafe behaviour, a major precursor to adverse events (Reason, 1997). 
This model was developed using the technique called structural equation modelling. 
This technique facilitates understanding of the interactions among variables and 
illustrates how the various parts of the system link together to influence outcomes. 
Models such as these enable the prediction of unsafe organisational conditions, 
which in turn assists in the design of suitably targeted intervention programs to 
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reduce unsafe behaviour and adverse incidents (Fogarty, 2004). The specific area 
examined in this project was medication administration by nurses. The following 
section will outline the rationale for this focus.      
1.3 Medication Error 
Within the medical environment, adverse events resulting from medication 
errors are recognised as a leading cause of unintended harm to patients (Kohn et al., 
1999; Wilson et al., 1995), with between 10% and 20% of all adverse events being 
drug related (Bates, 1999). In Australia it has been estimated that adverse drug events 
result in at least 80,000 hospital admissions each year at a cost of around $350 
million. Between 32% and 69% of these hospitalisations are considered preventable, 
that is, due to error rather than the disease process (Roughead, 1999; Roughead, 
Gilbert, Primrose, & Sansom, 1998). An adverse drug event that is not preventable is 
known as an adverse drug reaction, that is, when the right drug is used for the correct 
indication in the right dose given by the right route, but the patient suffers 
unexpected and unpreventable harm as a result (ACSQHC, 2002a). If, however, the 
patient had a previous reaction that was recorded in the medical records, and this was 
overlooked by the doctor, pharmacist, and/or nurse, then this would be considered 
preventable. Only preventable adverse drug events will be considered in the present 
research.  
 Medication error has been defined as a failure in the drug treatment process 
resulting in inappropriate medication use (ACSQHC, 2001b). This can occur at any 
time along the continuum of the medication system, from prescription by the doctor 
to administration by the nurse. Leape et al. (1995) found that most errors occur in the 
prescription (39%) and administration (38%) stages, with the remainder nearly 
equally divided between transcription and pharmacy dispensing. The current research 
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focused on the medication administration stage of the process and this is discussed in 
the next section.  
1.3.1 Medication Administration Errors by Nurses 
Medication administration is a complex and time-consuming task that forms a 
major part of the nurse’s role (O'Shea, 1999). Medicines are normally prescribed by a 
doctor and dispensed by a pharmacist or nurse, but responsibility for the safe 
administration of the medication rests with the nurse (Gibson, 2001; Wakefield, 
Wakefield, Uden-Holman, & Blegen, 1998). The nurse must ensure that correct 
procedures are followed so that the right dose of the right drug is administered to the 
right patient at the right time by the right route (Delaune & Ladner, 1998). Nurses are 
not only responsible for the administration of medications, but also for preparing and 
checking medications, updating their own knowledge of medications, monitoring the 
effectiveness of treatment, reporting adverse reactions, and teaching patients about 
their drugs (Australian Nursing Council, 2000; Delaune & Ladner). The complexity 
of the medication process increases the potential for error. If an error occurs, the 
nurse often assumes or is assigned responsibility for the error even though the actions 
of others involved in the system and the system design itself may have contributed to 
the situation (Wakefield et al.). Contributing factors for medication administration 
errors may include nurse error, system design (medication administration system, 
drug company practices), and the actions of doctors, pharmacists, and other nurses.   
 Although some studies are beginning to look at contributing factors to errors 
by nurses (e.g., Edmondson, 1996; Meurier, 2000; Meurier, Vincent, & Parmar, 
1997; Meurier, Vincent, & Parmar, 1998; Wakefield et al., 1998), research in this 
area has paid relatively little attention to the interactions among individual and 
organisational factors, and local circumstances in producing adverse events (Leape et 
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al., 1995; Roughead, 1999). Leape (1994) argued that more attention needs to be 
given to psychological and human factors that contribute to unsafe behaviour, 
particularly the fact that susceptibility to this behaviour is strongly affected by the 
context and conditions of work.  
 Our understanding of human functioning and errors has been enhanced by 
theory development and research activities in the areas of cognitive psychology and 
human factors (Helmreich, 2000; Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999; Reason, 
1990, 1997; Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000). Much has been learned about 
mental functioning from psychologists who investigate possible causes of error at an 
individual/cognitive level. In contrast, human factors experts look at the issue of 
error more from a social/organisational perspective, that is, they study the 
interrelationships between humans, the tools they use, and the environment in which 
they live and work (Weinger, Pantiskas, Wiklund, & Carstensen, 1998). According 
to the human factors approach, managing risk and reducing unsafe behaviour and 
errors requires attention to the design of tasks and processes, and to the conditions 
under which people work (e.g., hours, schedules and workloads), how people interact 
with one another, and how people are trained (Leape & Berwick, 2000). The 
following section will discuss the contributions made by cognitive psychologists and 
human factors experts to explain why humans err and why they sometimes choose to 
act unsafely.  
1.4 The Individual/Cognitive Approach to Human Error  
 Psychologists such as Hollnagel (1993) and Reason (1990) have studied the 
cognitive possesses involved in human error. Although the management of error in 
complex systems such as aviation and medicine is an organisational task that cannot 
be managed by dealing with psychological issues alone (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; 
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Reason, 1997), errors by individuals and teams have their roots in human cognitive 
limitations, restricted memory, and information processing capacity (Reason, 1997).  
 Several human error taxonomies have been published, with the most 
prominent being the category of cognitive errors proposed by Reason (1990), 
Norman (1988), and Rasmussen (1982). Although these psychologically oriented 
taxonomies do not provide a diagnosis of error causality, they do help our 
understanding of the underlying cognitive mechanisms that result in human failure 
(Sutcliffe & Rugg, 1998). 
1.4.1 Levels of Human Performance 
 An understanding of the different levels of performance involved in normal 
cognitive functioning can help to explain why errors occur. People pass through three 
stages of learning in their journey from novice to expert, that is, the cognitive, the 
associative, and the autonomous stages (Lourens, 1990; Rasmussen, 1982). The first 
stage is the knowledge-based level where reasoning, or thinking things through is 
required. As the person becomes more proficient, this declarative knowledge is 
replaced by procedural knowledge consisting of a list of rules (rule-based level) and, 
finally, of a set of automatic productions (skill-based level). The three levels of 
performance correspond to increasing levels of familiarity with the environment or 
task (Reason, 1990). 
 The knowledge-based level of performance is required in unfamiliar 
situations and in tasks for which no training was given or no procedures exist 
(Reason, 1990). Actions must be thought out using conscious analytical processes 
and stored knowledge. This conscious mode requires effort and is slow, sequential, 
restricted in capacity, and error-prone (Reason, 1997). It requires “paying attention” 
which is a limited resource that necessitates withdrawal of focus from other areas.   
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 The rule-based level of performance is used when stored rules are used to 
solve known but not routine problems; for example, if this situation happens, then do 
these actions (Leape, 1994; Reason, 1997). This situation will likely be one that has 
been encountered before, or has been trained for, or is covered by procedures. 
 The skill-based level of performance is applied to well-known and routine 
activities and is governed by stored patterns of pre-programmed instructions 
(Reason, 1990). Routine, highly-practiced tasks are carried out unconsciously with 
occasional conscious checks on progress (Reason, 1997). This functioning is 
automatic, fast, and requires little conscious effort and is the way people operate 
most of the time.    
 If a person is trained in normal operating and error-recovery procedures, most 
cognitive processing will be at the skilled level. Diagnostic training usually indicates 
rule-based processing; and lack of training usually results in knowledge-based 
reasoning (Sutcliffe & Rugg, 1998). An understanding of these performance levels 
helps to classify the variety of ways people err (Reason, 1997), as discussed in the 
following section. 
1.4.2 Errors  
 Errors are defined as the failure of planned actions to achieve their intended 
consequences (Reason, 1990, 1997). Errors can involve the involuntary deviation of 
action from intention (slips and lapses); or the departure of planned actions from 
some satisfactory path towards a desired goal (mistake). Slips occur when an 
intention is executed in an inappropriate manner, and lapses are the failure to 
perform some required action (Norman, 1988; Reason, 1990). Slips are potentially 
observable as they are external actions and are often caused by factors such as haste 
and divided attention (Hudson, 2000). Lapses, on the other hand, refer to more covert 
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memory failures and are often apparent only to the person. Slips and lapses occur at 
the skill-based level of performance (Rasmussen, 1982). Skill-level errors include 
failures from lack of attention and misallocation of attention. External causes are 
interruptions, distractions, and unpredictable events. Many events happening 
simultaneously can cause information overload and task failure (Sutcliffe & Rugg, 
1998). Most slips do not cause harm because they are often quickly detected by the 
individual. Lapses on the other hand can be missed as it is harder to detect an omitted 
behaviour (Hudson). For this reason, they are considered more dangerous than slips.  
 Mistakes are errors in the formation of an intention or in the choice of a 
strategy for achieving a goal (Reason, 1990). They involve deficiencies in the 
judgmental and/or inferential processes involved in the selection of an objective, or 
of the means to achieve it, or both. Mistakes can occur at the rule-based or 
knowledge-based level (Rasmussen, 1982). At the rule-based level, mistakes involve 
misapplication of normally good rules, applying an inappropriate rule, or the failure 
to apply a good rule. Good rules may be misapplied because of recognition problems, 
for example, when information overloading prevents normal recognition. Rule-based 
mistakes may be triggered by new variations to known problems and/or poor training 
(Sutcliffe & Rugg, 1998).  
 At the knowledge-based level, no problem-solving rules are available and the 
individual has to resort to resource-limited reasoning as a result of a novel situation. 
This can be a highly error-prone situation (Reason, 1997). Knowledge-based 
mistakes occur because people are faced with a novel, possibly emergency situation 
which requires conscious analytic processing and stored knowledge (Leape, 1994).     
 Slips and mistakes are errors of commission, whereas lapses are errors of 
omission (Sarter & Alexander, 2000). The majority of errors occur at the skill-based 
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level of performance followed by the rule-based level, and then the knowledge-based 
level (Lawton & Parker, 1998; Sarter & Alexander). This can be explained because 
nearly all adult actions have a skill-based component, that is, most things we do are 
at the automatic level. Skill-based errors are often detected by the individual, 
whereas rule-and knowledge-based mistakes can be more difficult to detect (Reason, 
1990). Mistakes are considered more dangerous than slips or lapses because the 
person making the mistake thinks they are doing the right thing. Evidence to the 
contrary may be ignored because the person is so sure (Hudson, 2000).   
1.5 A Change of Focus    
 Historically, the focus of safety research has been the individual. As noted 
earlier, errors by individuals and teams have their roots in human cognitive 
limitations, restricted memory, and information processing capacity (Reason, 1997). 
However, the management of error in complex systems cannot be achieved by 
dealing with psychological issues alone (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Reason, 1997). 
Lawton and Parker (1998) suggested that investigators may need to consider a range 
of possible contributing factors rather than focusing solely on the individual in 
isolation. They argued that individual, cognitive, social, and organisational factors all 
interact to generate the unsafe behaviours implicated in accidents. 
 The cognitive path to accident causation involves failures in information 
processing or skills, resulting in errors. However, the social-psychological path 
which involves attitudinal and behavioural factors, may lead to the deliberate 
deviation from safe working practices, that is, violation behaviour (Lawton & Parker, 
1998). In addition, accidents can often involve both errors and violations in 
combination (Lawton & Parker). Although an error may appear to be the immediate 
cause of an incident, the necessary condition in the accident sequence may have been 
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a violation of a safety rule. Violations tend to take people into an area of greater risk, 
thereby making the situation less forgiving of subsequent errors (Lawton & Parker). 
In addition, organisational precursors such as inadequate training, incorrect 
procedures, and/or poor task allocation may contribute to accidents by creating the 
kind of workplace that invites unsafe behaviour, both errors and violations, by 
individuals or teams (Reason, 1997). To reduce violations and errors, a range of 
organisational interventions may be required. For example, compliance with 
procedures will be unlikely if they result in inefficient work practices. Reducing 
unrealistic work demands may be a way the organisation can encourage compliance 
with procedures in this case.    
 In summary, there is now a growing emphasis within safety research to look 
beyond the individual contributors to human error to the social and organisational 
factors that influence unsafe behaviour (Lawton & Parker, 1998). These include 
attitudinal and behavioural factors which can lead to the deliberate deviation from 
safe working practices, that is, violation behaviour. This behaviour will be defined 
and discussed in the next section followed by a discussion of the social and 
organisational contributors to human error.    
1.5.1 Violation Behaviour – The Social/Psychological Contributors to Human 
Error 
 Violations are defined as behaviours that involve the deliberate deviation 
from rules that describe the safe or approved method of performing a particular task 
or job (Lawton, 1998; Reason, 1990). Violation behaviour is directly related to how 
people adapt to the situations they find themselves in and belongs to the social 
context in which behaviour is regulated by procedures, codes of practice, and rules 
(Hudson, 2000).  
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The conceptual boundaries between errors and violations are not always clear 
as both involve a deviation of action from some intended or required standard of 
performance (Reason, 1997). Reason has identified violations as a kind of rule-based 
mistake involving the failure to apply a good rule. He argued that rules can be broken 
for a variety of reasons and intentionality can serve to classify and distinguish among 
different types of behaviour (Reason, Manstead, Stradling, Baxter, & Campbell, 
1990). For example, if there was no prior intention to commit a particular violation, 
then this can be classed as an error. However, if the violation was deliberate, and the 
intention was to cause harm to the system, this would be classified as sabotage. 
However, if no harm was intended, a violation has occurred (Reason, 1990).  
Hudson (2000) also sees violations as a kind of mistake. However, he 
suggested that this involves a mistaken belief in one’s own invulnerability, that is, 
the mistaken belief that one is in control of the situation and that nothing will go 
wrong. Hudson argued that violations are more dangerous than errors (slips, lapses, 
and mistakes) because they represent the deliberate intention not to follow safety or 
other procedures. Therefore, Hudson seems to be in agreement with Reason and 
others who believe that the question of intentionality can differentiate errors and 
violations (Reason et al., 1990).  
 In a review of research investigating the impact of personality factors, 
cognitive factors, and social factors on the likelihood of accident involvement, 
Lawton and Parker (1998) suggested that researchers in this area need to take into 
account the two possible routes to accident involvement via errors and/or violations. 
They proposed that, although errors are mainly associated with cognitive factors, 
violations originate in social/psychological factors. For example, Reason et al. (1990) 
found that a clear distinction could be made between errors and violations in a study 
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investigating self-reported driver behaviour. They argued that violations can be 
explained by social and motivational factors, for example, a willingness to bend rules 
to get the job done more efficiently or because everyone else is doing so. In contrast, 
errors involve the information processing characteristics of the individual, that is, 
failures of cognitive competence, for example, the failure to effectively direct 
attention as a result of inadequate training, bad habits, or distractions. They go on to 
explain that, with this difference in psychological origins, the remedial strategies 
required for each would benefit from taking these cognitive/motivational distinctions 
into account. They suggested that while skills training may be able to reduce errors, 
this will not significantly affect violation behaviour. Reducing violations may require 
an investigation of the motivational and attitudinal precursors to accidents.  
 Although violation behaviour is a deliberate deviation from rules, the adverse 
outcome is not intentional (Lawton, 1998). In general, people who violate work rules 
perceive this behaviour as necessary and the result of a well-intentioned desire to get 
the job done (Lawton; Lawton & Parker, 1998). For example, in a study of railway 
workers in the United Kingdom, Lawton found that time pressure, high workload, 
and a more efficient way of working were strongly endorsed reasons for not working 
to the procedures. She argued that the benefits to workers in terms of saved time, 
energy, and effort are common motivational reasons for violating procedures.  
 Simard and Marchand (1997) investigated organisational factors that may 
impact on compliance with safety rules in a number of manufacturing plants in 
Canada. The researchers found that social relationship variables at the shopfloor 
level were the best predictors of compliance behaviour. Van Vuuren (2000) 
examined the cultural influences on incident causation and risk management in the 
Dutch steel industry and medical environment. This research showed that there was a 
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poor attitude towards following safety procedures in both domains. For example, 
risks were taken in the steel industry in order to save time, and the use of personal 
protective equipment was considered inconvenient especially when working 
conditions were hot. These violations of safety procedures were accepted by both 
employees and many team leaders and had become the norm in this group. In a study 
conducted in 13 industrial plants located throughout Europe, the USA, and Canada, 
Rundmo (2000) found that acceptance of rule violations as the norm was the 
strongest predictor of unsafe behaviour. As the above research suggests, social and 
organisational factors can have an impact on violation behaviour and these will be 
discussed in the following section.  
1.5.2 The Social/Organisational Contributors to Human Error    
 Human decisions and actions play a leading role in nearly all accidents 
(Reason, 1997; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001). Reason noted that this was not 
surprising considering the major role that the human factor plays in complex 
industries, that is, people design, build, operate, maintain, manage, and defend these 
industries. However, failures in these industries need to be understood as a complex 
set of interrelated events with the role of cognitive, social, and organisational factors 
taken into account (Sutcliffe & Rugg, 1998). Individual factors such as stress, 
fatigue, and poor motivation often have their origins in the working environment. 
Contributing factors to failures can include attention being distracted, memory being 
overwhelmed by too many facts, or operator stress. Fatigue, stress, and interruptions 
are frequently vital contributing factors to cognitive failures. These can be induced 
by organisational factors such as poor workload planning, resulting in long working 
hours or in excessive workload in peak times, which demands too much 
concentration. Environmental factors such as unusual events, excessive workload, 
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and stressful situations put pressure on people and increase the probability of error. 
Time stress in particular is a powerful cause of mistakes at the rule-based level when 
people have a tendency to use recently memorised or frequently used rules even if 
they are wrong (Reason, 1990). In addition, social and organisational level failures 
can occur when management or the organisation have not created a safety-conscious 
culture (Reason, 1997). For example, normal operational procedures may be well 
designed and documented but never enforced due to cultural deficiencies. Group 
dynamics and the culture of the organisation play a role in determining how 
effectively safety is managed (Neal & Griffin, 2002; Sutcliffe & Rugg).  
 The Quality in Australian Health Care Study identified a number of system 
failures that contribute to adverse events in hospitals in Australia (Wilson et al., 
1999; Wilson et al., 1995). These included weaknesses in the following areas: 
policies and procedures; education and training; access and transfer of information; 
organisational culture; organisational management; personnel, that is, number and 
quality; patients placed or managed in inappropriate facilities; and the availability 
and quality of equipment and other physical resources (ACSQHC, 2001a).  
 Each system possesses elaborate safety defences with accidents normally the 
product of a combination of a number of causal factors (Reason, 1997). Each factor 
is necessary to the adverse outcome, but not usually sufficient by itself to break 
through the safety defences. The people in the workforce are the final defensive filter 
and often inherit organisational defects, for example those created by inadequate 
design, conflicting goals, and poor management decisions (ACSQHC, 2001a).  
In summary, human error has been implicated in a variety of occupational 
accidents (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001). However, identifying human error as the 
ultimate cause of a system failure is of limited use unless the context in which the 
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error occurred is well understood (McCarthy et al., 1997). Error-resistant design has 
been influenced by cognitive models of human error such as Reason’s (1990) and 
Norman’s (1988). Rasmussen (1982) and Reason (1997) have now also included the 
organisational context of error by linking failure in organisational processes to 
individual actions and, ultimately, error. Reason argued that organisational failures 
such as lack of management commitment to safety, unclear safety responsibilities, 
and poor training contribute to accidents by creating the kind of workplace 
conditions (e.g., fatigue, time pressure, low morale) that provoke unsafe behaviour 
by the individual or team, or by creating deficiencies in system defences.  
Reason’s (1990) model of accident causation served as the basis for the 
search into possible organisational factors contributing to unsafe behaviour by nurses 
during medication administration in the current research. This model was not only 
chosen because of its widespread use in other complex industries but also because it 
has now been adopted by health care researchers interested in improving patient 
safety, including the 1Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care 
(ACSQHC, 2001a). Reason’s model of accident causation will be described in the 
following section.   
1.6 Reasons’ Organisational Accident Model 
Although many different accident causation theories exist, the accident 
causation system that has been used the most extensively is that of Reason (1990), 
based on theories by Rasmussen (1982) and Norman (1988). Reason’s model has 
been widely adopted throughout complex industries such as aviation and nuclear 
power as the method of choice to investigate the way in which threats penetrate the 
                                                 
1 The Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care was established in January 2000 by 
Health Ministers to lead national efforts to improve the safety and quality of health care in Australia.  
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extensive defensive barriers protecting such industries and now Reason has applied 
his model to the field of medicine (Reason, 1994, 2000a). He argued that medical 
mishaps share many causal similarities with those experienced in other complex 
systems and, although these organisations seem far removed from the medical 
domain, Reason noted that they share important characteristics with healthcare 
institutions. That is, they are complex, internally dynamic, and interactive, and tasks 
are often performed under considerable time pressure (Reason, 2000a). For example, 
if comparing aviation and medicine, both domains are, for the most part, highly 
reliable. Considering the volume of air traffic and the number of people treated in 
hospitals every day, remarkably few incidents occur (ACSQHC, 2001a). Pilots, 
doctors, and nurses work in similar environments where small highly trained teams 
face dynamic changing demands and daily incongruities between production and 
safety goals. Human issues such as teamwork, communication, leadership, and 
decision making are common to both domains. The professional cultures in aviation 
and medicine share positives such as professionalism and ethics as well as other 
negative and unrealistic attitudes regarding individual performance in times of stress 
or fatigue (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). Aviation and medicine are complex systems 
that require the coordination of a large number of human and technological elements 
(ACSQHC, 2001a).  
Health care researchers are taking advantage of the experience and research 
carried out in the aviation industry (Leape, 1994). Historically, airlines and hospitals 
have attempted to reduce errors and adverse events by focusing on the actions of 
individuals. However, the aviation industry has discovered that system-wide 
strategies and education are required to maximise safety (Helmreich, 2000; 
Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Helmreich et al., 1999). A description of these two 
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approaches, that is, the individual approach and the system approach, will be 
discussed in the following section. 
1.6.1 The Individual Approach vs. the System Approach 
 Reason (2000a) suggested that the human error issue could be viewed in two 
ways: the individual or person approach and the system approach. The individual 
approach focuses on the unsafe behaviour, that is, the error or violation by the 
individual in the workplace. Using this approach there is a tendency to view most 
unsafe behaviour as attributable to forgetfulness, inattention, or incompetence on the 
part of those identified with this behaviour. This individual approach is the dominant 
tradition in medicine (Moray, 1994). The usual approach to reducing the frequency 
of error in medicine has been to find and punish the individual or individuals who 
carried out the unsafe act (Leape, 1994). This approach has proven ineffective since 
errors are inevitable and part of the human condition. Although it is true that some 
unsafe acts in any field are due to negligence, the vast majority are not. Most people 
who make even serious errors are conscientious and dedicated professionals who 
usually do their jobs well (Bates, 1999). The individual approach isolates the person 
and the unsafe behaviour from their system context (Reason, 1997).   
 The system approach looks at unsafe behaviour in a different way (Reason, 
2000a). According to this approach, the most important cause of error within an 
organisation is faulty systems or design rather than the individual. Individuals are 
seen as fallible and errors as expected, even in the best organisations. This approach 
concentrates on the conditions under which individuals work and tries to build 
defences to prevent unsafe behaviour and errors or to diminish their effects. Errors 
are seen as consequences rather than causes, having their origins not so much in the 
fallibility of the individual as in contributing systemic factors. Countermeasures are 
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based on the assumption that though we cannot change the human condition, we can 
change the conditions under which humans work. From this perspective, an adverse 
event is seen to result from faults in system design that allow unsafe behaviour by the 
individual in the workplace that may result in an adverse outcome. The probability 
that unsafe acts will result in an adverse event can be minimised by changing the 
system (Reason, 1990, 1997). Examples of faulty system design in hospitals that 
relate to medication use include interruptions during drug administration, different 
drugs packaged in similar ways, and sound-alike drug names (Bates, 1999).    
Defences, barriers, and safeguards occupy a key position in the system 
approach (Reason, 1997). High technology systems have many defensive layers: 
some are engineered, for example, alarms, physical barriers, and automatic 
shutdowns, others rely on people, and yet others depend on procedures and 
administrative controls. Mostly these defences are effective but there are always 
weaknesses. These weaknesses may arise for two reasons: active failures and latent 
conditions. Active failures are unsafe behaviour by people who are in direct contact 
with the patient or system. They take a variety of forms: action slips or failures, such 
as picking up the wrong syringe; cognitive failures, such as memory lapses; mistakes 
through ignorance or misreading a situation; and violations, that is, deviations from 
safe operating practices, procedures, or standards (Vincent et al., 2000; Vincent et 
al., 1998). Active failures have a direct and usually short-lived impact on the 
integrity of the defences. The individual approach looks no further for the causes of 
an adverse event once the proximal unsafe behaviour has been identified. However, 
virtually all such behaviour has a causal history that extends back in time and up 
through the levels of the system (Reason, 2000a). Blaming the individual for adverse 
events that are not due to negligence or lack of care does not help to improve the 
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health system or ensure that lessons will be learned when things do go wrong (Leape, 
1994). To move beyond blame requires that the underlying contributing factors, that 
is, the latent conditions that provoke unsafe behaviour be identified (ACSQHC, 
2001c).  
Latent conditions/failures stem from fallible decisions, often made by people 
not directly involved in the workplace, such as designers, writers of policies and 
procedures, and senior management (Reason, 1997). Latent failures provide the 
conditions under which unsafe behaviour occurs. Reason referred to these as errors 
“waiting to happen” arising from poorly designed processes and systems (Reason, 
1990; Reinertsen, 2000). They can have two kinds of adverse effects: producing 
error-provoking conditions within the workplace (e.g., time pressure, understaffing, 
inadequate equipment, fatigue, and inexperience), and/or creating long-lasting holes 
or weaknesses in the defences (e.g., unworkable procedures and design deficiencies). 
Latent conditions may lie dormant within the system for many years before they 
combine with active failures and local triggers to create an accident opportunity. 
Unlike active failures, whose specific forms are often difficult to anticipate, latent 
conditions can be identified and remedied before an adverse event occurs (Reason, 
2000a). 
Whereas organisations that follow the individual approach direct most of 
their management resources at trying to make individuals less fallible, advocates of 
the system approach strive for a more holistic management program aimed at several 
different areas, that is, the individual, the team, the task, the workplace, and the 
institution as a whole (Reason, 2000a). Leape et al. (1995) argued that the concept of 
system failures as underlying causes of unsafe behaviour and errors has not been 
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widely accepted in medicine, although accident causation is more likely to be 
prevented by changing the system rather than the individual. 
In summary, analyses of incidents in medicine and elsewhere have led to a 
much broader understanding of accident causation, and a greater appreciation of the 
complexity of the chain of events that may lead to an adverse event (R. I. Cook & 
Woods, 1994). Reason (1997) argued that many errors result from interacting causes 
involving physical, cognitive, social, and organisational factors. This system 
approach focuses on the human component within complex systems with less 
emphasis on the individual and more on pre-existing organisational factors that 
provide the conditions in which unsafe behaviour occurs (Reason, 1990). The 
contributing factors may lie in several interrelated factors, such as communication 
and supervision problems, excessive workload, and training deficiencies (Vincent, 
1997).  
1.7 Operationalising Reason’s Model 
There is now a substantial body of empirical support from the general safety 
and nursing literature demonstrating the impact of individual and organisational 
factors on safety outcomes as proposed by Reason. For example, associations have 
been found between accidents and organisational factors such as work pressure and 
communication problems (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996), and individual factors such as 
motivation (Lawton & Parker, 1998) and unsafe behaviour (Lawton, 1998; Mearns, 
Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 2001; Oliver, Cheyne, Tomas, & Cox, 2002). Mearns et al. 
(2003) found that less favourable scores on safety dimensions such as perceived 
management commitment to safety, willingness to report incidents, and work 
pressure were associated with higher self-reported accident involvement in the 
offshore oil industry.  
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Hemingway and Smith (1999) explored the relationships among 
organisational climate variables, occupational stress, and stress-related outcomes, 
including injuries, in a sample of nurses in four hospitals in Canada. Injuries in this 
study were injuries to nurses rather than patients. They included near misses and 
reported and unreported injuries which consisted of contusions, scratches, 
sprains/strains, and cuts/punctures. The results suggested that different injury 
categories were predicted by different occupational stressors. For example, increased 
stress owing to the death and dying of patients resulted in more near-miss and 
unreported injuries, while nurses experiencing role ambiguity were more likely to 
experience a reportable injury at work.  
Oliver, Cheyne, Tomas, and Cox (2002) used a modelling technique to 
investigate the impact of work environment, social, organisational, and individual 
variables on occupational accidents in workers from the industrial sector in Spain. 
The results (see Figure 1.1) indicated that work environment variables impacted on 
occupational accidents, both directly and when mediated by individual factors. That 
is, workers perceived that occupational accidents were decreased when individuals 
demonstrated safe behaviours and were in good general health. In addition, accidents 
were lower when the organisation was more involved in safety management, and 
when the physical work environment was less hazardous. 
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Figure 1.1 Oliver, Cheyne, Tomas, and Cox (2002) Model 
 
In addition to investigating the associations between organisational and 
individual variables and accident liability, researchers are also looking at the 
precursors to accidents, for example, errors and violations and the safety climate of 
the organisation. Lawton and Parker (1998) and others (e.g., Shappell & Wiegmann, 
2001) argued that it is more beneficial to focus on these precursors because of the 
low frequency of accidents and, therefore, the unreliability of accidents as an 
outcome measure. They suggested that these precursors are a more sensitive and less 
ambiguous measure of safety performance and can be investigated using self-report 
measures. Coyle, Sleeman, and Adams (1995) believe that measuring the precursors 
of accidents, as identified in an analysis of the safety climate of an organisation, 
provides a powerful proactive management tool.  
Fogarty and colleagues (Fogarty, 2004; Fogarty, Saunders, & Collyer, 1999, 
2001) developed a conceptual model to predict aircraft maintenance performance and 
to investigate the role of individual and organisational factors in aviation 
maintenance (see Figure 1.2). Their model was based on Reason’s theory in that it 
highlighted background variables that induce unsafe behaviour. To provide an 
empirical test of Reason’s theory, they developed a model linking organisational and 
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individual variables to outcomes including job satisfaction, turnover intentions, and 
tendency to make errors in aircraft maintenance. They found support for a structural 
model that showed organisational variables predicting personal health variables, 
which in turn predicted self-reported maintenance errors.  
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Figure 1.2 Fogarty (2004) Model 
 
Prussia, Brown, and Willis (2003) also used modelling to predict safe work 
behaviours in a steel plant in the US to determine the extent to which managers and 
employees agreed on safety issues (see Figure 1.3). Their model included the 
organisational variables: safety hazards, management’s influence on workplace 
safety, and pressure for expediency over safety. Results suggested that managers and 
employees agreed that these system-level factors influenced individual-level factors 
(cavalier attitude towards safety behaviour and safety efficacy, that is, belief in one’s 
ability to work safely), which in turn impacted on safe workplace behaviour.  
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Figure 1.3 Prussia, Brown, and Willis (2003) Model 
 
In a study of employees from a number of different work groups in the 
hospital system in Australia, Neal et al. (2000) tested a model examining the effects 
of general organisational climate on safety climate and safety performance (see 
Figure 1.4). Organisational climate measured aspects of the work environment such 
as leadership, professional interaction, decision making processes, and role clarity. 
These factors were found to have a significant impact on safety climate, that is, 
perceptions of safety within the hospital environment such as management values, 
communication, training, and safety systems. Safety climate, in turn, was related to 
self-reports of compliance with safety regulations and procedures as well as 
participation in safety-related activities. 
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Figure 1.4 Neal et al. (2000) Model 
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 The above research provides support for the influence of individual and 
organisational factors on safety outcomes as proposed by Reason. These studies were 
conducted in a variety of countries (i.e., Canada, Spain, Australia, and the US) and 
industries (e.g., health, chemical, steel, and aviation) and included outcome variables 
such as injuries, accidents, errors, and safety compliance.  
 Health care researchers are now taking advantage of the experience and 
research conducted in other complex industries (ACSQHC, 2001a). Despite some 
cultural and contextual differences, the medical domain and these other industries 
have economic efficiency and safety as common goals. However, as Leape (2001) 
explained, while many of these industries are associated with substantial hazards, the 
health care setting is the only one in which adverse events result from the actions of 
individuals whose sole aim is to relieve the pain and suffering of the victim and, in 
particular, to “do no harm”. The following section will detail research investigating 
the impact of individual and organisational factors on unsafe behaviour and adverse 
events in the hospital system.      
1.7.1 Investigating Errors and Adverse Events in the Hospital System 
A study into the factors underlying the occurrence and reporting of 
medication errors by nurses was conducted by Gladstone (1995) in a district general 
hospital in the United Kingdom (UK). Data were collected from a variety of sources, 
that is, medication error reports, questionnaires, and interviews with nurses who had 
been involved in medication errors. The questionnaire results indicated that nurses 
and nurse managers both considered distractions, doctors’ writing, and failure to 
follow procedures, that is, checking patient’s name band, as reasons why medication 
errors occur. Additional information obtained from interviews with nurses who had 
made medication errors suggested that these nurses perceived that factors such as 
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workload, poor skill mix, interruptions, and loss of concentration had contributed to 
their error.    
Edmondson (1996) explored the impact of group and organisational factors 
on preventable drug administration errors in eight units in two urban hospitals in the 
US. Surveys were distributed to nurses, physicians, and pharmacists with potentially 
harmful drug-related errors being identified by a combination of patient chart 
reviews and voluntary reporting. The analyses of the relationships between unit 
characteristics and error rates yielded unexpected results. That is, higher error rates 
were strongly associated with higher scores on perceived unit performance, quality 
of unit relationships, and nurse manager leadership behaviours. Edmondson 
suggested that this result may have been due in part to respondents’ perceptions of 
how safe it was to discuss errors in their unit and this interpretation was supported by 
additional quantitative and qualitative results. For example, the qualitative data 
analysis identified several variables that distinguished among units, such as unit 
climate (blame oriented vs. learning oriented), openness, nurses’ trust in nurse 
manager, and perceived supportiveness. It was discovered that shared perceptions 
about the consequences of making errors influenced the climate and reporting 
behaviours within each team. For example, authoritarian leadership within a unit 
generated a climate of fear which tended to suppress reporting or discussion of 
errors.   
In order to examine the causes and consequences of errors as well as the 
potential for errors to initiate changes in practice, Meurier et al. (1997) surveyed 
nurses in a district general hospital in the UK. A nursing error was defined in this 
study as any wrongful decision, omission, or action that had adverse or potentially 
adverse consequences for the patient, and that would have been judged as wrong by 
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knowledgeable peers. Medication errors were not included in this study. Nurses 
reported that the most common contributing factors were lack of knowledge or 
information, work overload, stressful atmosphere, and lack of support from senior 
staff. Accepting responsibility for an error tended to lead to positive changes in 
practice, while negative coping strategies such as distancing were associated with 
defensive changes, in particular the tendency not to report errors.   
Wakefield et al. (1998) surveyed nurses in 24 acute care hospitals in the US 
to ascertain their perceptions of why medication administration errors occur. Five 
categories of reasons were identified. These were, in order of frequency of response, 
physician, systems, pharmacy, individual, and knowledge reasons. Descriptive 
statistics revealed that the contributing factors most endorsed on the questionnaire 
were to do with interruptions during administration and illegibility of doctors’ orders. 
Further analysis suggested that nurse managers were more likely to perceive 
individual factors as reasons for adverse events, while staff nurses were more likely 
to view physicians, pharmacists, and system issues as contributing factors.  
Meurier (2000) used Reason’s Organisational Accident Model to analyse 
critical incident reports of errors by nurses which had resulted in an adverse or 
potentially adverse event in the UK. Respondents were invited to produce a critical 
incident report of an error they had made in their professional practice and this was 
followed by an in-depth interview to explore further issues relating to the incidents. 
A detailed analysis of one of the incidents was reported in the article with results 
suggesting that a number of pre-existing organisational conditions may have 
contributed to the adverse event. These included staffing levels on the ward, lack of 
management support, inadequacy of protocol/policies, inadequacy of 
communication, and insufficient experience and training.  
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Headford, McGowan, and Clifford (2001) described a project by nursing staff 
and pharmacists in a hospital in Australia who reviewed medication incident data, 
and revised and established a new system of reporting. The researchers found that the 
most common type of incident in this study was the omission of a dose of a 
medication. This incident accounted for half of the 475 medication incidents reported 
in the year of the study. To establish factors that contributed to each incident, a 
pharmacist and nurse manager reviewed and discussed medication incident forms, 
medication charts, and other relevant documentation. Misreading the medication 
chart was considered to be a contributing factor for 25% of all reported incidents, 
with the next most commonly cited factor being a deviation from nursing policy. 
Other factors cited were medical orders that were unclear or written incorrectly, 
pharmacy dispensing error, and lack of staff education.    
A recent study in the US examined the link between the nurse-to-patient ratio 
and patient mortality among surgical patients, and factors related to nurse retention 
including the relationship between staffing levels and job dissatisfaction and burnout 
(Aiken, Clarke, Sloane, Sochalski, & Silber, 2002). The study used cross-sectional 
analyses of linked data from 10,184 nurses, over 200,000 surgery patients, and 
administrative data from 168 hospitals. The results indicated that nurse staffing 
levels had a significant effect on patient well-being, for example, for each additional 
patient over four in a nurse’s workload, the risk of death increased by 7%. In this 
study, patients in hospitals with the highest patient-to-nurse ratio, that is, eight 
patients per nurse, had a 31% greater risk of dying than those in hospitals with four 
patients per nurse. In addition to the above, it was found that patient load had a direct 
impact on nurse retention rates. That is, higher patient-to-nurse ratios were strongly 
associated with increased job-related burnout and greater job dissatisfaction.   
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A descriptive correlational design was used by McGillis Hall, Doran, and 
Pink (2004) to determine the association between nursing staff skill mix, costs, and 
patient safety outcomes in urban teaching hospitals in Canada. Nurse staffing 
variables were measured by questionnaires to unit managers, and outcome data, that 
is, costs and patient safety outcomes, were obtained through administrative records. 
Data collected on patient safety outcomes included patient falls, medication errors, 
wound infections, and urinary tract infections. The results suggested that nurse 
staffing was related to patient safety outcomes, that is, units that employed a lower 
proportion of professional nursing staff had a higher number of medication errors 
and wound infections. In addition, the less experienced the nurse, the higher the 
number of wound infections.  
 Recent research in rural hospitals in the US used a multimethod approach, 
that is, questionnaires, interviews, and textual analysis of responses to case studies to 
examine the different processes and systems within the hospitals that impacted on 
patient safety (A. F. Cook, Hoas, Guttmannova, & Joyner, 2004). Participants 
included nurses, doctors, pharmacists, and administrators from 29 rural hospitals in 
nine US states. The results suggested that there was a lack of agreement among 
professions as to what constitutes health care error, with this being viewed as more 
often involving nursing practice than medical practice. For example, both doctors 
and nurses were hesitant to categorise treatment and diagnostic problems as errors 
but rather doctors referred to them as “practice variances”, “suboptimal outcomes”, 
or examples of “differences in clinical judgment”. It was suggested by some 
respondents that this lack of agreement influenced health care workers’ willingness 
to report and chart errors and develop strategies that might mitigate risk. In addition, 
many nurse participants reported that they were reluctant to challenge doctors’ 
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clinical decisions and definitions of error, noting that this was considered detrimental 
to collegiality and beyond their authority. Those nurses who had questioned orders or 
clinical decisions reported that they had often been reprimanded by doctors for doing 
so. As a result of the perception that most errors fall within the realms of nursing 
practice, doctors and administrators, as well as nurses tended to believe that patient 
safety was predominantly a nursing responsibility. In addition, only 22% of 
respondents believed that doctors, nurses, pharmacists, and administrators should 
share responsibility for patient safety equally. Notwithstanding this allocation of 
responsibility, the participation of nurses in various patient-safety and error-reporting 
processes was limited among respondents. The researchers argued that a systems 
approach to patient safety was required in which responsibility for safety was shared 
by all members of the team rather than being assigned to the nursing profession. This 
is a sentiment echoed by Ballard (2003) who suggested that a variety of stakeholders 
(i.e., patients, nurses, nursing educators, administrators, and researchers, doctors, 
governments and legislative bodies, professional associations, and accrediting 
agencies) are all responsible for ensuring that patient care is safely delivered. 
1.8 The Current Research Project 
 The above research provides support, in the hospital system, for the influence 
of individual and organisational factors on safety outcomes as proposed by Reason’s 
Organisational Accident Model. This research suggests that, although human 
decisions and actions play a leading role in nearly all accidents, identifying human 
error as the ultimate cause of a system failure is of limited use unless the context in 
which the unsafe behaviour occurred is well understood (McCarthy et al., 1997). 
Reason’s model includes the organisational context by linking failure in 
organisational processes to individual actions and, ultimately, accidents. Although 
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errors are failures in cognitive competence and violations involve motivational 
factors, Reason (1997) argued that organisational failures contribute to accidents by 
creating the kind of workplace conditions that provoke unsafe behaviour by the 
individual or team, or by creating deficiencies in system defences.  
 Historically, hospitals have attempted to reduce errors and adverse events by 
focusing on the actions of individuals (Leape, 1994). However, the health care 
industry is now taking advantage of research carried out in other complex industries 
which indicates that system-wide strategies and education are required to maximise 
safety. The ACSQHC (2001a) suggested that health care will show evidence of a 
culture of safety when it accepts the inevitability of error and system failures and 
actively works to minimise the impact and prevention of error by understanding the 
causes of adverse events.  
Reason’s model of accident causation has been widely adopted throughout 
complex industries and has revolutionised modern understanding of accident 
causation (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001). However, this model is mainly descriptive 
and linear, appropriate for accident investigation but not well-suited to predicting 
accidents. To understand the various interactions requires a relational modelling 
technique that is able to illustrate how the various parts of the system link together to 
influence outcomes. Such a model is able to indicate the strength of the relationships 
among the various elements whilst taking into account the influence of all other 
variables. Examples of how researchers in the safety field are using this technique 
were demonstrated in the previous section (i.e., Fogarty, 2004; Fogarty et al., 1999, 
2001; Neal et al., 2000; Oliver et al., 2002; Prussia et al., 2003). Fogarty suggested 
that models such as these provide the basis for predicting unsafe organisational 
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conditions, which in turn will lead to the design of suitable intervention programs to 
reduce unsafe behaviour and adverse incidents.   
The current research used the technique, structural equation modelling, to 
operationalise Reason’s theory by developing a model linking organisational factors 
to unsafe behaviour in the hospital system. Specifically, the first study investigated 
the impact of organisational issues on procedural violations by nurses during 
medication administration. Violations are defined as behaviours that involve the 
deliberate deviation from rules that describe the safe or approved method of 
performing a particular task or job (Lawton, 1998; Reason, 1990). Strong claims 
have been made in the safety literature about the connection between violations and 
errors (Reason, 1990) and violations and adverse occurrences (e.g., Lawton, Parker, 
Stradling, & Manstead, 1997; Mearns, Flin et al., 2001). However, in the medical 
field in particular, there is limited empirical evidence that can serve as a basis for 
understanding why workers deviate from established procedures. The aim of Study 1 
was to identify organisational factors that create conditions wherein violation 
behaviour is more likely to occur.  
Study 1 explored the role of organisational factors in medication 
administration by nurses in rural and remote areas in Queensland, Australia. The 
above issues are particularly relevant to rural and remote area nurses. The facilities 
where these nurses work range in size from base or provincial hospitals where 
medical and allied health professionals are on site, to health facilities staffed by one 
nurse who relies on communication with the Royal Flying Doctor Service or other 
off-site medical support. The literature suggests that the nature of the rural and 
remote environment determines the scope of nursing practice in these areas (Hegney, 
1996). The professional isolation, which most of the remote area nurses experience, 
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can result in them taking on an expanded or advanced practice role in order to fill the 
gaps caused by the lack of medical and allied health professionals (Hegney, Pearson, 
& McCarthy, 1997).  
The second study expanded on this research by including individual factors 
and more organisational factors, that is, a measure of organisational climate. In 
addition to the outcome variable, violation behaviour, a measurement of error was 
included in this study. The third study in the series again investigated the impact of 
organisational and individual factors on unsafe behaviour. However, in this study, a 
specific type of organisational climate was examined, that is, safety climate. In 
addition, the violation behaviour and error instruments were expanded and improved. 
Details of Study 1 are reported in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 2 – Study 1  
The Influence of Organisational Factors on Violations during 
Medication Administration 
2.1 Introduction 
This section introduces Study 1. This study investigated the impact of 
organisational issues in the rural and remote environment on nurses’ ability to follow 
procedures that describe the safe or approved method of performing medication 
administration. The objectives of the study were to examine organisational factors 
considered likely to impact on medication administration performance; explore the 
relations among these variables; and develop a model for predicting the work 
outcome variable, self-reported violation behaviour. The following section will 
introduce the variables used in this study.   
2.2 Developing a model to explain violations by nurses  
 The variables measured in the current study were Level of Knowledge, 
Reference Material, Workload, Expectation by Doctor, and Violation Behaviour. 
These variables were chosen with reference to nursing and safety literature, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, and from the expertise of the members of a team of 
subject matter experts who have years of experience in rural and remote area nursing. 
The rationale for the inclusion of each variable follows. 
2.2.1 Level of Knowledge 
Nurses are expected to have up-to-date knowledge of the actions, side-effects, 
and dosage of any medication they administer (Delaune & Ladner, 1998). The 
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responsibility to update this knowledge intensifies as increasing numbers of new 
medications become available (Lilley & Guanci, 1995; Westien, 1994).  
In the aviation industry, low level of knowledge due to inadequate training 
was found to be a contributing factor to safety incidents (Hobbs & Williamson, 
2002). In another study in the same industry, training was found to impact on errors 
through the mediating effects of individual health (Fogarty, 2004). In the medical 
environment, lack of knowledge or education is a commonly cited contributor to 
unsafe behaviour in nursing practice (e.g., Headford et al., 2001; Meurier, 2000; 
Meurier et al., 1997; Wakefield et al., 1998). In particular, a lack of medication 
knowledge has been identified as one of the most common system failures 
contributing to medication errors (Leape et al., 1995; O'Shea, 1999).  
In this study, the scale used to measure this variable referred to nurses’ 
perceptions of the adequacy of their level of knowledge of medications and how 
these medications work. Nurses were also asked to rate their ability to explain this 
information to patients.   
2.2.2 Reference Material  
 Although nurses are required to have up-to-date knowledge of medications, it 
is unrealistic to expect them to remember all information about all medications at all 
times. Therefore, nurses who are unsure about the actions, dosage, or side effects of 
any medications they administer are required to have reasonable access to and 
familiarity with relevant and appropriate reference materials (Australian Nursing 
Council [ANC], 2000; Delaune & Ladner, 1998; The Joanna Briggs Institute for 
Evidence Based Nursing and Midwifery, 2000). Reference materials accessed by 
nurses in Queensland include the MIMS Manual and recently published 
pharmacology textbooks. The MIMS Manual contains comprehensive product 
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information on medications and is available in print, online, via CD ROM, and, in 
some hospitals, on palm pilot.  
Nurses are also required to know the rules and regulations governing their 
practice (ANC, 2000; Delaune & Ladner, 1998; The Joanna Briggs Institute for 
Evidence Based Nursing and Midwifery, 2000). The Health (Drugs and Poisons) 
Regulation 1996 (Qld) (Queensland Government, 2003), hereinafter called the 
Regulation, outlines the legal responsibilities and practice requirements of registered 
and enrolled nurses in Queensland with regard to medication practice. That is, it sets 
out the requirements for the administration, management, and supply of controlled 
and restricted drugs and poisons2 in the practice of nursing. Nurses are expected to 
have a good working knowledge of this legislation and work within its guidelines.   
Difficulties arise, however, when reference materials or the Regulation are 
not readily accessible, up-to-date, and adequate, as this may impact on the nurse’s 
ability to follow the rules and guidelines for safe practice (Reason, 1997). In this 
study, the scale used to measure this variable covered the ease of access of up-to-date 
reference materials such as MIMS and the adequacy of these materials. In addition, 
respondents were asked if they had easy access to the Regulation.  
2.2.3 Workload 
Susceptibility to unsafe acts is strongly affected by adverse conditions of 
work such as excessive workload (Leape, 1994; Vincent et al., 1998). Flin et al. 
(2000) argued that work pressure influences safety and performance in the workplace 
because of such issues as inadequate resources and time restrictions. In the offshore 
                                                 
2 Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 medications (referred to as poisons in the Regulation) (e.g., paracetamol) 
are used for minor ailments and are substantially safe substances for therapeutic use. Schedule 4 or 
restricted drugs (e.g., amoxicillin) are only available on prescription and require professional 
management and monitoring. Schedule 8 or controlled drugs (e.g., morphine) are prescription only 
medications which are mainly used for strong pain relief. Their supply and use is controlled because 
of their dependence-forming nature and potential for abuse. 
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oil industry, work pressure was found to influence safety behaviour, with these 
workers attributing their unsafe behaviour to pressure from management to put 
production before safety (Mearns, Flin et al., 2001). Oliver, Cheyne, Tomas, and Cox 
(2002) found workload to be one of the aspects of the work environment that 
affected the individual health of Spanish production workers, which in turn led to 
accidents among these workers.  
In the medical environment, researchers have found that workload factors 
impact on the rate of unsafe acts by nurses during medication administration (Leape 
et al., 1995; O'Shea, 1999). Under heavy workloads workers tend to ignore safety 
rules and procedures in order to complete tasks on time (Zeitlin, 1994). With nurses 
under increasing time pressure (Hegney, Plank, & Parker, 2003; McVicar, 2003), this 
may lead to a greater likelihood that safety will be compromised through shortcuts 
and errors. In support of this, research analysing incident reports submitted to the 
Australian Incident Monitoring Study indicated that incidents due to nursing staff 
shortages were associated with negative patient outcomes such as major 
physiological change, patient/relative dissatisfaction, and physical injury (Beckmann, 
Baldwin, Durie, Morrison, & Shaw, 1998). Issues such as work overload, poor skill 
mix, and inadequate staffing levels have been found to impact on both nurse and 
patient well-being (Aiken et al., 2002; McGillis Hall et al., 2004; Meurier, 2000; 
Meurier et al., 1997).   
This scale measured respondents’ perceptions about the impact of workload 
issues on their ability to comply with the Regulation. Issues covered included 
workload factors, and the adequacy of staffing levels and skill mix. 
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2.2.4 Expectation by Doctor  
The Regulation states that medication practice is a multidisciplinary 
responsibility. Therefore, the behaviour of other health professionals, particularly 
doctors, has a direct impact on a nurse’s ability to work within the rules (Queensland 
Government, 2003). In the safety literature, the attitude of significant others (i.e., 
management and supervisors) is considered one of the most common factors 
influencing workers’ attitudes to following procedures for safe practice (Flin, 
Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Reason, 1997).  
In the current study, this variable was adapted to the medical domain by 
measuring nurses’ perceptions of the extent to which doctors expected them to work 
outside the Regulation. In rural and remote areas, nurses are often expected to work 
outside their scope of practice (Hegney, 1996; Hegney et al., 1997). In a study 
investigating professional relationships between nurses and doctors in rural 
Australia, Blue and Fitzgerald (2002) found that nurses in rural areas accept more 
responsibility and risk for a variety of reasons. For example, protective practices by 
nurses towards doctors were common, that is, initiating actions that minimised the 
attendance of a doctor when he/she was busy or after hours. Because of the shortage 
of doctors in these areas, this practice was not only to protect the overworked doctor 
but also to decrease the risk of losing the doctor from the district. Doctors reported in 
this study that they knew and trusted the nurses’ capabilities and what they could or 
could not do in the way of managing patients. They also noted, however, that they 
resented being contacted repeatedly for minor issues and expected nurses to deal 
with these. Role blurring was also seen as an issue in a study in Wales (Snelgrove & 
Hughes, 2000). Nurses working on night shift in this study often reported moving 
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across usual boundaries to ease pressure on over-burdened doctors or to compensate 
for the unavailability of day-time services.     
2.2.5 Violation Behaviour  
 Violations are defined as behaviours that involve the deliberate deviation 
from rules that describe the safe or approved method of performing a particular task 
or job (Lawton, 1998; Reason, 1990). As noted earlier, strong claims have been made 
in the literature about the connection between violations and errors (Reason) and 
violations and adverse occurrences (e.g., Lawton et al., 1997; Mearns, Flin et al., 
2001). For example, in a study examining the occurrence and reporting of medication 
errors by nurses in the UK, Gladstone (1995) reported that both nurses and nurse 
managers considered failure to follow procedures as a reason why medication errors 
occurred. See Section 1.5.1 for a detailed discussion of violation behaviour.   
 The scale used to measure this variable included a number of statements 
covering legal and best practice issues with regard to medication administration. 
Strengths and weaknesses in current practice in rural and remote areas were 
identified during a chart audit, in a sample of facilities, conducted by a team from the 
Centre for Rural and Remote Area Health (CRRAH) prior to this study (Hegney, 
McKeon, Plank, Raith, & Watson, 2003). Current practice was compared with the 
Regulation (Queensland Government, 2003) and best practice in medication 
administration as identified by the Joanna Briggs Institute for Evidence Based 
Nursing and Midwifery (2000).   
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2.3 The Conceptual Model 
Figure 2.1 presents a conceptual model illustrating graphically the 
relationships to be evaluated in Study 1 using the statistical technique, structural 
equation modelling. The relationships in this model are based on research and 
consultations with a team of subject matter experts. The proposed model presents the 
direct and indirect effects of level of workload, availability and accessibility of 
reference material, level of knowledge of medications, and expectation by doctor on 
violation behaviour.  
This conceptual model is proposed and tested based on the following 
hypotheses: 
1. Level of workload will have a positive impact on violation behaviour, that 
is, higher workload will produce more violation behaviour (Leape et al., 
1995; O'Shea, 1999; Snelgrove & Hughes, 2000). 
2. Availability and accessibility of reference materials will have a negative 
impact on violation behaviour, that is, higher availability and accessibility 
will produce less violation behaviour (Reason, 1997). 
3. Level of knowledge will have a negative impact on violation behaviour, 
that is, higher levels of knowledge will produce less violation behaviour 
(Headford et al., 2001; Meurier, 2000; Meurier et al., 1997). 
4. Expectation by doctor will have a positive impact on violation behaviour, 
that is, higher perceived expectation by doctor will produce higher levels 
of violation behaviour (Blue & Fitzgerald, 2002; Hegney et al., 1997). 
5. Expectation by doctor will mediate the relationship between workload 
and violation behaviour (Flin et al., 2000; Hegney et al., 1997; Reason, 
1997). In a study of interprofessional relationships between doctors and 
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nurses in Wales, Snelgrove and Hughes (2000) found that work pressures 
often led to informal crossing of boundaries, that is, nurses making 
decisions about treatment without consulting a doctor.  
6. Expectation by doctor will mediate the relationship between reference 
material and violation behaviour. Although this indirect link is not 
specifically covered in the literature, it was included after consultation 
with a team of subject matter experts. These experts were registered 
nurses with extensive experience in rural and remote nursing.     
Expectation
by Doctor
Violation
Behaviour
Workload
Reference
Material
Level of
Knowledge
 
Figure 2.1 Conceptual Model of Relationships among Organisational Factors and 
Violation Behaviour 
 
 Although it is acknowledged that the sample data in this study are 
correlational, causality is postulated in the model and is represented by unidirectional 
arrows. Structural equation modelling is a popular statistical tool primarily because 
correlational data can be used to test causal relationships (MacCallum, Wegener, 
Uchino, & Fabrigar, 1993). However, this has initiated strong debate as to whether 
relationships in structural models can be interpreted as causal, with suggestions of 
alternative terms such as “influence” being substituted (Mueller, 1996).  
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 Loehlin (1998) argued that a strict or narrow definition of cause is not 
necessary in path models. He believes the “essential feature for the use of a causal 
arrow in a path diagram is the assumption that a change in the variable at the tail of 
the arrow will result in a change in the variable at the head of the arrow, all else 
being equal, that is, with all other variables in the diagram held constant” (p. 4). The 
use of unidirectional arrows in the hypothesised model in the current study is 
supported by theoretical arguments suggesting temporal ordering of the variables.    
2.4 Method 
2.4.1 Participants   
 The target population for this study included all registered and enrolled 
nurses currently registered with the Queensland Nursing Council and working in 
rural and remote area facilities in Queensland. The inclusion criteria were nurses: 
(a) working in government and non-government facilities with fewer than 50 
acute beds, including community health facilities; and 
(b) with an address in the postcode areas designated by the five Rural, Remote, 
and Metropolitan Areas (RRMA) classification. Categories used included 
small rural centres with population 10,000 – 24,999, other rural areas with 
population < 10,000, remote centres with population > 5,000, and other 
remote areas with population < 5,000.  
 Participants included 652 nurses working in either rural (n = 311, 47.7%) or 
remote areas (n = 340, 52.1%) (1 unidentified) in the state of Queensland, Australia. 
Most respondents were registered nurses (n = 497; 76.2%), with 148 (22.7%) being 
enrolled nurses, and 7 participants not indicating their registration category. The 
majority of the participants worked in acute hospitals (n = 396; 60.7%). Other health 
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services included Community Health (n = 46; 7.1%), multi-purpose health services 
(n = 71; 10.9%), and residential care facilities (n = 54; 8.3%). Nineteen (2.9%) 
participants did not indicate their location. Most were employed on a permanent full-
time (n = 299, 45.9%) or permanent part-time basis (n = 248, 38.0%). The majority 
of participants were aged 40 years and over (n = 440; 67.5%) with the largest group 
being between 40 and 49 years (n = 235; 36.0%). Most participants had more than 10 
years experience as a nurse (n = 548; 84.0%), with 365 (56.0%) having worked as a 
nurse for more than 20 years. There were 618 (94.8%) females and 27 (4.1%) males, 
with 7 not identifying their gender. 
2.4.2 Materials 
 Scales needed to obtain measures on relevant variables were embedded 
within a larger instrument constructed by the author and a team from the Centre for 
Rural and Remote Area Health (CRRAH). The questionnaire measured a number of 
variables of specific interest to CRRAH and the Queensland Nursing Council that 
were not included in this study. This larger instrument was used to measure current 
practice regarding medication administration in rural and remote areas; to identify 
whether this practice complied with current legislation, patient management 
protocols, health policy, nursing standards, and best practice guidelines; and to 
identify if patient safety was being compromised.  
 A preliminary questionnaire was assembled and reviewed several times by 
the team at CRRAH. After the questionnaire was pilot tested on a random sample of 
rural and remote nurses (n = 44), it was modified and then peer reviewed by the 
Queensland Nursing Council and rural nurses in the Toowoomba Health Service 
District.  
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 A description of each scale used in this study is listed below. Scales were 
formed on the basis of factor analysis. The mean response was used as the measure 
for each construct and was computed by dividing the total score for the scale by the 
number of items in the scale.  
 Level of Knowledge: This scale included three items asking respondents 
about the adequacy of their level of knowledge of medications and their ability to 
explain this information to patients. The items can be found in Section 2 (page 4) of 
the questionnaire in Appendix A, items 2.5(a), 2.5(b), and 2.5(c). The scale was rated 
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The scale 
was reverse-scored so that higher scores indicated a higher level of knowledge. 
Example: I am able to explain to my patients, in terms they can understand, how the 
medications they receive work.  
 Reference Material: Three items were used to ascertain respondents’ 
perceptions about the accessibility and adequacy of up-to-date reference material, 
and the accessibility of the Regulation. These items can be found in Section 2 (page 
4) of the questionnaire in Appendix A, items 2.5(d), 2.5(e), and 2.5(f). A 5-point 
scale was used with ratings ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The 
scale was reverse-scored so that higher scores represented a higher level of 
accessibility and adequacy. Example: I have easy access to up-to-date reference 
material with regard to the administration and supply of medications.  
 Workload: There were three questions in this scale asking respondents if 
their ability to comply with the Regulation was adversely affected by excessive 
workload, or inadequacy of staffing levels or skill mix. These items can be found in 
Section 3 (page 8) of the questionnaire in Appendix A, items 3.4(c), 3.4(d), and 
3.4(g). The scale was rated using a 5-point scale ranging from strongly agree to 
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strongly disagree. Scores were reversed so that higher scores indicated higher 
workload, lower staffing levels, and lower skill mix. Example: The workload in my 
facility is excessive. 
 Expectation by Doctor: This single-item measure asked respondents if their 
ability to comply with the Regulation was adversely affected by the expectation of 
the medical practitioners in their facility/town. This item can be found in Section 3 
(page 8) of the questionnaire in Appendix A, item 3.4(b). The item was rated using a 
5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Scores were reversed so that 
higher scores represented perceptions of higher expectation by the doctor. Item: The 
medical practitioners in my health facility/town expect me to work outside the 
Regulation. 
 Violation Behaviour: This scale covered legal and best practice issues with 
regard to medication administration. The scale originally included thirteen items and 
these items can be found in Section 3 (page 6) of the questionnaire in Appendix A, 
that is, all items in section 3.1 except 3.1(a). The scale was reduced to seven items 
after factor analysis was conducted (see Section 2.5.3 for the rationale for deletion of 
items). This scale was rated on a 4-point scale ranging from always to never with 
each statement indicating the legal or best practice requirement when administering 
medications, that is, safety behaviour. Therefore, higher scores represented higher 
numbers of violations in this scale. Example: When available, I provide Consumer 
Product Information to patients regarding the medications I administer/supply to 
them.  
2.4.3 Procedure 
 The Queensland Nursing Council supplied the research team at the Centre for 
Rural and Remote Area Health (CRRAH) with a list of codes from its database 
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representing all registered and enrolled nurses working in eligible health facilities in 
rural and remote areas in Queensland. From these codes, a list of random numbers 
was computer-generated by the research team. Coded questionnaires were forwarded 
to the Queensland Nursing Council who then affixed an address label to correspond 
with the code number, and posted packages to respondents. The package included a 
reply-paid envelope so respondents were able to post completed questionnaires 
directly to the researchers at CRRAH. Reminder packages were posted to non-
respondents three weeks after the initial mail-out. As with the initial mail-out, these 
packages were sent to the Queensland Nursing Council.      
Of the 1999 questionnaires distributed, 756 were returned after reminder 
packages, representing a response rate of 38%. This number included questionnaires 
that were unusable due to incompleteness. The final number available for analyses 
was 652.  
It is noted that 88 respondents returned blank questionnaires or declined to 
participate. Most of those who declined were still registered as nurses but were not in 
a clinical position, not working as a nurse, or not employed. Therefore, the above 
response rate may be deflated as it is unclear how many of the 1999 questionnaires 
were sent to nurses who were still on the register but not eligible to participate.   
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Statistical Analyses 
Data were screened using the complete sample (N = 652) prior to the main 
analyses to examine for accuracy of data entry, missing values, and fit between 
distributions and the assumptions of multivariate analysis. After deleting unusable 
cases, the data were then randomly split into two samples (each N = 313) using the 
                                                     Factors influencing Unsafe Behaviour    48                            
Select Cases command in SPSS 11.5 so that a cross-validation analysis could be 
conducted using the calibration sample (Sample 1) for model development and the 
validation sample (Sample 2) for model testing. With Sample 1 data only, 
exploratory factor analysis was used to examine the construct validity of the 
questionnaire. Reliability analyses (Cronbach’s alpha) were conducted on the items 
remaining to test the internal consistency of the scales.  
Structural equation modelling (AMOS 4) using Sample 1 data (N = 313) was 
then employed to test the fit of the a priori path model to the covariance matrix 
generated from the set of five variables in this sample. An exploratory approach to 
analysis was employed when testing the model, that is, a conceptual model was 
specified based on theory; the model was tested to examine its fit; the model was 
then respecified and re-estimated. To address the problems associated with post hoc 
model fitting, a cross-validation strategy was employed whereby the final model 
derived from Sample 1 data was tested on a second independent sample from the 
same population, that is, Sample 2 (J. C. Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; B. M. Byrne, 
2001). 
2.5.2 Data Screening 
 Prior to analyses and using the entire sample (N = 652), data were examined 
for accuracy of data entry, missing values, and fit between their distributions and the 
assumptions of multivariate analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). The accuracy of 
the data file was checked by proofreading a random sample of 100 of the original 
data against a computerized listing (SPSS printout). In addition, the Frequencies 
command in SPSS Version 11.5 was used to detect any out of range values. None 
were found.  
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The data were then checked for missing values. Four cases were deleted 
because all variables of interest were missing. A further 20 cases were deleted 
because all Violation Behaviour questions were either missing or answered with Not 
Applicable.  
 It is noted that missing values were not replaced for any items in the 
Violation section. Replacing missing values was considered inappropriate as some of 
these questions were not applicable to some participants. For example, one question 
asked whether Indigenous Health Workers or interpreters were accessed to provide 
patient education. This situation is more likely to apply to remote rather than rural 
areas.  Instead, the Violation Behaviour scale was formed by averaging the available 
items for each individual (Schafer & Graham, 2002).  
 All other missing values on individual items were replaced using the Missing 
Value Analysis command (SPSS) prior to scale formation. The expectation 
maximization (EM) technique was used as this produces less biased estimates than 
other techniques, and is one of the techniques of choice when the amount of data 
missing is between 11 and 15% (Roth, 1994; Schafer & Graham, 2002). The range of 
missing data in this study was from 1.0% to 14.5%, with a mean of 5.4% (SD = 
5.5%). The highest percentage of missing data was for the single-item variable, 
Expectation by Doctor. This is not surprising given the controversial nature of the 
question. An assumption when replacing missing data is that the data are “missing 
completely at random” (MCAR). The Little’s MCAR test was conducted and 
resulted in a non-significant χ2, suggesting that the data were missing at random (i.e., 
no identifiable pattern exists in the missing data) (Little, 1988).  
Table 2.1 below presents the number and percentage of missing data for each 
item in the final sample of 626.   
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Table 2.1  
Number and Percentage of Missing Values (N = 626) 
 
Item number N Number missing Percent missing
Item 2.5 (a) 619 7 1.1
Item 2.5 (b) 620 6 1.0
Item 2.5 (c) 617 9 1.4
Item 2.5 (d) 618 8 1.3
Item 2.5 (e) 617 9 1.4
Item 2.5 (f) 618 8 1.3
Item 3.4 (b) 535 91 14.5
Item 3.4 (c) 554 72 11.5
Item 3.4 (d) 560 66 10.5
Item 3.4 (g) 563 63 10.1
 
Scales were formed from the individual items and these were tested for 
outliers. Box plots indicated a number of univariate outliers in the Level of 
Knowledge and Reference Material scales. Transformations were carried out; 
however, untransformed data were used for analyses for the reasons outlined in the 
section dealing with normality below. Using Mahalanobis distance with p < .001, 
two cases were identified as multivariate outliers. Examination of these cases 
indicated they were not typical of the target population, that is, one respondent 
worked on a casual basis and the other worked temporary part-time. Therefore, these 
cases were deleted leaving 626 cases for analysis. 
 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic indicated that normality could not be 
assumed. Further investigation was conducted using box plots and histograms, and 
the skewness and kurtosis statistics in SPSS. These indicated that the Violation 
Behaviour and Workload variables were normally distributed; however, Expectation 
by Doctor was significantly positively skewed (8.02), and Level of Knowledge and 
Reference Material were significantly negatively skewed (-4.62 and -6.98 
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respectively). Level of Knowledge also displayed significant positive kurtosis (7.58). 
Skewness and kurtosis were improved by transforming these three scales. Because 
Expectation by Doctor was positively skewed, a log transformation was used for this 
scale. Level of Knowledge was reflected before being transformed using a square 
root transformation (the log transformation made skewness worse for this scale). 
Reference Material was reflected and transformed using a log transformation.  
Although transformations were conducted and considered, they were not 
applied for the following reasons: 
• In large sample sizes, the impact of skewness and kurtosis is diminished 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
• Analysis (structural equation modelling using AMOS 4) was carried out 
using the transformed and untransformed data to establish if there was any 
difference. There was little difference between the parameters obtained using the 
two data sets and fit statistics were comparable. 
• These variables would not be expected to be normally distributed in the 
population (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). For example, it would be expected that 
more nurses would agree than disagree that they have a high level of knowledge and 
that reference materials are accessible and adequate; and to disagree rather than 
agree that doctors expect them to violate procedures. Given the lack of difference 
between models derived from transformed and untransformed data, it was decided to 
proceed with the dataset that corresponded with the actual distribution of these 
variables in the population. 
• See also Section 2.5.6.1 – The Bootstrap Procedure. This procedure was used 
in later analyses, that is, structural equation modelling, to correct for non-normality. 
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2.5.3 Factor Analysis 
 The construct validity of the scales in Sample 1 (N = 313) was investigated 
by factor analysing the items using the Maximum Likelihood (ML) technique with 
direct oblimin rotation in SPSS 11.5. Although structural equation modelling was 
later used to test the fit of the model, exploratory factor analysis was used to help 
refine the measurement model.  
To determine the factorability of the items, Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
applied, and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin’s MSA was calculated. On both counts, the 
matrix was deemed to be factorable. 
Items were deleted from scales using the following criteria (Coakes & Steed, 
2003; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996):  
1. Items with a measure less than 0.5 in the Measures of Sampling Adequacy 
in the Anti-image Correlation Matrix. 
2. Items with a measure less than 0.2 in the estimates of Communality. 
3. Items with a poor loading (less than 0.3) on factors. 
All items were entered together into the factor analysis, that is, they were not 
separated into scales. Results indicated that a number of items from the Violation 
Behaviour scale should be deleted using the above criteria. These items were Item 
3.1(g) (< 0.5 in anti-image correlation matrix), Items 3.1(d) and 3.1(i) (low 
communality estimates). In addition, Item 3.1(n) from the same scale was deleted as 
it was highly correlated with Item 3.1(m) (r = .94) and therefore considered 
redundant. 
The factor analysis was rerun with these four items deleted. Results then 
suggested that Item 3.1(h) be deleted because of a low communality estimate. Factor 
analysis was run again with this item removed. Results then suggested that Item 
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3.1(j) be deleted as the factor loading was less than 0.3 in the Pattern Matrix. 
Therefore, the Violation Behaviour scale was reduced to seven items, that is, 3.1(b), 
(c), (e), (f), (k), (l), and (m).  
When the analysis was rerun, all factors sat together well with Violation 
Behaviour breaking into two factors, that is, violations originating with doctors and 
violations originating with nurses. These two were combined into one variable 
because, although some of these violations originate with doctors, these issues 
become the nurse’s responsibility to follow up rather than the doctor’s. For example, 
if a doctor issues a prescription for a controlled drug over the telephone, the 
legislation requires that the order must be put in writing within 24 hours. If the 
doctor does not do so, it becomes the nurse’s responsibility to follow this up with 
him/her and then with the Director of Nursing or Medical Superintendent 
(Queensland Government, 2003). That is, nurses are not only accountable for their 
own performance, but also for the performance of others (Gibson, 2001).    
  The rotated pattern matrix for the remaining 16 items is presented in Table 
2.2. Five factors were extracted and accounted for 67.07% of the variance. The 
eigenvalues, percentage of variance explained, and the correlation matrix are also 
displayed in this table. 
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Table 2.2  
Pattern Matrix, Eigenvalues, Percentage of Variance Explained and Correlation 
Matrix for Sample 1 (N = 313) 
Item 
Factor 1 
Violations 
by Doctor 
Factor 2 
Level of 
Knowledge 
Factor 3 
Workload 
Factor 4 
Violations 
by Nurse 
Factor 5 
Reference 
Material 
*Q3.1(c) GP signs for 
telephone-ordered medications 
within 24 hrs 
.926      
Q3.1(b) Medical super/registrar 
signs for telephone-ordered 
meds within 24 hrs  
.891      
Q3.1(f) MO signs & dates 
cessation of medication orders .441      
Q3.1(e) MOs’ name & 
signature legible on medication 
orders 
.345      
Q2.5(b) Able to explain to 
patients how medication they 
receive work 
 .851     
Q2.5(c) Able to explain to 
patients major side effects of 
medications 
 .704     
Q2.5(a) My knowledge of 
medication & how they work is 
adequate 
 .616     
Q3.4(d) The staffing levels in 
my facility are inadequate   .926    
Q3.4(c) The workload in my 
facility is excessive    .779    
Q3.4(g) The skill mix in my 
facility is inadequate   .476    
Q3.1(l) My name & signature 
are legible    .832  
3.1(k) Explain to patients 
relevant information about 
meds I administer/supply 
   .701  
Q3.1(m) Access Indigenous 
Health Workers/interpreters to 
provide patient education 
   .494  
Q2.5(e) Reference material in 
my facility adequate      -.779
Q2.5(d) Have easy access to 
up-to-date reference material      -.618
Q2.5(f) Have easy access to 
Regulation and its amendments      -.594
 
Eigenvalues 4.124 2.359 1.736
 
1.491 1.021
Percentage of Variance 
Explained 25.777 14.744 10.849 9.317 6.383
Correlation Matrix  
Factor 1 – Violation by Doctor 1.000  
Factor 2 – Level of Knowledge -.162 1.000  
Factor 3 – Workload .286 .003 1.000  
Factor 4 – Violation by Nurse .273 -.403 .152 1.000 
Factor 5 – Reference Material  .244 -.420 .256 .214 1.000
* Questions paraphrased to save space. 
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2.5.4 Reliability Analysis 
 To ensure that the items comprising the factors produced reliable scales, 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of internal consistency was calculated for each scale. 
The results are shown in Table 2.3 below. 
Table 2.3  
Cronbach’s Alpha for each Scale – Sample 1 (N = 313) 
 
Scale  Number of items Cronbach’s Alpha 
Level of Knowledge 3 .80 
Reference Material 3 .76 
Workload 3 .78 
Violation Behaviour 7 .73 
 
2.5.5 Descriptive Statistics 
The correlation matrix for Sample 1 showing relationships among the various 
scales, together with the means and standard deviations is presented in Table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.4  
Summary Statistics and Correlations for all Variables Sample 1 (N = 313)  
 
  
Mean SD Level of 
Knowledge 
Reference 
Material Workload 
Expect by 
Doctor Violations 
Level of 
Knowledge 4.05 0.59 1.00     
Reference 
Material 4.06 0.73 .45** 1.00    
Workload 2.87 0.99 -.04 -.26** 1.00   
Expectation 
by Doctor 2.19 1.10 -.06 -.29** .42** 1.00  
Violation 
Behaviour 2.27 0.55 -.30** -.27** .24** .34** 1.00 
Note. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).  
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Estimation of structural equation models are based on covariance, rather than 
correlation, matrices (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999). However, Hoyle and Panter 
(1995) recommend presenting a correlation matrix as this is more informative than 
the covariance matrix for communicating the pattern of relations among variables. 
These descriptive statistics were calculated using SPSS Version 11.5. Level of 
Knowledge, Reference Material, Workload, and Expectation by Doctors were all 
measured using a 5-point scale. Mean responses to the Level of Knowledge and 
Reference Material scales were high, suggesting that most nurses perceived few 
problems in these areas. Workload was rated as average but the variance was larger 
for this variable. For example, approximately 33% of respondents either agreed or 
strongly agreed that their ability to comply with the Regulation was affected by 
excessive workload and staffing inadequacies; however, approximately the same 
proportion either disagreed or strongly disagreed that this was the case. The mean 
response for Expectation by Doctor was low which suggests that most nurses 
disagreed that their ability to comply with the Regulation was adversely affected by 
doctors’ expectations. However, again, the variance was high for this item, with a 
number of respondents being unsure and 58 (approximately 19%) either agreeing or 
strongly agreeing that they felt pressured by doctors’ expectations to work outside 
regulations. Violation Behaviour was measured using a 4-point scale with the mean 
response indicating that most nurses followed the procedures or best practice most of 
the time.   
 The correlation matrix indicated that all organisational factors were 
significantly related to each other with the exception of Level of Knowledge and 
Workload, and Level of Knowledge and Expectation by Doctor. Coefficients ranged 
from -.26 to .45. Violation Behaviour was significantly negatively correlated with 
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Level of Knowledge (-.30) and Reference Material (-.27), and significantly positively 
correlated with Workload (.24) and Expectation by Doctor (.34). All these 
coefficients were significant at the .01 level.   
2.5.6 Structural Equation Modelling 
AMOS 4 (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999) was used to test the fit of the a priori 
path model to the covariance matrix generated from the set of five variables in 
Sample 1. The estimation method used was the maximum likelihood (ML) method. 
The full model to be tested was presented earlier in a simplified conceptual form (see 
Figure 2.1).  
 The principal objective of structural equation modelling is to fit the 
hypothetical model to a set of sample data and examine how well the model fits the 
data. If the fit is adequate, the model supports the hypothesised relations among 
variables (B. M. Byrne, 2001). Various measures of model fit are provided in AMOS 
and these will now be discussed.  
2.5.6.1 Fit Criteria 
 This section will report the fit indices chosen for this study together with the 
justification for choosing those indices.  
The χ2 statistic. This statistic is an absolute fit index indicating how well an 
analysis succeeded in minimizing the discrepancy between the hypothesised 
covariance matrix and the sample covariance matrix (Hoyle & Panter, 1995). The 
smaller the value of χ2 the better the fit, with zero indicating perfect fit and a value 
with an associated probability greater than .05 indicating acceptable fit (Hoyle, 1995; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). However, a number of writers have raised concern 
about the use of this statistic as a test of model fit (e.g., Bollen & Long, 1993; Hoyle, 
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1995; MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996) because of its sensitivity to data that 
are not multivariate normally distributed and its tendency to indicate misfit as sample 
size increases (because of power). Despite these reservations, it has been used here as 
it allows for comparisons between models, with the χ2 statistic for the hypothesised 
model providing a baseline value against which all subsequent tests of invariance can 
be compared (B. M. Byrne, 2001). Furthermore, in cross-validation analysis, the χ2-
difference test can be used whereby a non-significant difference between the χ2 for 
the calibration sample and the χ2 for the validation sample indicates no difference 
between the two models.  
The Bootstrap Procedure (Diaconis & Efron, 1983). Maximum likelihood 
estimation of SEM parameters requires data with multivariate normal distribution. 
The violation of normality inflates the computed χ2 value leading to possible model 
rejection or modification that may not be necessary. Violation of normality also tends 
to underestimate standard errors (B. M. Byrne, 2001). This technique uses a post hoc 
adjustment to account for non-normality in the underlying database and produces 
adjusted standard error estimates and the Bollen-Stine p-value, that is, a bootstrap 
modification of model χ2. This p-value is used instead of the usual maximum 
likelihood p-value and should be greater than .05 to indicate overall model fit (B. M. 
Byrne, 2001).      
The χ2 /DF ratio. Researchers have addressed some of the limitations of the χ2 
statistic by developing a number of alternative goodness-of-fit indices (B. M. Byrne, 
2001; Hoyle, 1995). One of these indices is the χ2 /degrees of freedom ratio (reported 
as CMIN/DF), an index that is designed to compensate for the tendency of the χ2 test 
to reject models when sample sizes are large. As with the χ2 statistic, this ratio 
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provides an indication of the efficiency of the hypothetical model in reproducing the 
sample data. Values of 2 or less represent a good fit (B. M. Byrne, 2001). 
The Root Mean-Square Error of Approximation Index (RMSEA). The 
RMSEA takes into account the error of approximation in the population and relaxes 
the stringent requirement on χ2 that the model holds exactly in the population 
(Browne & Cudeck, 1993). Values of .05 or less indicate the hypothetical model is a 
close fit to the sample data, however, Browne and Cudeck suggest that models with 
RMSEA values of .08 or less can be accepted.   
The Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI). This index is an incremental (or comparative) 
fit index which provides a measure of improvement in fit when the hypothesised 
model is compared with a more restricted baseline model. TLI is recommended when 
the maximum likelihood estimation method is used (Hoyle & Panter, 1995) as was 
the case in this study. TLI should be greater than 0.95 (Hu & Bentler, 1995) although 
values greater than 0.9 indicate reasonable fit (Hoyle & Panter, 1995). This index can 
exceed a value of 1 (i.e., it is a non-normed fit index), however, this indicates a lack 
of parsimony.   
The Confirmatory Fit Index (CFI). The CFI is also an incremental fit index 
and is recommended when data are not multivariate normally distributed, as the CFI 
shows minimum estimation bias when this is the case (Hoyle, 1995). This index is 
normed with values constrained to fall between 0 and 1. CFI should be greater than 
0.95 although values greater than 0.9 indicate reasonable fit (B. M. Byrne, 2001).   
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2.5.6.2 Model Fit – Sample 1 
The fit indices for Sample 1 indicated that the hypothesised model was a 
good fit to the data, χ2 (38, N = 313) = 74.48, 3Bollen-Stine p = .05, CMIN/DF = 
1.96, TLI = .95, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .06. However, the path from Reference 
Material to Violation Behaviour, with a standardised regression weight of .01, was 
not statistically significant and, for reasons of parsimony, this pathway was deleted 
and the model retested. The fit statistics for the revised model (see Figure 2.2) were 
good: χ2 (39, N = 313) = 74.49, Bollen-Stine p = .07; CMIN/DF = 1.91; TLI = .96; 
CFI = .97; RMSEA = .05. This model accounted for 23% of the variance in Violation 
Behaviour, and 22% of the variance in the mediating variable, Expectation by 
Doctor. 
 
Q3.4d
Q3.4g
Q2.5d
Q2.5e
Q2.5f
Q2.5a
Q3.4c
Q2.5c
Q2.5b
Level of
Knowledge
Reference
Material
Workload
Expectation by 
Doctor
Violation 
Behaviour
.82
.84
.57
.80
.77
.60
.67
.82
.79
-.25
.58
.37
.13
-.22
-.32
.26
.22
.23
 
Figure 2.2 Structural Model of Relationships among Organisational Factors and 
Violation Behaviour – Sample 1 
 
                                                 
3 The Bollen-Stine adjusted p has been used instead of the usual maximum likelihood p-value when 
data do not conform to the assumption of multivariate normality.  
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The numbers shown along the pathways in the model indicate the strength of 
the relationship between each variable. The higher the absolute value of the number, 
the stronger the relationship and the greater the benefit there is to be gained by 
manipulating the factor at the start of the chain. A negative value indicates an inverse 
influence on the outcome variable, that is, higher scores on one variable are 
associated with lower scores on the other. 
2.5.6.3 Cross-Validation Analysis using Sample 2 (N = 313) 
 Models developed using an exploratory approach should be considered as a 
tentative solution because re-specifications of the model may be based on 
circumstances relating uniquely to that particular data set (Hoyle, 1995). Byrne 
(2001) has suggested an approach for addressing the problems associated with post 
hoc model fitting which involves an invariance-testing strategy to test for the 
replicability of structural paths across groups. This strategy involves cross-validating 
the findings by randomly splitting the dataset into two parts, with one sample 
becoming the calibration sample and the other the validation sample (Cudeck & 
Browne, 1983). The originally hypothesised model is tested using Sample 1, with 
post hoc analyses being conducted on this sample to obtain the best-fitting model. 
When the final model is determined using Sample 1 data, this then becomes the 
hypothesised model to be tested using Sample 2 data.  
 The first step in this process is to establish a multigroup baseline model 
against which to compare a subsequent model in which equality constraints are 
specified (B. M. Byrne, 2001). The final model for the calibration sample is the 
model used for the validation sample. The goodness of fit of the model for the two 
groups in combination with no equality constraints imposed was excellent: χ2 (78) = 
141.34, Bollen-Stine p = .09; CMIN/DF = 1.81; CFI = .97; TLI = .96; RMSEA = .04. 
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The χ2 value, with its degrees of freedom, served as a comparison point to determine 
if the causal structure was the same across the calibration and validation groups. 
After equality constraints were applied, by labelling the five path coefficients to be 
constrained equal across groups, the analysis was rerun and the goodness-of-fit 
results investigated for the χ2 value and its degrees of freedom. These were as 
follows: χ2 (83) = 148.77. The difference in χ2 values between this test and the 
previous test (with no constraints) is 7.43, with 5 degrees of freedom, which is not 
statistically significant. This suggests that the causal structure related to the model is 
equivalent across the calibration and validation samples, that is, the models are 
equivalent.   
2.5.6.4 Comparing Rural and Remote Groups 
The conditions under which nurses in this study worked varied considerably. 
Facilities ranged in size from base or provincial hospitals where medical and allied 
health professionals are on site, to those staffed by one nurse dependent on 
communication with the Royal Flying Doctor Service or other off-site medical 
support. Therefore, to investigate whether isolation acted as a moderating variable, a 
comparison was made between models for rural and remote communities using the 
multigroup procedure as explained in the previous section.  
The rural dataset (N = 302) was used as the calibration sample and the remote 
dataset (N = 323) as the validation sample. The goodness of fit of the model for the 
two groups in combination with no equality constraints imposed was good: χ2 (78) = 
146.51, Bollen-Stine p = .03; CMIN/DF = 1.88; CFI = .97; TLI = .96; RMSEA = .04. 
The χ2 difference when equality constraints were applied was 4.51, with 5 degrees of 
freedom. This is not statistically significant which suggests that the models and 
coefficients are equivalent across the rural and remote samples.  
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2.5.7 Qualitative Data Analysis 
A number of open-ended questions were included in the questionnaire to help 
elicit further qualitative information. These were item numbers 2.6, 3.5, and 5.4 and 
can be found in the questionnaire in Appendix A. It is noted that these data were not 
analysed in depth and were merely used to support the quantitative data results. In 
general, this was found to be the case. This was considered particularly important, 
for example, with variables such as Expectation by Doctor, which was limited to one 
item. A summary of the results under each variable heading is listed below. 
2.5.7.1 Level of Knowledge  
 The quantitative results indicated that most nurses perceived few problems in 
this area. This was supported by the qualitative data with 30 nurses focusing on how 
they kept their knowledge up to date. However, 13 respondents noted that there were 
limitations in their knowledge of medications and expressed a need for further 
education, for example: 
 Because the hospital I work in requires general knowledge of a number of 
different fields … my knowledge base in the specifics of those areas is not in-
depth … there is definitely an indication for more education. 
 
… associating with different and unfamiliar drugs at times and ward being so 
busy, one administers without full knowledge of all [information] pertaining 
to drugs … 
 
 
 Eleven respondents noted that issues such as time and distance all impacted 
on their ability to access education, for example: 
Nowhere near enough time is available at work for self development in this 
area. All self development is attended in my own time. 
 
Difficult to access education and training programs due to the distance the 
town is from major centres … 
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2.5.7.2 Reference Material 
In the quantitative results, most nurses reported that they had easy access to 
adequate and up-to-date reference material. This outcome was supported here with 
32 respondents noting that this was the case within their facility. Others noted that, if 
reference material was not available, they were able to access information and 
support either within their facility or nearby.   
 In contrast, 20 respondents noted that access to reference material was not 
available. In addition, 11 noted that they had access but that the material was out of 
date. Others indicated that, although reference materials were available, access was 
difficult due to lack of time or unavailability of computers for on-line information. 
For example: 
 Often there is no time to look up drugs while at work … 
 
 I would like to have the time to use the online MIMS info, which is quite 
useful. But there are not enough computers and not enough time to access it. 
 
2.5.7.3 Workload 
 There was wide variability in the quantitative results for this factor with 
approximately the same number of respondents agreeing as disagreeing that 
workload was an issue impacting on their ability to comply with the Regulation. 
Qualitative comments were received from 71 nurses regarding workload, staffing 
levels, and skill mix. For example, 21 believed that the workload was high and 27 
noted nursing staff levels were inadequate. Comments tended to suggest that 
workload issues were impacting on the nurses’ ability to work safely, for example:   
Mistakes happen because time frames to complete tasks safely become 
ridiculous and miscalculations may be done … disruptions happen trying to 
do too many things at once. Interruptions occur all the time.  
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The current skill mix requires that staff often work above and beyond their 
expected roles. 
 
Increased patient load [and] decreased nursing staff level push you to the 
limit of your ability to comply with regulations.  
 
2.5.7.4 Expectation by Doctor 
 The variance for this variable was also high in the quantitative results with 
structural equation modelling indicating that doctors’ expectations did have an 
impact on the number of violations. In answer to the qualitative items, 29 
respondents commented on how issues relating to doctors’ expectations impacted on 
their ability to work within the Regulation. These situations often involved 
emergency situations or were after-hours when doctors were less available. For 
example: 
 Several MOs … never provided documentation … expected you to make 
judgment calls re S4 meds at night …would get very short/hostile if woken for 
“trivial matters”. 
 
 … doctors will not sign for medications within the legal time frame and 
regard you as a pain in the neck if you insist. 
 
I am the only nurse … the doctors do expect me to work outside my scope of 
practice sometimes, usually during an emergency. 
 
 At night RNs are expected to do it – don’t wake the doctors for anything 
that’s not basically life threatening! Have been told by doctor to be more 
confident and to supply S4s for him to sign later. I don’t feel I have any legal 
standing if something goes wrong.  
 
 Doctor on call often not happy if woken for phone orders – “can’t you just 
give it”. [They] need reminding that … legally I can’t. 
 
Comments such as the following tend to suggest that nurses perceive doctors 
in rural and remote areas to be overworked: 
The main problem affecting staff and patients … is that the doctors are all 
overworked and stretched to their limits … 
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In our area we have approximately 4,000 people who are serviced by one 
GP/Medical Superintendent. He is on call 24 hours a day. 
 
The number of doctors available in our district is totally inadequate – they 
have too many demands made on them …Nurse is obligated to fill the gap left 
by doctors. 
 
2.5.7.5 Violation Behaviour 
 The quantitative data analysis revealed that most nurses in this study worked 
within the legal and best practice guidelines most of the time. This was supported by 
the qualitative data with the vast majority of nurses commenting that this was the 
case. However, comments such as the following also appeared:      
There are some practices which all the ENs carry out which are outside 
regulations … 
 
 Small hospital … one doctor. Common practice to initiate, administer, and 
supply meds without MO order … 
  
 … I do this in the best interest of the patients. I do this only when it is within 
the scope of my knowledge and skills. It is done when a doctor is not readily 
available and it is unreasonable to expect patient to wait or suffer 
unnecessarily … this practice is done with the knowledge and concurrence of 
the medical superintendent. My concern is that it is not according to the letter 
of the law and I will be deregistered if caught. 
 
 Legally I’m not covered – my registration is in jeopardy. But if I know I am 
competent to give it and the patient will benefit, why shouldn’t I? 
 
 Nursing staff are being used instead of pharmacist in some situations. 
  
 Nursing staff unsure of legal position; despite Act available some have 
difficulty understanding in real terms, i.e., what can I give? what’s best for 
the patient? should I bother the doctor? – all influencing decision ultimately. 
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In conclusion, the following quote tends to sum up the general feeling and 
difficulties faced by nurses working in rural and remote areas:   
It is very difficult for all staff to exactly follow the rules of the Health (Drugs 
& Poisons) Regulation 1996 at all times. Pressure of workload; small 
numbers of GPs; emergency situations lead to staff doing what is best for the 
patient at the time even if it is outside the guidelines. Nobody deliberately 
flouts the rules, but staff know that the GPs would “burn out” if they were 
called every time someone presents to the hospital after hours.   
 
2.6 Discussion 
 Human factors researchers know that organisational issues are a key 
determinant in the occurrence of adverse events, but the effect of these factors on 
violations is not as well understood. Reason (2000) argued that it is important to 
investigate the factors that contribute to these unsafe acts and this study has made a 
start in this direction in the rural and remote medical environment by demonstrating 
the link between organisational factors and violations. It was argued that, in order to 
understand this interaction, a model was required of how the components of the 
system work together to influence outcomes. This study has provided such a model 
for some parts of the system.  
 In addition to testing the conceptual model, a cross-validation analysis was 
carried out by randomly splitting the dataset into two parts. This analysis indicated 
that the causal structure was equivalent across the two samples. A comparison was 
also made between models for rural and remote communities to investigate the 
possible contributing factor of isolation as a moderating variable. The results of this 
analysis suggested that there was no difference between the rural and remote 
samples. As well as the quantitative data, a number of open-ended questions were 
included in the questionnaire. In general, these qualitative data supported the results 
of the quantitative analyses.     
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 It was hypothesised that level of workload and expectation by doctor would 
have a positive impact on violation behaviour, and availability and accessibility of 
reference materials, and level of knowledge would have a negative impact on 
violation behaviour. Expectation by doctor was also expected to mediate the 
relationships between workload and violation behaviour and reference material and 
violation behaviour.   
 The strongest direct path to Violation Behaviour in the model was from Level 
of Knowledge. This indicates that the more nurses know about medications, the less 
likely they are to violate procedures and best practice. Nurses’ perception of their 
level of Workload also had a direct influence on violation behaviour but this pathway 
was weaker. It appears that the number of violations was better explained in this case 
by the influence of the mediating variable Expectation by Doctor. This outcome 
suggests that when workloads are excessive, nurses succumb to perceived social 
pressure from doctors to work outside regulations, which, in turn, leads to more 
violation behaviour. This was also the case for Reference Material. That is, when 
reference materials are less accessible, nurses perceive that doctors expect them to 
work outside the guidelines more often, thus leading to more violations. The study 
was unable to support the hypothesised direct relationship between adequacy and 
accessibility of Reference Material and Violation Behaviour. 
 Historically, the focus of safety research in the hospital system has been the 
individual. However, as Reason (1997) and others (e.g., Dekker, 2001; Leape et al., 
1998; Vincent et al., 1998) argued, this is the old view of human error. According to 
this approach, accidents are caused by people and management resources are directed 
at making these individuals less fallible by such activities as better training, 
automation, discipline, and proceduralisation. The new view of human error is much 
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more complicated and takes into account the human component within complex 
systems with less emphasis on the individual and more on pre-existing organisational 
factors that provide conditions in which unsafe behaviour occurs (Reason, 1990).  
 This old view of human error has been resistant to extinction (Dekker, 2002), 
especially in the health domain (Leape, 1994). Extensive investigations of incidents 
rarely occur in busy environments such as hospitals and too often the investigation 
stops at an arbitrary point where cause is identified. That stopping point usually 
involves someone else further removed from the actual incident site. For example, it 
is important to note that the mediating role played by doctors’ expectations found in 
this study does not suggest a re-allocation of blame to doctors. Re-allocating blame 
in this manner is to perpetuate the old view of error, a view that Reason (1997) and 
others have shown to be counterproductive in terms of achieving institutional safety 
goals. 
 A better approach is to move away from a “blame culture” by using climate 
surveys to monitor organisational and individual variables that have an impact on 
safety outcomes (ACSQHC 2001), as in the current study. There is no single element 
in the model tested in this study that is the source of violation behaviour, but rather 
there is a network of interconnected variables, all of which act together to influence 
safety outcomes. Reason (1997) recommended such a strategy and it is now used in 
the offshore oil industry (Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2001), aviation (Fogarty, 2004; 
Fogarty et al., 1999, 2001), and medicine (Neal et al., 2000). For this approach to 
work, however, the survey must capture the key variables that impact on safety 
behaviours. The present study has made a start in this direction but it is 
acknowledged that much has still to be learned about safety in health settings. 
Indeed, with only 23% of the variance in violation behaviour explained by the 
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variables in the current study, further investigation is warranted. Some of the 
limitations of the present study are dealt with in the next section.  
2.6.1 Limitations 
The current study was considered to be a preliminary exploration into this 
area and was necessarily limited in scope for a number of reasons. As noted earlier 
(Materials section), this study formed part of a larger study investigating a number of 
issues in rural and remote area nursing. Because of the length of the complete 
questionnaire (12 pages), the number of variables that could be investigated in the 
current study and the number of items used to measure each latent construct had to 
be restricted. The safety and nursing literature suggest a number of other factors that 
may contribute to unsafe behaviour and, in order to capture a larger percentage of the 
variance in safety outcomes, these were included in the next study in this series. A 
number of changes were made in Study 2 and these will be discussed in the 
following section. 
2.6.2 Modifications for Study 2   
The next study was conducted in rural health service districts only as no 
difference was found between rural and remote areas in Study 1. A validated 
instrument that is widely used in public sector hospitals in Queensland was employed 
to measure organisational and individual factors. Therefore, private hospitals were 
not included as this instrument has not been approved for use in that sector.  
The instrument chosen for Study 2 included similar organisational issues 
measured in the previous study, that is, workload, professional growth, and 
professional interactions, as well as a number of other issues relevant to 
organisational climate. In addition, this instrument included individual factors such 
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as morale, distress, and quality of work life. Although availability and accessibility 
of reference materials was not measured, it was decided not to alter the 
organisational climate section of the questionnaire as this would impact on the 
validity and reliability of the instrument. This decision was not considered 
problematic as the hypothesis that this variable would directly impact on violation 
behaviour was not supported in the first study.  
The Violation Behaviour scale in Study 1 included violations originating with 
doctors as well as nurses. In hindsight, it may have been more useful to include only 
those issues originating with nurses, that is, behaviours directly under their control. 
Therefore, this scale was modified in the next study to include more generic violation 
behaviour questions based on nursing competencies with regard to medication 
administration.  
Also included in the next study was another measurement of unsafe 
behaviour, that is, medication errors. The items were developed in conjunction with 
subject matter experts and were based on the “five rights” of medication 
administration, that is, the right drug to the right patient at the right dose at the right 
time by the right route. It was expected that individual factors, that is, morale, 
distress, and quality of work life, would impact on errors as was suggested by 
research conducted by Fogarty and colleagues (Fogarty, 2004; Fogarty et al., 1999, 
2001) in the aviation domain. 
The next study included registered nurses and enrolled nurses (EN) with 
medication endorsement only, that is, enrolled nurses (without endorsement) were 
not invited to participate. The Regulation states that ENs are authorised to administer 
only Schedule 2 or Schedule 3 poisons under the supervision of a registered nurse or 
doctor. That is, ENs are not permitted to administer controlled or restricted drugs, or 
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intravenous drugs. Exclusion of ENs was considered appropriate as most adverse 
incidents with medications in the medical environment involve drugs in these 
categories (ACSQHC, 2002a; Headford et al., 2001). ENs with medication 
endorsement were included because they are authorised to administer restricted drugs 
(other than an anaesthetic) on a doctor’s instruction and under the supervision of a 
registered nurse or doctor (Queensland Health, 2000). The following chapter will 
give a detailed description of Study 2.   
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Chapter 3 – Study 2 
The Influence of Organisational Climate and Individual Factors 
on Violations and Errors during Medication Administration 
3.1 Introduction 
 The first study investigated the impact of organisational issues on procedural 
violations by nurses in rural and remote areas during medication administration. The 
specific organisational variables measured were Level of Knowledge, availability 
and accessibility of Reference Material, level of Workload, and Expectation by 
Doctor. These variables accounted for 23% of the variance in Violation Behaviour 
and 22% of the variance in the mediating variable, Expectation by Doctor.  
 This chapter introduces Study 2. This study investigated the impact of 
organisational climate and individual factors on violations and errors during 
medication administration by nurses in rural areas. The following section will 
describe organisational climate, as well as the instrument used to measure this 
construct in the current study.   
3.2 Organisational Climate 
 The concept of organisational climate was developed in the 1970s and 
originally referred to the global concept underlying the events and processes of an 
organisation. This concept is now known as organisational culture with 
organisational climate being seen as the manifestation of organisational culture 
(Guldenmund, 2000). Organisational culture refers to the norms, values, and basic 
assumptions of a given organisation, that is, the values, beliefs, and behaviours 
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shared by members of a group (Schein, 1990, 1992). Organisations with a strong 
culture display a degree of predictability of behaviour (Hudson, 2000). Culture binds 
people together as a group and provides cues and clues as to how to behave in a 
given situation. In particular, culture influences how subordinates relate to their 
seniors and how information is shared. Culture also impacts on how people relate to 
technology, such as computers, and adherence to rules. In aviation, investigations of 
accidents have suggested that poor organisational cultures were associated with 
accidents because of a lack of safety concerns, pressures to put production before 
safety, poor leadership, and an environment of conflict between pilots and 
management (Helmreich, 2000; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998).  
 Organisational climate reflect employees’ perceptions of the organisation’s 
culture, that  is, the collective reflection of their experience of the culture (Schneider, 
1987, 1990). A positive organisational climate is indicated by harmony between 
subcultures of the organisation, better teamwork, and greater safety awareness.  
Employees will tend to project pride and a sense of family in the organisation and 
will generally feel positive about their job (ACSQHC, 2001a).  
 Because of the interdisciplinary nature of this concept, definitions and 
methods for studying organisational culture vary according to the academic 
discipline from which they originated (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). Traditionally, 
organisational culture has been studied by sociologists through qualitative methods 
such as interviews and observations, with organisational climate being studied by 
psychologists through quantitative methods such as self-administered questionnaires 
(Guldenmund, 2000). Organisational psychologists tend to focus on the practical 
significance of organisational climate and on the means by which to manipulate this 
climate to improve productivity, safety, and so on (Deal & Kennedy, 1988; Peters & 
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Waterman, 1984; Smircich, 1983). Schneider, Brief, and Guzzo (1996) argued that 
organisational culture can be changed through a focus on organisational climate. This 
is so because climate reflects the tangibles that produce the culture, that is, the events 
that happen to and around employees that they are able to describe. By changing the 
everyday policies, practices, procedures, and routines, this will impact on the beliefs 
and values that guide employee actions (Schneider et al.). 
 The measurement of organisational culture and climate has been complicated 
by the tendency for the two terms to be used interchangeably and the lack of 
agreement on the major dimensions that define them (Gershon, Stone, Bakken, & 
Larson, 2004; Schneider et al., 1996). However, Gershon et al. have identified the 
following common themes in a number of instruments used to measure 
organisational culture or climate in healthcare:  
• Leadership Characteristics – For example, leadership styles, such as degree 
and type of supervision, degree of support and trust, degree of aloofness, and type of 
leadership hierarchy;  
• Group Behaviours and Relationships – For example, characteristics of 
interpersonal interactions, group behaviours, perceptions of co-worker trust, degree 
of group supportiveness, group cohesion, and coordination of group effort;  
• Communication – For example, formal and informal mechanisms for 
transfer of information and for conflict resolution; 
• Structural Attributes of Quality of Work Life – For example, rewards, 
working conditions, hours of work, forced overtime, and job security. 
 The above common themes are included in the instrument chosen to measure 
organisational climate in this study. This instrument will be described in the next 
section. 
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3.2.1 Measuring Organisational Climate  
 Although a number of instruments are available to measure organisational 
culture/climate (cf., Gershon et al., 2004; Scott, Mannion, Davies, & Marshall, 
2003), the one chosen for this study was the Queensland Public Agency Staff Survey 
(QPASS) (Hart, Griffin, Wearing, & Cooper, 1996). QPASS is a validated 
instrument and has been authorised by the Queensland Government to be used in 
public sector organisations in that state, and has been used extensively in a number of 
health service districts in Queensland. It has also been used widely with public sector 
groups such as the police (Hart & Cotton, 2002; Hart & Wearing, 1995a), teachers 
(Hart, 1994; Hart & Wearing, 1995b), and health professionals (Wilson-Evered & 
Griffin, 1998), as well as for comparative studies with local government workers and 
tertiary students (Hart & Wearing, 1995b).  
3.3 Measuring Individual Variables 
In addition to Organisational Climate, QPASS also measures a number of 
individual variables relating to occupational well-being, that is, Individual Distress, 
Individual Morale, and Quality of Work Life. According to the QPASS model (Hart 
et al., 1996; Hart & Wearing, 1995b), Organisational Climate directly affects 
Individual Distress, Individual Morale, and Quality of Work Life. Quality of Work 
Life is also indirectly affected by Organisational Climate through Distress and 
Morale. Quality of Work Life encompasses both negative (distress) and positive 
(morale) feelings that employees have about their work. According to this model, 
when evaluating the quality of their work life, people weigh up the good and bad 
aspects of their job and form an overall judgment. 
It was considered appropriate to include these individual variables in the 
current study because stress is now recognised as one of the most significant and 
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fastest growing health hazards in the workplace (Chu & Dwyer, 2002; Spector, 
2002). Constant exposure to stress can impact on psychological well-being, physical 
health, and social functioning (e.g., Folkman & Lazarus, 1991). Research suggests 
that people working under stress experience four to five times as many injuries as 
those not in stressful situations (Petersen, 1996). Work-related stress has been shown 
to impact on unsafe behaviour in high-risk industries such as offshore oil (Mearns, 
Flin et al., 2001), aviation (Fogarty, 2004; Fogarty & Worth, 2003), and the hospital 
system (Dugan et al., 1996). For example, in a study of nurses in the United States, 
stress levels of nurses were found to be associated with a number of patient incidents 
including falls and medication errors (Dugan et al.).  
The QPASS model is based on the dynamic equilibrium theory of stress as 
proposed by Hart, Wearing, and Headey (e.g., Hart, 1994; Hart & Wearing, 1995a). 
According to this theory, stress is defined as a state of imbalance within the system 
of variables that relates people to their environment, which brings about a change in 
normal levels of psychological well-being. A variety of factors such as personality 
characteristics, coping strategies and processes, and organisational climate all 
contribute to this disequilibrium, however, the development of a supportive 
organisational climate has been identified as the most fruitful factor in terms of 
prevention of occupational stress.  
 Lawton and Parker (1998) suggested that people differ in the way they react 
to stress. Some respond by an increase in risk-taking or violation behaviour, while 
the effect on others is an increase in the likelihood of suboptimal cognitive 
processing, that is, susceptibility to errors. Reason (1990) believes that vulnerability 
to externally imposed stresses is associated with errors. He suggested that errors are 
not so much caused by stress but that the cognitive styles of some people result in 
                                                     Factors influencing Unsafe Behaviour    78                            
both higher rates of absentmindedness when stressed and in coping strategies that are 
inadequate for dealing with stressful situations. Although people are sensitive to the 
possible consequences of their fallible behaviour and attempt to protect themselves in 
risky conditions by being deliberately “present-minded”, in certain stressful 
situations this is difficult because of limited cognitive resources (Reason & 
Mycielska, 1982). Human performance is affected by stress because it tends to 
induce “tunnel vision”, that is, an inability to deal simultaneously with multiple 
stimuli, which is a characteristic of most tasks in complex systems (Petersen, 1996).  
 Research in the aviation industry investigating contributors to maintenance 
errors and violations suggests that errors are linked with individual variables, 
including stress, and violations with organisational factors (Fogarty & Worth, 2003). 
In addition, this research confirmed the claim in the literature that violations are 
often a predecessor to errors (Lawton, 1998; Reason, 1997). Therefore, in this study 
it is hypothesised that Organisational Climate will impact on Violation Behaviour, 
individual variables will impact on Errors, and Violation Behaviour will impact on 
Errors.   
3.4 The Conceptual Model 
 Figure 3.1 below presents a conceptual model illustrating graphically the 
relationships to be evaluated in Study 2. The proposed model presents the direct and 
indirect effects of organisational climate and the individual variables, that is, 
individual distress, individual morale, and quality of work life on violation behaviour 
and errors.  
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This conceptual model is proposed and tested based on the following 
hypotheses: 
1. Organisational climate will have a negative impact on violation 
behaviour, that is, a more positive organisational climate will produce 
fewer violations (Fogarty & Worth, 2003; Reason, 1990; Rundmo, 2000). 
2. Violation behaviour will impact positively on errors in that higher 
numbers of violations will produce more errors (Lawton, 1998; Reason, 
1997). 
3. Organisational climate will have an indirect impact on errors through 
violations (Reason, 1997). 
4. Organisational climate will impact directly on the individual variables. A 
more positive organisational climate will produce a higher quality of work 
life and individual morale, and lower individual distress (Hart & Cooper, 
2001; Hart et al., 1996).   
5. Organisational climate will have an indirect impact on errors through the 
individual variables (Fogarty & Worth, 2003). 
6. Individual morale and individual distress will impact on quality of work 
life in that higher individual morale and lower distress will improve 
quality of work life (Hart & Cooper, 2001; Hart et al., 1996).  
7. The individual variables will impact directly on error. That is, higher 
individual distress will produce more errors, higher quality of work life 
and higher individual morale will produce fewer errors (Fogarty, 2004; 
Fogarty & Worth, 2003).   
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Figure 3.1 Conceptual Model of Relationships among Organisational Climate, 
Individual Factors, Violation Behaviour, and Errors 
 
3.5 Method 
3.5.1 Participants  
 Participants included 176 nurses working in 11 public sector hospitals in two 
rural health service districts in South-East Queensland, Australia. These hospitals 
ranged in size from 11 to 100 beds, with all hospitals providing acute inpatient care, 
long stay aged care, accident and emergency, and outpatients. Eight of the hospitals 
also provided facilities for obstetrics.   
 Most respondents were registered nurses (n = 136; 77.3%), with 37 (21.0%) 
being enrolled nurses with medication endorsement, and 3 participants not indicating 
their registration category. There were 162 (92.0%) females, 12 (6.8%) males, and 2 
unidentified. Most were employed on a permanent full-time (n = 64; 36.4%) or 
permanent part-time basis (n = 85; 48.3%). The majority of participants were over 
the age of 40 years (n = 102; 58.0%) with the largest group being between 41 and 50 
years (n = 59; 33.5%). Most participants had more than 10 years experience with 
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Queensland Health (n = 104; 59.1%), with a number (n = 38; 21.6%) having worked 
for the organisation for more than 20 years. 
3.5.2 Materials 
 The variables used in the current study were Quality of Work Life, Individual 
Morale, Individual Distress, Organisational Climate, Violation Behaviour, and 
Errors. The first four scales were from the Queensland Public Agency Staff Survey 
and the Violation Behaviour and Error scales were developed for this study.   
3.5.2.1 The Queensland Public Agency Staff Survey (QPASS) 
 Three scales measuring both the affective and cognitive components of 
occupational well-being were used in this study, that is, Quality of Work Life, 
Individual Morale, and Individual Distress (Hart & Cooper, 2001). The 6-item 
Quality of Work Life Scale (Hart et al., 1996), based on the Life Satisfaction Scale 
(Pavot & Diener, 1993), was used to measure nurses’ level of satisfaction with 
conditions at work. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with 
a number of statements on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree with higher scores indicating a higher perceived quality of work life. 
These items can be found at the top of page 2 of the questionnaire in Appendix B. 
Example: In most ways my work life is close to my ideal. 
The 14-item Occupational Positive and Negative Affect Scale was used to 
assess the positive (individual morale) and negative (individual distress) emotional 
responses that nurses have to their workplace. Respondents were asked to indicate 
how often over the past month they had experienced seven positive and seven 
negative emotions on a 7-point scale ranging from not at all to all the time. Higher 
scores indicated a higher level of emotion, either positive or negative. These items 
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can be found at the bottom of page 2 of the questionnaire in Appendix B. The 
individual morale items are the odd numbered statements and individual distress the 
even numbered statements. Example: Over the past month I have been feeling 
enthusiastic at work. 
 The Organisational Climate Scale covers a range of organisational behaviour 
and human resource management issues that are common to most organisations 
(Milton, Entrekin, & Stening, 1984; Schuler, Dowling, Smart, & Huber, 1992) and is 
based on the School Organisational Health Questionnaire (Hart, Wearing, Conn, 
Carter, & Dingle, 2000). The scale was used to assess perceptions about eight 
positive – workplace morale, supportive leadership, participative decision-making, 
role clarity, professional interaction, appraisal and recognition, professional growth, 
and goal congruence – and two negative aspects of the work environment – 
workplace distress and excessive work demands (Hart et al., 1996). This is a 50-item 
scale with respondents being asked to indicate their level of agreement on a 5-point 
scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Higher scores indicate higher 
levels of each variable, either positive or negative. Confirmatory factor analysis 
indicated that the ten dimensions could be aggregated at a second-order level to 
provide an overall index of general organisational climate.  
 A definition of each subscale in the Organisational Climate scale is listed 
below. Also included are examples of items, the number of items in each scale, and 
the item numbers in the questionnaire. These items can be found on pages 3 and 4 of 
the questionnaire in Appendix B:  
 Workplace Morale: This 5-item scale measured perceptions of how 
other staff are coping in the workplace, that is, whether respondents perceive 
others in the workplace as showing enthusiasm, pride in their work, team spirit, 
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and energy. Example: Staff go about their work with enthusiasm.  Item Nos. 7, 
19, 29, 36, 45.  
 Supportive Leadership: This 5-item scale measured how respondents 
perceive their managers, that is, are managers approachable, dependable, and 
supportive; do they know the problems faced by staff; and do they 
communicate well with staff? Example: I am able to approach the managers in 
this workplace to discuss concerns and grievances. Item Nos. 2, 14, 24, 35, 40 
(Item No. 14 is reverse-scored).   
 Participative Decision-Making: Four items were used to assess 
perceptions about the decision-making processes in the organisation, that is, 
whether staff are asked to participate in decisions and given opportunities to 
express their views. Example: I am happy with the decision making processes 
used in this workplace. Item Nos. 8, 20, 30, 46. 
 Role Clarity: This 4-item scale measured perceptions about whether 
expectations, work objectives, responsibilities, and lines of authority are clearly 
defined. Example: My work objectives are always well defined. Item Nos. 3, 15, 
25, 41.   
 Professional Interaction: This scale replaced the Expectation by 
Doctor measure used in Study 1, as this new scale encompasses all staff and not 
specifically doctors. This 7-item scale assessed how workers interact in the 
workplace, that is, whether respondents perceive acceptance and support from 
others, with involvement, sharing, good communication, and help when needed. 
Example: There is good communication among staff in this workplace. Item 
Nos. 4, 11, 16, 26, 33, 42, 49.   
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 Appraisal and Recognition: Six items were used to measure 
perceptions about the quality and quantity of feedback on work performance. 
Example: I am happy with the quality of feedback I received on my work 
performance. Item Nos. 6, 12, 18, 28, 44, 50.   
 Professional Growth: This scale replaced the Level of Knowledge 
scale used in Study 1. This 5-item scale measured perceptions about career 
development, that is, do respondents feel encouraged to attend further training 
and development and is there the opportunity to do so? Example: I am 
encouraged to pursue further training and development. Item Nos. 1, 13, 23, 
34, 39. 
 Goal Congruence: Five items were used to measure whether 
respondents’ personal goals are in agreement with workplace goals, and 
whether workplace goals are clearly stated and easily understood. Example: 
This work place has a clearly stated set of objectives and goals. Item Nos. 9, 
21, 31, 37, 47 (Item No. 21 is reverse-scored). 
 Workplace Distress: This 5-item scale measured respondents’ 
perceptions of how others in the workplace are coping, that is, whether they 
perceive others as frustrated, stressed, tense, anxious, and depressed about their 
work. Example: Staff in this work place are frustrated with their job. Item Nos. 
10, 22, 32, 38, 48.  
 Excessive Work Demands: The scale replaced the Workload scale 
used in Study 1. This 4-item scale measured perceptions of the workload in the 
organisation, that is, whether staff are overloaded with work and under constant 
pressure to keep working. Example: Staff in this work place are overloaded 
with work. Item Nos. 5, 17, 27, 43. 
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3.5.2.2 Violation Behaviour Scale 
This scale replaced the Violation Behaviour scale used in Study 1. It was 
modified to include more generic violation behaviours based on nursing 
competencies and to include only those behaviours directly under the control of the 
nurse administering the medication. That is, it excludes doctors’ behaviours. This 
new scale was developed with the assistance of subject matter experts, that is, nurses 
with many years experience in medication administration, and with reference to the 
procedures required for safe medication administration, as outlined in Clinical 
Psychomotor Skills: Assessment Tools for Nursing Students (Tollefson, 2001) and 
other textbooks (e.g., Delaune & Ladner, 1998).  
The scale included 13 items asking respondents to indicate how often in the 
past 12 months they had to bend the rules when administering a medication. The 
scale was measured on a 5-point scale ranging from never to most of the time, with 
higher scores representing higher numbers of violations. It is noted that the anchors 
on the Likert scale for these items were modified from Study 1, that is, changed from 
a 4-point (never, sometimes, most of the time, always) to a 5-point scale (never, 
sometimes, often, frequently, most of the time) in an attempt to capture more 
variability. The scale can be found on page 6 of the questionnaire in Appendix B. 
Example: Did not check the patient’s chart. 
3.5.2.3 Error Scale 
 This scale was also developed with the assistance of subject matter 
experts and was an additional measure not included in Study 1. The items were 
based on the ‘five rights’, that is, the guidelines traditionally taught to all nurses 
regarding medication administration: ‘the right patient, the right drug, the right 
dose, the right route, and the right time’ (Delaune & Ladner, 1998; Tollefson, 
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2001). In recent literature, these ‘five rights’ have been referred to as the ritual 
that nurses should use to prevent medication errors in nursing (Cheek & 
Gibson, 1996; J. Cox, 2000; Gibson, 2001). However, there is some debate as 
to whether rituals and procedures such as the five rights give nurses a sense of 
security, which in turn prevents errors (Keill & Johnson, 1993), or whether they 
can actually lead to errors as a result of ritualistic unthinking (Cheek & 
Gibson).   
This scale included 5 items covering errors that can occur during 
medication administration. Respondents were asked on a 4-point scale (never, 
once or twice, three or four times, more often), how often in the past 12 months 
they had made an error when administering a medication. Higher scores 
represented higher numbers of errors. This scale can be found on page 5 of the 
questionnaire in Appendix B. Example: Given the wrong DRUG.  
3.5.3 Procedure 
 Two health service districts in South-East Queensland were invited to take 
part in this study. In exchange for the participation of nurses, the researcher 
administered the Queensland Public Agency Staff Survey (QPASS) to all staff and 
provided a report on the survey results which was used by management and staff to 
assist with the implementation of strategies for workplace reform and ongoing 
development. The aim of the survey was to provide staff with an opportunity to 
comment on aspects of their work environment.  
Questionnaires were either delivered or mailed to the various hospitals and 
data were collected over a one-week period. Staff were allocated work time to 
complete their questionnaires. Questionnaires were either picked up by the 
researcher, mailed individually by respondents to a reply-paid address, or collected at 
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a central point by the hospital and mailed altogether to the researcher. Of the 280 
questionnaires distributed to nurses, 176 were completed and returned, representing a 
response rate of approximately 63%. It should be noted that the figure of 280 
included enrolled nurses (without medication endorsement) who were not eligible to 
participate in this study. Therefore, the above response rate will be slightly deflated.  
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Statistical Analyses 
 Data were screened prior to the main analyses to examine for accuracy of 
data entry, missing values, and fit between distributions and the assumptions of 
multivariate analysis. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted using 
structural equation modelling (AMOS 4) to verify the construct validity of the 
QPASS instrument. CFA was considered appropriate as QPASS is a well validated 
instrument with reliable scales. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted on 
the violation behaviour scale and the error scale using structural equation modelling 
by testing the fit of the measurement model for each variable. Because these were 
new scales, the exploratory mode was chosen to identify the minimal number of 
variables underlying each factor (B. M. Byrne, 2001). Reliability analyses 
(Cronbach’s alpha) were calculated on the items in each subscale to test the internal 
consistency of the scales. Structural equation modelling was then used to test the fit 
of the structural model including all variables.   
3.6.2 Data Screening 
The accuracy of the data file was verified by using the Frequencies command 
in SPSS Version 11.5 to detect any out of range values. None were found. This 
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verification was considered sufficient as the questionnaire was in a scannable format 
(Optical Mark Recognition) which increases the accuracy of data entry.  
The data were then checked for missing values. All missing values on 
individual items were replaced using the Missing Value Analysis command (SPSS) 
prior to scale formation. The expectation maximization (EM) technique was used as 
this produces less biased estimates than other techniques (Roth, 1994; Schafer & 
Graham, 2002). The range of missing data was from 0.0% to 3.4%, with a mean of 
1.3% (SD = 0.7%). The Little’s MCAR test resulted in a non-significant χ2, 
suggesting that the data were missing at random, that is, there was no identifiable 
pattern in the missing data (Little, 1988).  
Scales were formed from the individual items and these were tested for 
outliers. Box plots indicated a number of univariate outliers in the Violation 
Behaviour and Error scales. However, transformed data were not used for the reasons 
outlined below. Using Mahalanobis distance with p < .001, two cases were identified 
as multivariate outliers. Examination of these cases indicated they were not typical of 
the target population, that is, one respondent worked on a temporary part-time basis 
and the other worked as a casual. These cases were deleted leaving 174 cases for 
analysis. 
 Normality was tested using box plots and histograms, and the skewness and 
kurtosis statistics in SPSS. These indicated that all scales were normally distributed 
except for the Error scale (skewness 8.42; kurtosis 8.01) and the Violation 
Behaviour scale (skewness 8.48; kurtosis 12.49). As both were positively skewed, a 
log transformation was applied to each. Skewness and kurtosis were improved on 
both scales; however, the Error scale was still significantly positively skewed. It was 
decided not to use transformed data because these variables would not be expected 
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to be normally distributed in the population (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996), and the 
Bollen-Stine adjusted p-value was used, when appropriate, to evaluate model fit in 
structural equation modelling (Byrne, 2001). This technique uses a post-hoc 
adjustment to account for non-normality in the underlying database. 
3.6.3 Structural Equation Modelling - Evaluation of the Measurement Models 
 Prior to the evaluation of the full model, the measurement and structural 
model of the QPASS instrument was tested. Measurement models specify the 
relationships among the items and the latent constructs represented by the scales, and 
the structural model specifies the relations among the latent constructs. This two-step 
approach was recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988) who suggested that 
the construct validity of the scales is better assessed and the scale factors more easily 
interpreted if the measurement model is estimated, and respecified if necessary, prior 
to the evaluation of the full model. According to this approach, the first step should 
be the assessment of the measurement model of the whole QPASS instrument.  
It is noted that, because of the large number of items used to measure 
Organisational Climate (50 items) and the unfavourable ratio of free parameters to 
cases, the subscales rather than the items were used in the measurement model for 
this latent construct. Gribbons and Hocevar (1998) refer to this as a partially 
aggregated model. This was considered appropriate as QPASS is a well validated 
instrument with reliable scales. The items were used for the measurement models for 
the Quality of Work Life, Individual Moral, and Individual Distress scales.  
The model for the QPASS instrument is shown in Figure 3.2 below. For 
clarity, the error terms have not been included in this figure. Some fit indices 
indicated that the model was a poor fit to the data, χ2 (400) = 867.69, p = .00; 
CMIN/DF = 2.17; TLI = .89; CFI = .90; RMSEA = .08. Modification indices 
                                                     Factors influencing Unsafe Behaviour    90                            
suggested that the model fit would be improved by allowing the correlation of the 
error terms for Workplace Distress and Excessive Work Demands, Workplace 
Distress and Workplace Morale, Individual Morale and Individual Distress, Item F2 
(Feeling tense at work) and Item F8 (Feeling anxious at work), and Item F8 and Item 
F12 (Feeling uneasy at work). A number of other modifications were also suggested, 
however, these were not included as they did not make theoretical or practical sense 
(B. M. Byrne, 2001). The modified model provided improved fit statistics, χ2 (395) = 
695.10, p = .00; CMIN/DF = 1.76; TLI = .93; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .07. 
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Figure 3.2 Measurement Model for QPASS Instrument 
Note: WM = Workplace Morale, SL = Supportive Leadership, PDM = Participative Decision Making, 
RC = Role Clarity, PI = Professional Interaction, A/R = Appraisal & Recognition, PG = Professional 
Growth, GC = Goal Congruence, WD = Workplace Distress, EW = Excessive Work Demands 
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The measurement models for the Violation Behaviour and Error scales were 
also tested. As these were new scales which were developed for this study, an 
exploratory factor analytic approach was used in this case. The fit statistics for the 
initial Violation Behaviour model were as follows: χ2 (65) = 137.26, 4Bollen-Stine p 
= .46; CMIN/DF = 2.11; TLI = .81; CFI = .85; RMSEA = .08. Standardised 
parameter estimates for all pathways in this model were significant. However, the 
standardised regression estimate associated with the path from Violation Behaviour 
to the indicator item 2 (Did not obtain the proper authority, e.g., order from doctor 
or signed protocol) was the lowest in the model at .32.  It was decided to exclude this 
item from further analyses because of this low regression weight. Evaluation of the 
amended model (see Figure 3.3) indicated that model fit was improved by the 
deletion of this item: χ2 (54) = 94.64, Bollen-Stine p = .55; CMIN/DF = 1.75; TLI = 
.88; CFI = .90; RMSEA = .07. 
                                                 
4 The Bollen-Stine adjusted p has been used instead of the usual maximum likelihood p-value when 
data do not conform to the assumption of multivariate normality.  
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Figure 3.3 Measurement Model for Violation Behaviour Scale 
 
The measurement model for the Error scale was a poor fit to the data: χ2 (5) = 
22.28, Bollen-Stine p = .20; CMIN/DF = 4.46; TLI = .64; CFI = .82; RMSEA = .14. 
In addition, the pathways from item 2 (By the wrong ROUTE), item 4 (At the wrong 
TIME), and item 5 (At the wrong DOSE) were not significant. A reliability analysis 
conducted on this scale revealed that the internal consistency estimate was low at .41. 
Two possibilities were considered, that is, that the scale was not a good measure of 
the construct because of the contentious nature of the questions and the “blame 
culture” present in the hospital system, or that it should be treated as a formative 
rather than reflective indicator (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001; Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994). Items composing a scale (i.e., the measured variables) are usually 
perceived as reflective indicators of an underlying construct (i.e., the latent variable). 
However, an alternative measurement perspective involves the creation of an index 
                                                     Factors influencing Unsafe Behaviour    93                            
rather than a scale in which the observed variables are assumed to impact on the 
latent variable rather than the other way around. Formative indicators are not 
necessarily internally consistent (Nunnally & Bernstein). It was decided to include 
this variable as a formative index instead of a reflective scale, rather than delete it 
from the study.  
3.6.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Reliability analyses were conducted to provide information about the internal 
consistency of the scales. The results are shown in Table 3.1 below, together with the 
means, standard deviations, and alpha coefficients for the QPASS subscales, as 
reported in the manual (Hart et al., 1996). 
These descriptive statistics were calculated using SPSS Version 11.5. The 
Quality of Work Life Scale and the Occupational Positive and Negative Affect 
Scales (Individual Morale and Individual Distress) were all measured on 7-point 
scales. Quality of Work Life was rated as average, however, the variance was large 
for this scale. When the individual responses were investigated it was found that the 
majority of respondents (approximately 50%) agreed (slightly to strongly) that their 
quality of work life was positive. Approximately 20% were neutral and 30% rated 
this aspect of their work life as low.  The variances for the Individual Morale and 
Individual Distress scales were also high. Individual Morale was rated slightly above 
average suggesting that most nurses (approximately 45%) felt positive feelings at 
work more than moderately often. Approximately 30% indicated that they felt these 
positive feelings moderately often and 25% not at all to moderately often. The mean 
response to the Individual Distress scale suggests that most nurses (approximately 
70%) did not experience high levels of negative feelings at work. However, a number 
did experience these feelings moderately often to all the time (approximately 30%). 
                                                     Factors influencing Unsafe Behaviour    94                            
Table 3.1  
Means, Standard Deviations, and Alpha Coefficients for QPASS and Violation 
Behaviour Scales and Error Index (N = 174) 
 
Scale Subscale No. of  
items 
M SD α α* 
Quality of Work Life 
Scale 
 6 4.14 1.40 0.90 0.91 
Occupational Positive 
& Negative Affect 
Scale 
Individual 
Morale 
7 4.38 1.30 0.94 0.92 
 Individual 
Distress 
7 2.96 1.25 0.90 0.88 
Organisational Climate 
Scale 
Workplace 
Morale 
5 2.93 0.85 0.88 0.84 
 Supportive 
Leadership 
5 3.20 0.99 0.91 0.84 
 Participative 
Decision Making 
4 2.97 0.86 0.85 0.78 
 Role Clarity 4 3.56 0.64 0.73 0.75 
 Professional 
Interaction 
7 3.49 0.62 0.82 0.83 
 Appraisal & 
Recognition 
6 3.03 0.81 0.87 0.88 
 Professional 
Growth 
5 3.26 0.76 0.79 0.79 
 Goal 
Congruence 
5 3.21 0.69 0.81 0.73 
 Workplace 
Distress 
5 3.36 0.87 0.91 0.83 
 Excessive Work 
Demand 
4 3.26 0.86 0.82 0.79 
Violation Behaviour 
Scale 
 12 1.37 0.33 0.80  
Error Index  5 1.18 0.23 0.41**  
* Cronbach’s Alpha as provided by Hart, Griffin, Wearing, and Cooper (1996) for QPASS instrument. 
** Formative indicator rather than scale. Alpha coefficient reported for information only. 
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The subscales of the Organisational Climate scale were rated on a 5-point 
scale. Most of the positive aspects of Organisational Climate were rated above 
average. The exceptions were Workplace Morale and Participative Decision Making 
which were rated only slightly below average. This suggests that most nurses were 
reasonably happy with the different positive aspects of organisational climate. 
However, the two negative aspects, Workplace Distress and Excessive Work 
Demands, were also rated above average. While a large number of respondents chose 
the neutral response to both these scales (approximately 38%), the majority either 
agreed or strongly agreed that they were overworked and that others in the workplace 
were stressed (approximately 45% for both).  
The Violation Behaviour scale was measured on a 5-point scale with the 
mean response indicating that most nurses reported following the procedures most of 
the time. The Error index was measured using a 4-point scale. The mean response 
suggested that most nurses reported rarely making errors.   
3.6.5 Correlations 
The correlation matrix showing relationships among the Quality of Work Life 
scale, the Occupational Positive and Negative Affect scales, the Organisational 
Climate scale, the Violation Behaviour scale, and the Error index is presented in 
Table 3.2 below. 
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Table 3.2  
Correlation Matrix for Individual Variables, Organisational Climate, Violation 
Behaviour, and Errors (N = 174) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Quality of 
Work Life 
1.00         
2. Individual 
Morale 
.73** 1.00       
3. Individual 
Distress 
-.63** -.55** 1.00      
4. Workplace 
Morale 
.69** .60** -.57** 1.00     
5. Supportive 
Leadership 
.69** .52** -.54** .73** 1.00    
6. Participative 
Decision Mk 
.58** .52** -.44** .72** .78** 1.00   
7. Role Clarity .56** .48** -.43** .61** .66** .61** 1.00 
 
 
8. Professional 
Interaction 
.59** .50** -.50** .77** .68** .68** .61** 1.00 
9. Appraisal & 
Recognition 
.54** .45** -.46** .61** .66** .71** .61** .67** 
10. Professional 
Growth 
.58** .47** -.44** .61** .62** .71** .53** .66** 
11. Goal 
Congruence 
.68** .56** -.51** .78** .73** .78** .68** .73** 
12. Workplace 
Distress 
-.66** -.59** .65** -.74** -.64** -.58** -.48** -.56** 
13. Excessive 
Work  
-.50** -.43** .48** -.47** -.45** -.44** -.40** -.31** 
14. Violation 
Behaviour 
-.25** -.19** .26** -.22** -.13* -.21** -.20** -.20** 
15. Errors 
 
-.22** -.21** .17* -.11 -.12 -.12 -.18** -.06 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15  
9. Appraisal & 
Recognition 
1.00        
10. Professional 
Growth 
.73** 1.00       
11. Goal 
Congruence 
.69** .72** 1.00      
12. Workplace 
Distress 
-.54** -.58** -.68** 1.00     
13. Excessive 
Work 
-.42** -.49** -.47** .75** 1.00    
14. Violation 
Behaviour 
-.20** -.19** -.26** .24** .23** 1.00   
15. Errors 
 
-.06   
 
-.06 -.18** .16* .16* .49** 1.00  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1 tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1 tailed). 
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The Quality of Work Life scale and Occupational Positive and Negative 
Affect scales (Individual Morale and Individual Distress) were all significantly 
correlated with each other and with the ten Organisational Climate subscales. All 
correlations associated with these scales were in the expected directions.  
Violation Behaviour was negatively and significantly correlated with Quality 
of Work Life, Individual Morale, and the eight positive aspects of Organisational 
Climate. Coefficients ranged from -.13 (p < .05) to -.26 (p < .01). Violation 
Behaviour was positively and significantly correlated with Individual Distress, the 
two negative aspects of Organisational Climate, and the Error index, with 
coefficients ranging from .23 to .49 (p < .01).  
 The Error index was negatively and significantly correlated with Quality of 
Work Life and Individual Morale, and with two of the positive aspects of 
Organisational Climate, that is, Role Clarity and Goal Congruence. These 
coefficients ranged from -.18 to -.22 (p < .01). Errors was also positively and 
significantly correlated with Individual Distress and the two negative aspects of 
Organisational Climate, that is, Workplace Distress and Excessive Work Demands, 
with coefficients ranging from .16 to .17 (p < .05). 
3.6.6 Structural Equation Modelling - Evaluation of the Structural Model 
 AMOS 4 (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999) using the maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation method was employed to test the structural model to the covariance 
matrix generated from the set of variables. The model to be tested was presented 
earlier in a simplified conceptual form (see Figure 3.1). Although the hypothesised 
model fitted the data reasonably well, the pathways from the individual variables 
(Individual Distress, Individual Morale, and Quality of Work Life) to Errors were not 
significant. These pathways were deleted and the respecified model (see Figure 3.4) 
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was found to be a moderate fit to the data, χ2 (454) = 765.49, Bollen-Stine p = .07; 
CMIN/DF = 1.69; TLI = .93; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .06.  
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Figure 3.4 Structural Model of Relationships among Organisational Climate, 
Individual Factors, Violation Behaviour, and Errors 
 
Note: WM = Workplace Morale, SL = Supportive Leadership, PDM = Participative Decision Making, 
RC = Role Clarity, PI = Professional Interaction, A/R = Appraisal & Recognition, PG = Professional 
Growth, GC = Goal Congruence, WD = Workplace Distress, EW = Excessive Work Demands 
 
To enhance interpretation, the error terms and measurement models at the 
item level have been excluded from the diagram. This model accounted for 7% of the 
variance in Violation Behaviour and 24% of the variance in Errors. Contrary to 
expectations, no relationships were found between the individual variables and 
Errors.   
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3.6.7 Qualitative Analysis 
 Again qualitative data were collected with respondents being asked to 
comment on what they believed may have contributed to the errors and violations 
they had reported. These items can be found on pages 5 and 6 of the questionnaire in 
Appendix B.  
A total of 83 respondents chose to make comments. The majority cited 
workload factors, that is, high workload, time constraints, interruptions/distractions, 
and staff shortages as the major contributors to errors and violations. Another major 
theme related to doctors’ prescribing behaviour. Results are detailed below.  
3.6.7.1 Contributors to Errors 
 According to this group, a major contributor to errors was workload issues 
with 14 mentioning high workload, 3 – time constraints, 8 – interruptions and 
distractions, and 5 – staff shortages. Other factors mentioned were stress (n = 3) and 
tiredness (n = 2). For example: 
Workload too high. Staff expected to do too much thus resulting in mistakes. 
 
… Constant interruptions when giving out medications, i.e., phone ringing, 
doctors’ demands, patients’ demands, other staff asking for assistance.  
 
 
 Matters relating to doctors’ prescribing were also mentioned a number of 
times by these respondents. Seventeen identified unclear orders or medication sheets 
as being the contributor to an error, with illegible handwriting by the doctor 
specifically mentioned nine times. Examples include the following:    
Instead of rewriting a medication sheet, Doctors cross out (or leave) then 
recommence or commence another drug.  
 
Busy workloads and messy prescribing by Doctors greatly contribute to 
medication errors. 
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With regard to the specific error of giving a medication at the wrong time, 
nine respondents noted that this occurred often for various reasons, for example: 
Giving a medication at a time that is written on the medication order sheet 
can sometimes be impossible.  
 
Time error caused by limited staff on duty at time of clinical emergency or 
heavy workload. Medications given later than when ordered. 
 
3.6.7.2 Contributors to Violation Behaviour 
Workload factors were also cited by this group as contributing to violation 
behaviour, with time constraints being mentioned by 13 respondents. Four suggested 
high workload as a contributor and two, staff shortages. Two also noted that stress 
was a contributor to violation behaviour. Examples were as follows: 
Time constraints make 5, 7 and 12 [i.e., checking reference materials, 
monitoring after administration, and giving education to patient] impossible 
at times when limited staff on duty. 
 
Time constraints mean I don’t always check MIMS to check for purpose of 
medications. 
 
Again a common theme involved doctors’ issues with 14 respondents citing 
various matters as contributing to violation behaviour, for example:  
Obtaining a signature from a Doctor for a V/T [verbal telephone] order is 
sometimes nigh impossible. 
 
Unavailability of Medical Officer makes it impractical to always check before 
changing route … 
 
… unwillingness to disturb Dr overnight may contribute in some cases. 
 
Difficulties in contacting MOs and difficult reception when dealing with 
MOs. 
 
Sometimes you felt you were bothering the doctor … because you felt they 
were too busy and stressed. 
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With regard to the specific violation “did not check the patient’s identity”, 
four people made comments similar to the following: 
…in a small town like this you get to know patients and don’t always need to 
verify identity. 
3.7 Discussion 
 The aim of this study was to develop a model explaining the relationships 
among organisational and individual variables, violation behaviour, and errors during 
medication administration. It was hypothesised that organisational climate would 
have a direct impact on violation behaviour and the individual variables, and an 
indirect impact on errors through violation behaviour and the individual variables. 
Violation behaviour and the individual variables were expected to have a direct 
impact on errors.   
 As expected, Organisational Climate had a direct negative impact on 
Violation Behaviour. This outcome suggests that when the organisational climate is 
positive (for example, when nurses receive supportive leadership, are involved in 
decision making, are able to participate in professional development, and workloads 
are reasonable), then they are less likely to participate in unsafe behaviour when 
administering medications. Organisational Climate also had an indirect impact on 
medication Errors through the mediating variable Violation Behaviour. That is, when 
the climate is positive nurses are less likely to violate procedures, which in turn leads 
to less medication errors. The study was unable to support the hypothesised direct 
relationship between the individual variables and Errors, or the indirect relationship 
between Organisational Climate and Errors through the individual variables. It is 
unclear whether this outcome resulted because no relationship exists between the 
variables in this population or because the items used were not a valid measure of the 
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construct. The reliability and validity of this measure will be further investigated in 
the next study.    
 As anticipated, all pathways in the QPASS model were significantly related 
and in the expected direction. That is, Organisational Climate had a negative impact 
on Individual Distress and a positive impact on Quality of Work Life and Individual 
Morale. Individual Distress was negatively related to Quality of Work Life and 
Individual Morale was positively related to Quality of Work Life. The strongest 
direct pathways were the two from Organisational Climate to Individual Distress and 
Individual Morale. This outcome suggests that creating a more positive 
organisational climate will produce a direct improvement in the morale of nurses and 
a consequent improvement in their quality of work life, as well as a negative impact 
on their distress, thereby improving quality of work life.  
3.7.1 Modifications for Study 3 
 The instrument chosen for Study 2 measured organisational climate and 
individual variables but was not able to explain more than 7% of the variance in 
violation behaviour. In addition, the hypothesised relationships between the 
individual variables and errors were not supported in this study, contrary to previous 
research (e.g., Dugan et al., 1996; Fogarty, 2004).  
 Schneider (1990) argued that measuring the climate of an organisation may 
require a strategic focus, that is, rather than investigating general organisational 
climate, it may be more appropriate to choose a focus of interest and measure the 
form of climate that is compatible with the outcomes being investigated. For 
example, if service is the criterion of interest, then measure the service climate; or if 
safety is of interest, measure the facets of the workplace related to a climate for 
safety. In support of this line of reasoning, research conducted by Neal et al. (2000) 
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found that a specific climate for safety was more strongly related to safety 
performance than the general climate of an organisation. Although general 
organisational climate had a significant impact on safety climate, which in turn was 
related to compliance with safety regulations and procedures, when the effects of 
safety climate were partialled out in this study, general organisational climate did not 
contribute to safety performance. The researchers suggested that this outcome 
encourages the use of specific forms of climate when specific outcomes are of 
interest.  
 For the above reasons, the next study measured the climate of the 
organisation relative to safety rather than the general climate of the organisation. The 
instrument was developed based on safety climate tools already in use in other 
complex industries, but was adapted to suit the medical domain. Similar variables to 
those included in Studies 1 and 2 were measured, that is, workload, training and 
competence issues, professional interactions, and unsafe acts, as well as a number of 
other issues relevant to safety climate (Flin et al., 2000).  
 In Study 2, the Violation Behaviour scale was written in the negative and 
comments from some nurses suggested that this made it difficult to answer. 
Therefore, in the next study this scale included positive statements associated with 
safety behaviour rather than violation behaviour. These statements again included 
generic behaviours based on nursing competencies with regard to medication 
administration. However, only behaviours that should be performed every time a 
nurse administers a medication were included. For example, behaviours like 
obtaining the proper authority or checking the patient’s identity are always required 
to be performed under the legislation; however, actions such as recording side or 
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adverse effects are only required in special circumstances and therefore, do not apply 
all the time.  
 After the Violation Behaviour scale in Study 2 there was an open ended 
question asking for comments on what the respondents believed may have 
contributed to violation behaviour. In this study, this question was replaced by an 
additional measure of unsafe behaviour, that is, contributors to violations. These 
questions were used in an attempt to ask the question in a different way, perhaps 
eliciting more honest answers to a controversial set of questions.  
 The Error scale was again included but consisted of near misses as well as 
errors in an effort to improve reliability and validity and to obtain more variability 
from this scale. Reason (2000b, p.12) called near misses “free lessons” and argued 
that knowledge from inconsequential errors and near misses provides information 
about where problems exist in the system. In addition to the errors relative to the 
“five rights”, two items were included covering missed doses and extra doses of 
medications. These were included as they are among the most commonly reported 
medication incidents (ACSQHC, 2002; Headford et al. 2001). As with the safety 
behaviour scale above, the open ended question asking about contributors was 
excluded from this study. Instead, statements concerning possible contributors to 
medication errors and near misses were included. Again this was an attempt to gain 
more honest answers to a less threatening set of questions.   
Although individual variables did not impact on errors in the previous study, 
a measure of individual distress was again included as this link appears so regularly 
in the literature (e.g., Dugan et al., 1996; Fogarty & Worth, 2003). It was suspected 
that the nature of the error scale may have contributed to this lack of relationship 
rather than no relationship existing. As the error questions were modified in this 
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study to include near misses, it was expected the individual variable would have a 
direct impact on errors and near misses in this sample.  
Qualitative questions were included at the end of the questionnaire. These 
were general questions asking respondents about how they would improve 
medication safety, as well as what they see as the major risk/problem with 
medication administration. The following chapter will give a detailed description of 
Study 3.   
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Chapter 4 – Study 3 
The Influence of Safety Climate on Violations and Errors/Near 
Misses during Medication Administration 
4.1 Introduction 
 The previous study investigated the impact of organisational climate and 
individual factors on violation behaviour and errors during medication administration 
by nurses in rural areas. The instrument chosen to measure organisational climate 
and the individual factors was the Queensland Public Agency Staff Survey (QPASS), 
which is a validated instrument authorised by the Queensland Government for use in 
public sector organisations. These variables accounted for 7% of the variance in 
Violation Behaviour, however, the hypothesised relationships between the individual 
variables and Errors were not supported in this study. It is unclear whether this 
outcome was because no relationship exists between the variables in this population 
or the result of methodological issues. This matter will be further investigated in the 
following study.  
 This chapter introduces Study 3. This study investigated the impact of 
individual factors and a specific type of climate, that is, safety climate, on violation 
behaviour and errors/near misses during medication administration. In addition, a 
new variable was introduced which investigated reporting behaviour. The following 
section will describe safety climate and the factors used to measure this construct. 
Reporting behaviour and the individual factor, psychological strain, will also be 
described.   
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4.2 Safety Climate 
Organisational climate is a multidimensional construct that includes a wide 
range of individual evaluations of the general work environment (James & James, 
1989). Organisational climate instruments typically measure aspects of the work 
environment, such as organisational policies, procedures, and practices (Reichers & 
Schneider, 1990). Evaluations of the climate may refer to general dimensions of the 
environment or to specific dimensions, such as the climate for service (Schneider, 
1990) or the climate for safety (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Zohar, 1980). The climate for 
safety, or safety climate, describes perceptions of the value of safety in the work 
environment (Neal & Griffin, 2002). This is in contrast to the broader concept of 
safety culture which incorporates a number of additional constructs, such as attitudes, 
values, and behaviour. An organisation with a safety culture is one that willingly and 
enthusiastically works at safety (Hudson, 2000).  
Safety climate is identified by the attitudes and perceptions of employees and 
represents the current surface features of the safety culture (Flin et al., 2000). Safety 
climate and safety culture are often used interchangeably by writers, with the 
distinction not as clear cut as it appears. Guldenmund (2000) suggested that safety 
climate describes the attitudes towards safety within an organisation, whereas safety 
culture refers to the underlying beliefs, convictions, and prevailing values of the 
social group. That is, safety climate can be seen as an indicator of the organisation’s 
safety culture as perceived by employees at a given point in time (S. J. Cox & Flin, 
1998).  
The concept of safety culture was developed in response to major 
organisational accidents, the first being the nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl, 
which led to the conclusion that the safety systems within the organisation had 
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broken down (Mearns et al., 2003; Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000). Safety improvement 
in the past had concentrated on technical issues and individual human failures. 
However, these accidents highlighted the role that organisational, managerial, and 
human factors played in contributing to accidents (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 
1999). With each investigation, knowledge of the factors which make organisations 
vulnerable has increased (Pidgeon, 1997). This vulnerability does not just originate 
from human failures, chance environmental factors, or technological failures alone, 
but rather, it is the entrenched policies and standards of the organisation that have 
been shown to predate accidents (Pidgeon). 
In recent years there has been a move away from relying on retrospective 
analyses of accidents and incidents, towards a more proactive approach such as 
safety audits and measurements of the safety climate of an organisation (Flin et al., 
2000). These more predictive measures enable the monitoring of the safety condition 
of an organisation so that remedial action can be taken prior to an incident occurring 
(Flin, 1998).  
 Research suggests that perceptions of safety climate impact positively on 
safety compliance and are negatively associated with accidents and incidents (Hayes, 
Perander, Smecko, & Trask, 1998; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Mearns et al., 2003; 
Zohar, 2000). Although there is little evidence to suggest that weaknesses in safety at 
the organisational level are associated with individual accidents, case studies of 
major disasters have provided evidence linking weaknesses in the safety culture of an 
organisation with organisational accidents (Mearns et al.; Reason, 1997). 
 In recent times, a number of assessment instruments have been developed in 
this field (e.g., S. J. Cox & Cheyne, 2000; Mearns et al., 2003; Zohar, 1980). 
However, there is little agreement as to the underlying structure of safety climate, 
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with factor analyses suggesting solutions ranging from two to nineteen key 
dimensions (Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Flin et al., 2000; Williamson, Feyer, 
Cairns, & Biancotti, 1997). Drawing direct comparisons between safety climate 
measures is complicated by the fact that these instruments tend to vary significantly 
in content, style, statistical analyses, size and composition of workers and industries, 
and country of origin (Flin et al.).  
However, although there is limited evidence for or against a common factor 
structure for safety climate, researchers are beginning to examine the thematic basis 
of a number of scales and have suggested that a basic set of features is beginning to 
emerge. For example, Flin et al. (2000) identified themes relating to management, 
safety systems, risk, training/competence, procedures, and work pressure in a number 
of safety climate instruments. In his evaluation of the safety climate literature, 
Guldenmund (2000) identified a similar set of factors, that is, management, risk, 
safety arrangements, procedures, training, and work pressure as the most frequently 
measured dimensions.  
In the current research, variables relating to these themes were investigated, 
that is, managements’ commitment to safety, training/competence, procedures and 
reference materials, and work pressure. In addition, reporting behaviour and 
individual psychological strain were examined. These variables were not included as 
part of safety climate but were expected to be influenced by the safety climate of the 
organisation. The rationale for the inclusion of the above variables will be discussed 
in the next section. 
4.2.1 Management’s Commitment to Safety 
The role played by social forces within an organisation is emphasised by the 
safety culture approach to accident reduction, with these social forces acting upon the 
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individual employee’s cognitions, perceptions, and behaviour regarding safety at 
work (Clarke, 1999). For example, Schein (1992) suggested that the way in which 
managers instruct, reward, allocate their attention, and behave under pressure, will be 
important in shaping the culture of an organisation. In his early work in this area, 
Zohar (1980) identified perceived management attitude towards safety as one of the 
two primary dimensions of safety culture. Zohar argued that, while perceptions of 
personal risk are fundamental to safety behaviour, the cognitions that guide 
behaviour “… are largely related to perceptions of management attitudes about 
safety” (p.101).  
Subsequent research has revealed that employees’ perceptions of 
management’s attitudes and behaviours towards safety are the most useful 
measurement of an organisation’s safety climate, with different levels of 
management influencing safety attitudes in different ways (S. J. Cox & Cheyne, 
2000; Flin et al., 2000; Fogarty & Shaw, 2003). For example, in a study of Australian 
manufacturing companies, Griffin and Neal (2000) found that a key factor to the 
safety climate within an organisation was how managers viewed safety in the 
workplace. In addition, in a study of nurses in a large urban hospital in the US, 
Grosch, Gershon, Murphy, and DeJoy (1999) found that management’s commitment 
to safety was one of the safety climate dimensions (together with job hindrances and 
feedback/training) that was positively associated with nurses’ compliance with 
procedures prescribing safe working practices.  
 An issue in the research into management’s commitment to safety is that in 
many studies the management label is used in an ambiguous fashion so that it is 
difficult to discern which level of management is being assessed (Flin et al., 2000). 
Clarke (1999) argued that levels of management have distinct roles and are perceived 
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differently by the workforce. Various management layers within an organisation 
affect safety issues in different ways. While senior management influences the tone 
and pace of the organisation, establishes priorities, and allocates resources, first-line 
supervisors play an important role in setting the work atmosphere and the safety 
climate for their workgroups (Flin et al.). For this reason, questions relating to 
management at the senior level and to the immediate supervisor were included in this 
study.  
These scales replaced the item in Study 1 dealing with professional 
interactions between doctors and nurses (Expectation by Doctor), and the scales in 
Study 2 covering professional relationships with colleagues (Professional 
Interaction) and managers (Supportive Leadership). These scales covered matters 
such as senior management’s and supervisors’ attitude to patient safety and 
communication issues.      
4.2.2 Training/Competence  
 Training/Competence refers to issues such as selection, training, and 
competence standards and includes employees’ perceptions of the level of 
qualifications, and the skills and knowledge of the workforce at the task/job level and 
the safety level (Flin et al., 2000). As previously noted, nurses are expected to have 
up-to-date knowledge of the actions, side-effects, and dosage of any medication they 
administer (Delaune & Ladner, 1998), with a lack of medication knowledge being 
identified as one of the most common system failures contributing to medication 
errors (Leape et al., 1995; Meurier et al., 1997; O'Shea, 1999). Access to training was 
also included in this scale as this may be a problem in rural areas, particularly with 
issues such as distance, cost, and lack of sufficient replacement personnel to provide 
coverage when nurses are away from work (J. Anderson & Kimber, 1991).  
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 This scale included level of knowledge or competence issues, as covered in 
Study 1 (Level of Knowledge), and availability of and access to ongoing training, as 
covered in Study 2 (Professional Growth). In addition, items relating to safety 
training were included.  
4.2.3 Procedures 
 The Procedures factor relates to attitudes to safety rules and the quality of 
written procedures, that is, their accuracy, relevance, availability, and workability 
(Flin et al., 2000; Reason, 1990). Guldenmund (2000) identified this factor as one of 
the most frequently occurring themes in his review of safety questionnaires. In 
complex industrial settings that operate under hazardous conditions, human 
behaviour has to be limited not only to that which is efficient and productive, but 
also to that which is safe (Reason, Parker, & Lawton, 1998). One way of doing this 
and of maintaining a level of predictability is to use procedures and rules to regulate 
the behaviour of workers. However, if these rules are not practical and/or are 
complicated to follow, it is unlikely that they will produce the desired effect, that is, 
compliance (Reason, 1997).  
This was a new scale, not included in the previous studies, and measured 
nurses’ attitudes towards medication administration procedures. In particular, nurses 
were asked about the practicality and ease of use of procedures, as well as 
compliance issues.  
4.2.4 Reference Material 
As noted earlier, nurses are required to refer to reference material if they are 
unsure about the actions or dosage of a particular medication or its side-effects 
(Delaune & Ladner 1998). However, if reference materials are not readily accessible, 
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up-to-date, and easy to follow, this may impact on the nurse’s ability to follow the 
rules for safe practice (Reason, 1997).   
This scale was reintroduced from Study 1, with a few changes to provide 
more clarity. For example, in Study 1 nurses were asked if they “… have easy access 
to up-to-date reference material with regard to the administration and supply of 
medications”. Upon reflection, this question may have caused confusion because of 
its “double-barrelled” nature. Therefore, in this study, this question was divided into 
two items, one asking about access to reference materials and the other asking 
whether these materials were up-to-date. In Study 1 another question was asked 
about the adequacy of reference materials to maintain competence. This was replaced 
with the less ambiguous item “Reference materials in this hospital are easy to 
follow”. The Reference Material scale in Study 1 also included an item regarding 
easy access to the Regulation. In order to keep this scale purely about reference 
materials containing medication information, the item was dropped from this study.     
4.2.5 Work Pressure  
 As noted earlier, it is widely accepted that susceptibility to unsafe acts is 
strongly affected by work pressures (Leape, 1994; Vincent et al., 1998). In the 
medical field, researchers have found that workload factors impact on unsafe 
behaviour by nurses during medication administration (Leape et al., 1995; O'Shea, 
1999). Work pressure appears in a number of surveys investigated by Flin et al. 
(2000) and relates to work pace, workload, and the balance between pressure for 
production and safety.  
 This factor was again included and covered workload and staffing level issues 
as investigated in Studies 1 (Workload) and 2 (Excessive Work Demands). This scale 
also included an item about the effect of staffing levels on safety.  
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4.3 Additional Scales 
4.3.1 Reporting Behaviour  
The dominant tradition in medicine when incidents occur is to blame the 
apparent perpetrator of the unsafe behaviour (Leape, 1994), with this behaviour often 
attributed to inattention, forgetfulness, or incompetence (Reason, 2000). However, 
Reason (1994) argued that, although blaming fallible individuals for incidents is 
universal, natural, emotionally satisfying, and legally convenient, this action has little 
or no remedial value. Most people who make even serious errors are conscientious 
and dedicated professionals who usually do their jobs well (Bates, 1999). Finding 
and punishing the individual who carried out the unsafe act has not reduced the 
frequency of error in medicine (Leape, 1994). Reason (1994) also suggested that 
blaming can lead to countermeasures, such as retraining, disciplinary action, and new 
procedures, that may be ineffective when dealing with a well-qualified and highly 
motivated work force such as in the medical environment.  
A study evaluating adverse incident reporting in the UK found that staff in 
two obstetric units reported less than a quarter of designated incidents to the units’ 
risk managers (Stanhope, Crowley-Murphy, Vincent, O'Connor, & Taylor-Adams, 
1999). Further research exploring the reasons for the low reporting rate found that 
the main reasons for not reporting were fears that junior staff would be blamed, high 
workload, and the belief that the circumstances or outcome did not warrant a report 
(Vincent, Stanhope, & Crowley-Murphy, 1999). The nursing literature suggests that 
nurses deliberately choose not to report errors because of the potential professional 
and personal ramifications (D. J. Anderson & Webster, 2001; Cheek & Gibson, 
1996). A nurse who makes an error is often viewed as a “bad nurse”, with this 
simplistic view resulting in a person-centred investigation and blame being focussed 
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solely at the nurse directly involved. This has resulted in a reluctance by nurses to 
report incidents, with the consequence being the perpetuation of the system which 
contributed to the unsafe behaviour (Leape, 1994; Meurier, 2000).  
A reporting culture is a crucial component required for a good safety culture 
(Reason, 1997). The safety of an organisation depends on the willingness of 
members to report incidents and near misses so that lessons can be learned, and 
future incidents averted. The way in which an organisation deals with blame and 
punishment of errors and violations is a critical factor in the development of an 
effective reporting culture (Reason). 
This scale covered issues such as respondents’ perceptions of the reporting 
culture in their hospitals, for example, reporting policies, feedback channels, and 
punishment issues. In addition, items were included covering knowledge about the 
correct reporting procedures and willingness to report incidents or near misses.   
4.3.2 Psychological Strain  
 As noted earlier, stress is recognised as one of the most significant and fastest 
growing health hazards in the workplace (Chu & Dwyer, 2002; Spector, 2002). 
Stress influences human behaviour because it tends to induce “tunnel vision”, that is, 
an inability to deal simultaneously with multiple stimuli, which is a characteristic of 
most tasks in complex systems (Petersen, 1996).  
   Work-related stress has been shown to impact on unsafe behaviour in high-
risk industries such as offshore oil (Mearns, Flin et al., 2001), and aviation (Fogarty, 
2004; Fogarty & Worth, 2003). Moreover, in a study of nurses in the US, 
psychological strain of nurses was found to be associated with a number of patient 
incidents including falls and medication errors (Dugan et al., 1996). Researchers in 
the UK suggested that the causes of stress in nursing appear to originate from two 
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primary sources, that is, organisational factors and the caring element of nursing 
work (Taylor, White, & Muncer, 1999). The highest rated organisational factors 
contributing to stress noted in that study were staffing levels, inadequate support, 
multiple roles, and the behaviour of managers.  
 This scale replaced the individual variables, Quality of Work Life, Individual 
Morale, and Individual Distress from Study 2. In the interests of parsimony, this 
study included only the negative emotional and physical responses nurses have to 
their workplace, rather than looking at job satisfaction (Quality of Work Life) and 
the positive responses (Individual Morale). The scale covered a number of issues 
relating to the well-being of nurses, for example, feeling unwell or emotionally 
drained at work.    
4.3.3 Violation Behaviour 
 Violation Behaviour was made up of two subscales, that is, Safety Behaviour 
and Violation Contributors. The Safety Behaviour scale was similar to the Violation 
Behaviour scale from the previous study, however, as the name implies, items were 
written in the positive rather than the negative. For example, rather than statements 
such as Did not check the patient’s identity, the item was rephrased to Checked the 
patient’s identity. This modification was made because some nurses from the 
previous study commented that these questions were difficult to answer when written 
in the negative. The questionnaire was shorter than the previous scale and included 
only those behaviours that are required whenever a medication is administered, for 
example, obtaining the proper authority. Five items were excluded because these 
behaviours are required in specific situations only and their inclusion would 
confound results. For example, the never response to these items could indicate 
either that the respondent violates procedures in this way or that they have never 
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faced this type of situation. These behaviours included verifying illegible orders, 
verifying verbal/telephone orders, checking reference materials for unfamiliar 
medications, recording side or adverse effects, and checking with a doctor before 
changing the route of administration.        
 Violation Contributors was a new scale and replaced the open ended question 
from the previous study asking respondents to comment on what they considered 
contributed to violation behaviour. Instead, respondents were given a short list of 
five possible contributors, for example, I bend the rules to get the job done. This 
scale was included to provide further information about unsafe behaviour. 
4.3.4 Errors/Near Misses  
 Errors/Near Misses was made up of two subscales, that is, Error Category and 
Error/Near Miss Contributors. The scale used to measure errors in the previous study 
proved to be problematic and it is unclear whether the hypothesised relationship 
between errors and the individual variables was not found because of the scale or 
because no relationship exists in this population. The Error Category scale in this 
study was similar to the error index from the previous study in that it included errors 
relative to the “five rights”. However, it was modified in this study to include near 
misses as well as errors in an effort to improve reliability and validity and to obtain 
more variability from this scale. Reason (2000b, p.12) referred to near misses as 
“free lessons” and argued that they provide information about where problems may 
exist in the system. In addition, two extra items were included in this scale covering 
missed doses and extra doses of medications as these errors are among the most 
commonly reported medication incidents (ACSQHC, 2002; Headford et al. 2001).  
As with the safety behaviour scale above, the open ended question asking 
about contributors was excluded from this study. Instead it was replaced by a new 
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scale, Error Contributors, which included statements concerning possible 
contributors to medication errors and near misses. It was hoped that this set of items 
would elicit more honest answers to a less threatening set of questions.    
4.4 The Conceptual Model 
 Figure 4.1 presents a conceptual model illustrating graphically the 
relationships to be evaluated in Study 3. The proposed model presents the 
relationships among Safety Climate, Psychological Strain, Reporting Behaviour, 
Violation Behaviour, and Errors/Near Misses.  
This conceptual model is proposed and tested based on the following 
hypotheses: 
1. Safety climate will have a direct negative impact on violation behaviour, 
that is, a more positive safety climate will decrease violation behaviour 
(Grosch et al., 1999; Neal et al., 2000; Reason, 1997). 
2. Safety climate will have a direct positive impact on reporting behaviour, 
that is, a more positive safety climate will increase reporting behaviour 
(D. J. Anderson & Webster, 2001; Cheek & Gibson, 1996; Edmondson, 
1996; Leape, 1994).  
3. Safety climate will have a direct negative impact on strain, that is, a more 
positive safety climate will decrease the levels of strain (Clarke, 1999; 
Fogarty, 2004; Fogarty & Worth, 2003).  
4. Violation behaviour will have a positive impact on errors/near misses, that 
is, higher levels of violation behaviour will be associated with more errors 
and near misses (Lawton, 1998; Reason, 1997).  
5. Violation behaviour will have a negative impact on reporting behaviour, 
that is, more violation behaviour will be associated with less reporting (D. 
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J. Anderson & Webster, 2001; Cheek & Gibson, 1996; Leape, 1994; 
Reason, 1994). 
6. Strain will have a direct positive impact on reporting behaviour, that is, 
more strain will produce less reporting behaviour (D. J. Anderson & 
Webster, 2001; Cheek & Gibson, 1996; Vincent et al., 1999). 
7. Strain will have a direct positive impact on errors and near misses, that is, 
higher strain will be associated with more errors/near misses (Dugan et 
al., 1996; Fogarty, 2004; Mearns, Flin et al., 2001).  
8. Safety climate will have an indirect effect on errors/near misses through 
violation behaviour and strain (Fogarty, 2004; Fogarty & Worth, 2003). 
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Figure 4.1 Conceptual Model of Relationships among Safety Climate, Reporting 
Behaviour, Strain, Violation Behaviour, and Errors/Near Misses 
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4.5 Method 
4.5.1 Participants 
 Participants included 106 nurses working in a public sector hospital in a large 
rural centre in South-East Queensland. Most respondents were registered nurses (n = 
99, 93.4%), with 6 (5.7%) being enrolled nurses with medication endorsement, and 1 
respondent not indicating his/her registration category. There were 96 (90.6%) 
females, 9 (8.5%) males, and 1 unidentified. Most were employed on a permanent 
full-time (n = 34; 32.1%) or permanent part-time basis (n = 50; 47.2%). The majority 
of participants were over the age of 30 (n = 81; 76.4%) with the largest group being 
between 31 and 40 years (n = 33; 31.1%). Most participants had more than 6 years 
experience with Queensland Health (n = 77; 72.6%), with a number (n = 21; 19.8%) 
having worked for the organisation for more than 20 years. 
4.5.2 Materials 
 The scales used in the current study were Safety Climate (subscales included 
Supervisor’s/Management’s Commitment to Safety, Training/Competence, 
Procedures, Reference Material, and Work Pressure), Reporting Behaviour, 
Psychological Strain, Errors/Near Misses, and Violation Behaviour. These variables 
were chosen with reference to nursing and safety literature as discussed in the 
previous section. The items used to measure the safety climate scales were adapted to 
the medical environment from items included in the Summary Guide to Safety 
Climate Tools prepared by the Health and Safety Executive (Davies, Spencer, & 
Dooley, 2001). Although the emphasis of these tools is mainly for use in the oil and 
gas industry, the items were adapted by the developers so that they could be applied 
to any industry. A description of each scale is listed below.  
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4.5.2.1 Safety Climate Questionnaire 
 All scales in the Safety Climate Questionnaire were measured on a 5-point 
scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. These items can be found on 
pages 6 and 7 of the Safety Climate section of the questionnaire in Appendix C. 
Some items were reverse-scored. With the exception of Work Pressure, which was 
negatively associated with Safety Climate, higher scores on scales represented a 
more positive safety climate.   
 Training/Competence: This scale included seven items (items 1 to 7) asking 
respondents about safety issues in training programs, ongoing training, and their 
level of knowledge of their responsibilities, medications, and the Regulation. Higher 
scores indicated higher levels of training and competence. Example: Patient safety 
issues are given high priority in medication training programs.  
Management’s Commitment to Safety: This was broken down into two sets 
of five items each, that is, immediate supervisor’s commitment to safety (items 8 to 
12) and senior management’s commitment to safety (items 13 to 17). Items 11 and 
12 from the supervisor scale, and 16 and 17 from the management scale were 
reverse-coded so that higher scores on both scales indicated higher commitment to 
safety. Example: Management really cares about patient safety in this hospital. 
Procedures: This scale included four items (items 18 to 21) relating to 
medication administration procedures, that is, their practicality and whether most 
nurses followed these procedures. Items 19 and 20 were reverse-coded so that higher 
scores on this scale indicated higher levels of practicality and simplicity of 
procedures, and higher compliance. Example: Medication administration procedures 
in this hospital reflect how the job is usually done.  
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 Reference Material: Three items (items 22 to 24) were used to ascertain 
respondents’ perceptions about the accessibility and ease of use of up-to-date 
reference material. Higher scores indicated higher levels of access and ease of use of 
reference materials. Example: Reference materials in this hospital are easy to follow. 
 Work Pressure: The scale included four items (items 25 to 28) asking about 
workload, staffing levels, and expectations on nurses. Items 26 and 27 were reverse-
coded so that higher scores on this scale indicated higher work pressure. This scale 
was negatively related to Safety Climate. Example: Nurses are overloaded with work 
in this hospital. 
4.5.2.2 Additional Scales  
Reporting Behaviour: Seven items (items 29 to 35) were used to ascertain 
respondents’ perceptions of the reporting environment and their willingness to report 
incidents and near misses. Item 35 was reverse-coded so that scores on this scale 
indicated a more positive attitude towards the environment and reporting. Example: I 
am willing to report incidents in which I am involved. 
 Psychological Strain: This scale included five items (items 36 to 40) asking 
about the respondents’ level of well-being at work. Item 40 was reverse-coded so 
that higher scores on the scale reflected higher levels of strain. Example: I feel 
emotionally drained at work. 
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4.5.2.3 Medication Administration Questionnaire 
 This questionnaire included the outcome variables Violation Behaviour 
(made up of Safety Behaviour and Violation Contributors) and Errors/Near Misses 
(made up of Error Category and Error/Near Miss Contributors).   
Safety Behaviour: These items can be found on page 4 of the Medication 
Administration section of the questionnaire in Appendix C. This scale replaced the 
Violation Behaviour scale from the previous studies. Eight items were used to 
measure how often in the past 12 months respondents had followed procedures when 
administering medications. The scale was measured on a 5-point scale from never to 
always. Example: Checked the patient’s identity. 
 Violation Contributors: These items can be found on page 4 of the 
Medication Administration section of the questionnaire in Appendix C. This was a 
new scale and was included to elicit further information about safety/violation 
behaviour, that is, respondents’ perception of factors contributing to violation 
behaviour. It was anticipated that this way of asking may be less threatening to 
respondents. Respondents were asked, using five items, their reasons for bending 
rules. The items were chosen based on the literature and the answers to the 
qualitative questions in Study 2. The scale was measured on a 5-point scale from 
never to always. Example: I bend the rules to get the job done. 
 Error Category: This 7-item scale can be found on page 5 of the Medication 
Administration section of the questionnaire in Appendix C. This scale replaced the 
Error index from the previous study. Respondents were asked to indicate how often 
in the past 12 months they had been involved in an incident or near miss when 
administering a medication. This scale was measured on a 4-point scale (never, once 
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or twice, three or four times, more often). Higher scores indicated higher numbers of 
errors and/or near misses. Example: I gave, or very nearly gave, the wrong drug. 
 Error/Near Miss Contributors: These items can be found on page 5 of the 
Medication Administration section of the Questionnaire in Appendix C. Five items 
were used to elicit perceptions of the contributing factors to errors and near misses. 
These items were chosen based on the answers to the qualitative questions in Study 
2. This was a new scale and was used as an additional measurement of errors and 
near misses as it was anticipated that this way of asking the questions may be less 
threatening to respondents. The scale was measured on the same 4-point scale as the 
Error Category subscale. Example: I have made, or very nearly made, an error 
because of fatigue.  
4.5.3 Procedure 
 A Health Service District in a large rural centre in South-East Queensland 
was invited to take part in this study. Questionnaires were delivered to the District 
Office and questionnaires were distributed via this office. Staff were allocated work 
time to complete their questionnaires. Questionnaires were either collected at a 
central point by the hospital and picked up by the researcher, or mailed individually 
by respondents to a reply-paid address. Of the 482 questionnaires distributed, 106 
were completed and returned for analysis giving a response rate of 22%. This 
response rate may have been deflated by the fact that the figure of 482 included 
enrolled nurses (without medication endorsement) who were not eligible to 
participate in the survey.  
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4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Statistical Analyses 
Data were screened prior to the main analyses to examine for accuracy of 
data entry, missing values, and fit between distributions and the assumptions of 
multivariate analysis. The construct validity of each scale was tested using a 
combination of confirmatory factor analysis and exploratory factor analysis with 
structural equation modelling. These techniques were used in this case as the 
instrument was a new questionnaire developed for this study. Reliability analyses 
(Cronbach’s alpha) were calculated on the items in each subscale to test the internal 
consistency of the scales. Structural equation modelling (AMOS 4) was then used to 
test the fit of the structural model.   
4.6.2 Data Screening 
The accuracy of the data file was verified by using the Frequencies command 
in SPSS Version 11.5 to detect any out of range values. None were found. This 
verification was considered sufficient as the questionnaire was in a scannable format 
(Optical Mark Recognition) which increases the accuracy of data entry.  
The data were then checked for missing values. All missing values on 
individual items were replaced using the Missing Value Analysis (SPSS) prior to 
scale formation. The expectation maximization (EM) technique was used as this 
produces less biased estimates than other techniques (Roth, 1994; Schafer & 
Graham, 2002). The range of missing data was from 0.9% to 4.4%, with a mean of 
2.3% (SD = 1.2%). The Little’s MCAR test resulted in a non-significant χ2, 
suggesting that the data were missing at random, that is, there was no identifiable 
pattern in the missing data (Little, 1988).  
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Scales were formed from the individual items and these were tested for 
outliers. Box plots indicated that a number of univariate outliers were present in 
some scales. However, data were not transformed for the reasons outlined below. 
Using Mahalanobis distance with p < .001, two cases were identified as multivariate 
outliers. Examination of these cases indicated they were typical of the target 
population, that is, both were female, registered nurses, 31-40 years, and worked on a 
permanent part-time basis. Therefore, both cases were included in further analyses.  
 Normality was tested using the skewness and kurtosis statistics in SPSS. 
These indicated that all scales were normally distributed except for Safety 
Behaviour, (skewness -11.10; kurtosis 31.04), Violation Behaviour (skewness 4.40; 
kurtosis 4.48), Error Category (skewness 4.22), and Error/Near Miss Contributors 
(skewness 3.68). It was decided not to use transformed data because these variables 
would not be expected to be normally distributed in the population (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1996), and the Bollen-Stine adjusted p-value was used in structural equation 
modelling to correct for non-normality (Byrne, 2001).  
4.6.3 Structural Equation Modelling – Evaluation of the Measurement Models 
 Prior to the evaluation of the structural model, the one-factor congeneric5 
measurement models for each scale were examined separately using AMOS 4 
(Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999). Adopting this procedure highlights any potential 
problem areas in each scale prior to the analysis of the larger measurement models 
for the latent constructs. These analyses revealed that the models for Management, 
Supervisor, Reference Material, Procedures, Work Pressure, Strain, Violation 
Contributors, Error/Near Miss Contributors all fit the data well. The model for 
                                                 
5 A set of measures is said to be congeneric if each item assesses the same construct (B. M. Byrne, 
2001). 
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Training/Competence indicated that the pathways from item 3 and item 4 were not 
significant. When these items were deleted the model was a good fit to the data. The 
pathway from item 6 in the Safety Behaviour measurement model was low at .31. 
This item was deleted and the modified model fit the data well. The model for Error 
Category revealed that the pathways from item 2, item 5, and item 7 were all low at 
.33 .32, and .29 respectively. These items were deleted and the modified model fitted 
the data well. The similar Error index in Study 2 was problematic; however, a 
reliability analysis revealed that the new scale reached acceptable reliability at .72. 
The analysis of the model for Reporting Behaviour indicated that the 
pathways from items 29, 30, and 31 were not significant. Further investigation using 
factor analysis in SPSS suggested that the scale was made up of two factors; one 
including items 29, 30, 31 which seemed to measure the reporting environment, 
while items 32, 33, 34 seemed to be measuring willingness to report. The reverse-
scored item 35 loaded equally onto each factor. Reliability analysis suggested that 
the reporting environment factor was unreliable with an alpha coefficient of .43. 
Therefore this scale was not included in any further analyses. Analysis of the 
willingness to report factor, with item 35 included, was reliable but this was 
improved with item 35 removed. Alpha for the three-item scale was acceptable at 
.72. Therefore this item was renamed Willingness to Report and included items 32, 
33, and 34.  
The measurement models for the Safety Climate, Violation Behaviour, and 
Errors/Near Misses scales were analysed next. The Safety Climate model included 
the variables Management, Supervisor, Training/Competence, Reference Material, 
Procedures, and Work Pressure. The fit statistics for the initial model were poor. 
Examination of the model revealed that the regression estimate associated with the 
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path from Work Pressure was low at -.27. This factor was excluded from the 
measurement of Safety Climate but was included in the structural model to be tested 
later. Even with this factor excluded, some initial fit statistics (i.e., TLI and CFI) for 
the modified model indicated that the fit was still poor: χ2 (204) = 329.65, p = .00; 
CMIN/DF = 1.62; TLI = .84; CFI = .85; RMSEA = .08.  
Modification indices suggested that fit would be improved if a number of 
error terms were correlated. These error terms related to the factors Management 
Commitment to Safety and Supervisor Commitment to Safety. These included the 
pathways between the error terms for item 11 (My supervisor turns a blind eye if 
patient safety procedures are not followed) and item 16. As item 16 was the same 
question directed at Management, this pathway was included to account for common 
method variance (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). A pathway was 
also included between the error terms for item 12 (My supervisor is more concerned 
with financial considerations than patient safety) and item 17 for the same reason.  
Pathways were also suggested between items 10 and 11, and between items 
15 and 16. These pathways seemed plausible and were included because item 10 (My 
supervisor acts decisively when a patient safety concern is raised) and item 11, 
which is reverse-scored (My supervisor turns a blind eye if patient safety procedures 
are not followed), and items 15 and 16, which are the same items directed at 
Management, are eliciting similar information. The fit statistics for the modified 
model (see Figure 4.2) indicated that the model was a good fit to the data: χ2 (200) = 
268.92, p = .00; CMIN/DF = 1.35; TLI = .91; CFI = .92; RMSEA = .06.      
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.95.39
 
Figure 4.2 Measurement Model for Safety Climate Scale 
Note: Error terms and covariance pathways between error terms for items 10 and 11, 15 and 16, 11 
and 16, and 12 and 17 not illustrated in model.   
 
 
 
The Violation Behaviour measurement model included the variables Safety 
Behaviour and Violation Contributors. The fit statistics for this model (see Figure 
4.3) indicated that the fit was good: χ2 (53) = 76.07; 6Bollen-Stine p = .57; CMIN/DF 
= 1.44; TLI = .92; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .06.      
                                                 
6 The Bollen-Stine adjusted p has been used instead of the usual maximum likelihood p-value when 
data do not conform to the assumption of multivariate normality.   
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Figure 4.3 Measurement Model for Violation Behaviour Scale 
 
The Errors/Near Misses measurement model included Error Category and 
Error/Near Miss Contributors. The fit statistics for this model (see Figure 4.4) were 
good: χ2 (26) = 29.01, Bollen-Stine p = .90; CMIN/DF = 1.12; TLI = .99; CFI = .99; 
RMSEA = .03.       
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5
Item 1 Item 3 Item 4 Item 6
Error Category
Error/
Near Miss 
Contributors
Errors/ 
Near Misses
.59
.63 .72.56 .62
.90
.69
.73 .57 .72 .73
.83
.95
 
Figure 4.4 Measurement Model for Errors/Near Misses Scale 
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4.6.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Reliability analyses were conducted to provide information about the internal 
consistency of the scales. The alpha coefficients are shown in Table 4.1 below 
together with the number of items, means, and standard deviations for each scale. 
These descriptive statistics were calculated using SPSS Version 11.5. All scales were 
measured using a 5-point scale, except Error Category and Error/Near Miss 
Contributors which were measured on a 4-point scale. 
  All Safety Climate subscales were rated as average to above average, which 
suggests that most respondents perceived the safety climate in their hospitals as more 
positive than negative. Investigation of individual responses revealed that, in general, 
respondents perceived their supervisors to be more committed to safety than senior 
management. That is, while 33% agreed that management was committed to safety, 
over 70% agreed that their supervisor was committed to safety. The mean for 
Training/Competence was high suggesting that most nurses perceived few problems 
in this area. That is, approximately 80% felt competent with regard to medication 
administration and agreed that patient safety issues were covered in training 
programs. Most nurses (approximately 70%) also agreed that Procedures were 
practical and uncomplicated to follow and that compliance rates were high. The 
mean for Reference Material was lower and the variance higher, however, with only 
about 50% agreeing that reference materials were accessible, up-to-date, and easy to 
follow. 
The mean for Work Pressure was high with no one disagreeing and 
approximately 85% of nurses agreeing that they were overworked and that there 
were not enough nurses to do the job safely. The mean for Willingness to Report was 
also high with around 88% of respondents agreeing that they know the correct 
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reporting procedures and would be willing to report incidents and near misses. The 
mean for Strain was rated as average. Approximately 24% disagreed, 40% were 
neutral, and 36% agreed that they felt strain as a result of conditions at work.  
The mean for Safety Behaviour was high with around 99% of nurses 
reporting that they followed procedures most of the time or always. The responses to 
the Violation Contributors scale supported this result with approximately 92% 
reporting that they never to sometimes violated procedures. From the list of possible 
contributing factors, around 25% of respondents reported that they sometimes bend 
the rules because everyone else does, 35% perceived management pressure as a 
contributor, 50% cited impractical rules, 53% referred to their workload, and 56% 
bent the rules to get the job done. Approximately 13% reported that they often to 
always bend the rules because of their workload.      
The Errors/Near Misses scales were measured using a 4-point scale. The 
means for both were low suggesting that most nurses reported never to rarely making 
errors. The category of errors/near misses most endorsed was a missed dose with 
approximately 53% of nurses responding that they had done so once or twice and 
22%, three or more times. From the list of contributing factors, around 42% reported 
that they had made, or very nearly made an error once or twice because of someone 
else’s mistake, 44% because of unclear, illegible, or incomplete documentation, 52% 
because of their workload, 55% because of fatigue, and 63% because of distractions. 
Approximately 10% reported that they had made, or very nearly made an error three 
or more times because of distractions or someone else’s mistake, 11% because of 
fatigue, 19% because of their workload, and 30% because of unclear, illegible, or 
incomplete documentation.    
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Table 4.1  
Means, Standard Deviations, and Alpha Coefficients for Safety Climate, Work 
Pressure, Strain, Willingness to Report, Violation Behaviour, and Errors/Near 
Misses Scales (N = 106) 
 
Scale Subscale No. of  
items 
M SD α 
Safety Climate Management’s 
Commitment to Safety 
5 3.20 0.76 0.83 
 Supervisor’s 
Commitment to Safety 
5 3.81 0.79 0.84 
 Training/Competence 5 3.94 0.56 0.65 
 Procedures 4 3.67 0.53 0.66 
 Reference Material 3 3.36 0.93 0.85 
Work Pressure  4 4.10 0.66 0.75 
Strain  5 3.14 0.83 0.84 
Willingness to Report  3 4.03 0.55 0.72 
Violation Behaviour Safety Behaviour 7 4.45 0.47 0.73 
 Violation Contributors 5 1.56 0.50 0.85 
Errors/Near Misses Error Category 4 1.61 0.47 0.72 
 Error/Near Miss 
Contributors 
5 1.89 0.59 0.80 
 
4.6.5 Correlations 
The correlation matrix showing relationships among the Safety Climate 
scales, Work Pressure, Strain, Willingness to Report, the Violation Behaviour scales, 
and the Errors/Near Misses scales is presented in Table 4.2 below.  
All the Safety Climate scales were positively and significantly related to each 
other with the exception of Supervisor’s Commitment to Safety and Reference 
Material. Coefficients ranged from .18 (p < .05) to .60 (p < .01). Safety Behaviour 
was not significantly related to any of the Safety Climate scales. Violation 
Contributors and Error Category were significantly related to Management’s 
                                                     Factors influencing Unsafe Behaviour    134                           
Commitment to Safety, Supervisor’s Commitment to Safety, and Procedures. 
Error/Near Miss Contributors was related only to Management’s Commitment to 
Safety.  
 Work Pressure was not significantly related to any of the Violation Behaviour 
or Errors/Near Misses scales. However, it was significantly negatively correlated 
with Management’s Commitment to Safety with a coefficient of -.23 (p < .01), and 
significantly positively correlated to Strain at .44 (p < .01). Strain was also 
significantly negatively related to Management’s Commitment to Safety, Procedures, 
Reference Material, and Willingness to Report with coefficients ranging from -.22 (p 
< .05) to -.34 (p < .01). Strain was also significantly positively related to Violation 
Contributors (.24; p < .01), Error Category (.20; p < .05), and Error/Near Miss 
Contributors (.23; p < .01).  
 Willingness to Report was significantly positively related to all the Safety 
Climate scales with the exception of Reference Material. Coefficients ranged from 
.16 (p < .05) to .34 (p < .01). Willingness to Report was also significantly positively 
related to Safety Behaviour (.25; p < .01) and negatively related to Violation 
Contributors (-.29; p < .01), Error Category (-.19; p < .05), and Error/Near Miss 
Contributors (-.26; p < .01).  
Safety Behaviour was significantly negatively related to Violation 
Contributors, Error Category, and Error/Near Miss Contributors with coefficients 
ranging from -.27 (p < .01) to -.44 (p < .01). Violation Contributors, Error Category, 
and Error/Near Miss Contributors were all significantly positively related to each 
other. Coefficients ranged from .38 (p < .01) to .59 (p < .01). 
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Table 4.2  
Correlation Matrix for Safety Climate, Work Pressure, Strain, Willingness to Report, 
Violation Behaviour, and Errors/Near Misses Scales (N = 106) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Management’s Commitment 
to Safety 
 
1.00       
2. Supervisor’s Commitment  
to Safety 
.60** 1.00     
3. Training/Competence 
 
.25** .20* 1.00    
4. Procedures 
 
.41** .18* .34** 1.00   
5. Reference Material 
 
.39** .13 .30** .31** 1.00  
6. Work Pressure 
 
-.23** -.01 .04 -.15 -.06 1.00 
7. Strain 
 
-.34** -.16 -.14 -.22* -.26** .44** 
8. Willingness to Report 
 
.20* .16* .34** .17* .15 -.09 
9. Safety Behaviour 
 
.16 .12 .12 .05 .10 .04 
10. Violation Contributors 
 
-.35** -.22* -.13 -.27** -.14 .08 
11. Error Category 
 
-.26** -.30** -.05 -.18* -.11 -.06 
12. Error/Near Miss Contributors 
 
-.17* -.15 .09 -.16 -.13 -.08 
 7 8 9 10 11 12 
7. Strain 
 
1.00      
8. Willingness to Report 
 
-.30** 1.00     
9. Safety Behaviour 
 
-.07 .25** 1.00    
10. Violation Contributors 
 
 .24** -.29** -.32** 1.00   
11. Error Category 
 
.20* -.19* -.44** .38** 1.00  
12. Error/Near Miss Contributors 
 
.23** -.26** -.27** .45** .59** 1.00 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1 tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1 tailed). 
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4.6.6 Structural Equation Modelling – Evaluation of the Structural Model   
AMOS 4 (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999), using the maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation method, was employed to test the structural model to the covariance 
matrix generated from the set of variables. The model to be tested was presented 
earlier in a simplified conceptual form (see Figure 4.1). As noted in section 4.6.3, 
however, the Work Pressure scale was not included in the Safety Climate 
measurement model because the parameter estimate was low. This factor was 
included in the structural model and was expected to impact on Strain (Hegney, 
Plank et al., 2003; McVicar, 2003) and Willingness to Report (Stanhope et al., 1999; 
Vincent et al., 1999). It is noted that the subscales rather than the items were used in 
this model because of the unfavourable ratio of free parameters to cases if 
measurement models were used. Gribbons and Hocevar (1998) refer to this as a 
partially aggregated model.  
Although the initial model was an acceptable fit to the data, the pathways 
from Strain to Errors/Near Misses, Safety Climate to Willingness to Report, and 
Work Pressure to Willingness to Report were not significant. These pathways were 
deleted and the respecified model (see Figure 4.5) was found to be a good fit to the 
data: χ2 (50) = 62.92; Bollen-Stine p = .64; CMIN/DF = 1.26; TLI = .93; CFI = .95; 
RMSEA = .05.  
To enhance interpretation, the error terms have been excluded from the 
diagram. In addition, the covariance between the error terms for Management’s 
Commitment to Safety and Supervisor’s Commitment to Safety is not shown. This 
covariance was considered appropriate because of common method variance, that is, 
variance that is attributable to the measurement method rather than to the constructs 
being measured (Podsakoff et al., 2003), as the same items were used to measure 
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each construct. The model accounted for 27% of the variance in Violation 
Behaviour, 61% of the variance in Errors/Near Misses, and 20% of the variance in 
Willingness to Report. No relationships were found between Strain and Errors/Near 
Misses, Safety Climate and Willingness to Report, and Work Pressure and 
Willingness to Report.   
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Figure 4.5 Structural Model of Relationships among Safety Climate, Workload, 
Strain, Willingness to Report, Violation Behaviour, and Errors/Near Misses 
 
 
4.6.7 Qualitative Analysis 
 Again qualitative data were collected with respondents being asked to 
comment on what they believed would improve medication safety and the major 
risk/problem associated with medication administration. These items can be found on 
page 8 of the questionnaire in Appendix C. A total of 64 respondents chose to make 
comments. 
                                                     Factors influencing Unsafe Behaviour    138                           
4.6.7.1 Improving Medication Safety 
 The majority noted that safety would be enhanced by improving doctors’ 
handwriting, increasing staffing levels, and providing ongoing education. Other 
themes mentioned to improve safety were accessibility of reference materials, 
standardisation of procedures, and communication. 
Twenty-three respondents mentioned issues with doctors as impeding 
improvements to medication safety, with the majority (n = 20) citing illegible 
handwriting as a concern. Four nurses believed this situation would be improved if 
doctors were encouraged to print. Examples include the following: 
 Clearer documentation by doctors would increase our work time and reduce 
the risk of errors. 
 
 Clear written orders. Handwriting is not easy to read in most cases. If you 
are not familiar with that drug, it’s not easy to make out most Drs’ writing. 
 
 
Communication issues with doctors were also noted by 3 nurses with one 
suggesting that doctors should be encouraged to “… talk to their clients about 
ordering new medication instead of relying on nursing staff”. Another believed that 
“Drs need to liaise with primary nurse on changes to pt care and medications”.     
 
Another major theme to improve medication safety mentioned by 18 
respondents involved staffing levels and work pressure. Eleven of these specifically 
noted that an increase in nursing staff levels would be beneficial to safety. For 
example: 
 Small staff-patient ratios to reduce rushing through medications. 
  
Reduce staff workloads especially on the wards, to facilitate better/improved 
quality of care. And to decrease risk of drug errors. 
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 Seventeen nurses cited the lack of on-going training as impacting on 
medication safety. All of these suggested that more education regarding medications 
was necessary to ensure safety. Seven suggested there should be more inservice 
training or time off in work time to pursue training. For example: 
Allow time for nurses in “work time” to continually up-date on all 
medication procedures and administration. This should be policy in all 
nursing areas … 
   
 A lack of standardisation of procedures was cited by 9 respondents as 
impacting on safety. Four of these suggested that having “ … personal medication 
cupboards beside each bed”  would benefit safety. Other suggestions included: 
Ensure that medication administration is same across hospital. 
… management must insist that all medication orders be printed clearly by 
all doctors. 
 
Reference materials were mentioned by 6 respondents, with 5 noting that 
access to these materials was a problem and 2 a lack of up-dated materials as the 
issue. For example: 
Have written (i.e., on paper) reference material on ward. Having to look up 
MIMS on computer is a bunch of crap as computer not easily accessible, 
especially while doing medication rounds. Each nurse should be able to 
access a copy of MIMS at the bedside.   
 
4.6.7.2 Major Risk/Problem Areas with Medication Administration 
The major risk/problem areas cited by nurses were decreasing nursing staff 
levels and workload issues, illegible, unclear, or incorrect information on orders, and 
lack of knowledge/training. Also mentioned were issues with reference materials and 
procedures. 
Thirty-one nurses noted nursing shortages, time constraints, and work 
pressure as major risk areas to safety. Heavy or high workload was mentioned by 15 
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nurses, lack of time or time constraints by 12, nursing shortages by 9, and stress by 4. 
For example: 
Insufficient time, increased workload with no increase in staffing leads to 
shortcuts to get the job done.    
 
Time and overworked staff. Everyone knows the rules, however, sometimes 
you get things wrong when you are pressured. 
 
 A number of nurses (n = 27) cited issues with doctors’ orders as the major 
problem area with medication administration. That is, 21 specifically noted illegible 
or poor handwriting on orders, with 10 citing unclear, incorrect, or unfinished orders 
as an issue. Examples are as follows: 
 Drs not correctly writing up medications – need to type or print drugs. 
 Incorrect orders / unfinished orders e.g., route not written, no times written, 
start date not written. 
 
 Poor doctor’s handwriting makes it difficult to read medication orders. 
 
 Fifteen nurses mentioned lack of knowledge and training as problem areas. 
Thirteen respondents noted a lack of knowledge of medications (n = 11) or a lack of 
knowledge of medications and policy (n = 2) as a major risk area. Five of these 
referred to doctors’ lack of knowledge or inexperience and 2 referred to “… 
transient” or “… redeployed staff” being unfamiliar with certain medications. Three 
nurses mentioned “…poor” or “…not enough education”. For example: 
 Inexperienced are not checking medications/patients properly. Insufficient 
knowledge about some medications. 
 
  
 Other issues mentioned were to do with reference materials and procedures. 
One nurse noted that there was a need to have “… more copies of MIMS available 
for use at the bedside, not just computer”. Another suggested that “Policies [are] too 
wordy. Need to be concise and to the point”. 
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4.7 Discussion 
 The aim of this study was to develop a model explaining the relationships 
among safety climate variables, willingness to report, strain, violation behaviour, and 
errors/near misses during medication administration. It was hypothesised that safety 
climate would have a direct impact on violation behaviour, willingness to report, and 
strain, and that violation behaviour and strain would have a direct impact on 
willingness to report and errors/near misses.  
 In the original conceptual model, Work Pressure was included as part of the 
measurement of Safety Climate as suggested by previous research (Flin et al., 2000). 
However, the measurement model for Safety Climate revealed that the regression 
estimate associated with the path to Work Pressure was low and this factor was 
excluded from the model. Therefore, the measurement of Safety Climate in this study 
included Management’s Commitment to Safety, Supervisor’s Commitment to Safety, 
Training/Competence, Procedures, and Reference Material. Work Pressure was 
included in the structural model, however, and was expected to directly impact on 
Strain (Hegney, Plank et al., 2003; McVicar, 2003) and Willingness to Report 
(Stanhope et al., 1999; Vincent et al., 1999).  
  As expected, Safety Climate had a direct negative impact on Violation 
Behaviour. This outcome suggests that when the safety climate of the organisation is 
positive (e.g., staff perceive management to be committed to safety, procedures are 
practical, reference materials are accessible, competence levels are high, and safety 
issues are included in training), then nurses are less likely to participate in unsafe 
behaviour when administering medications. Safety Climate also had a direct negative 
impact on Strain, indicating that when the climate of the organisation is positive, 
nurses experience less strain. Safety Climate had an indirect impact on Errors/Near 
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Misses through Violation Behaviour. This outcome suggests that creating a more 
positive safety climate will produce less violation behaviour in nurses, which in turn 
will lead to less medication errors/near misses.  
 Also as expected, Work Pressure had a direct positive impact on Strain, and 
an indirect impact on Willingness to Report through Strain. However, contrary to 
previous research (Vincent et al., 1999), the hypothesised direct relationship between 
Work Pressure and Willingness to Report was not supported. It appears that reporting 
behaviour was better explained in this case by the influence of the mediating variable 
Strain. That is, when nurses are subjected to high work pressures, they experience 
more strain, which in turn makes it less likely that they will report incidents in which 
they are involved. Violation Behaviour also had a direct negative impact on 
Willingness to Report. That is, the likelihood of reporting incidents is lower when 
nurses are violating procedures more often.  
The study was unable to support the hypothesised direct relationship between 
Safety Climate and Willingness to Report. This result is contrary to previous research 
which suggests that the working environment influences reporting behaviour. For 
example, Edmondson (1996) found that shared perceptions about the consequences 
of making errors influenced the climate and reporting behaviours within hospital 
work teams. In this research, the quality of relationships within the unit and the 
leadership behaviours of nurse managers influenced the number of errors reported. 
For example, authoritarian leadership within a unit generated a climate of fear which 
tended to suppress reporting or discussion of errors.   
Of interest, the mean for the Willingness to Report scale was high suggesting 
that most nurses agreed that they would report incidents and near misses in which 
they were involved, and that they were aware of the correct reporting procedures. 
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However, this is in contrast to the literature which indicates that nurses are reluctant 
to report errors because of the “blame” culture that exists in the hospital environment 
and the fear of potential professional and personal ramifications (Cheek & Gibson, 
1996; Leape, 1994). It has also been suggested that reporting behaviour is influenced 
by the lack of agreement among health care professionals as to what constitutes an 
error (A. F. Cook et al., 2004).  
This study was also unable to support the hypothesised direct relationship 
between Strain and Errors/Near Misses. This link has previously been found in the 
aviation industry (e.g., Fogarty, 2004) and in the hospital environment (e.g., Dugan 
et al., 1996). For example, Dugan et al. investigated the relationship between 
increased levels of stress and burnout and increased nurse injuries and patient 
incidents. Although the relationship between stress and nurse injuries was weak, the 
researchers identified a moderately strong relationship between self-reported stress 
and patient incidents. That is, hospital units reporting higher levels of stress were 
more likely to exhibit increased patient incidents, with this relationship most evident 
with medication errors and patient falls. It is unclear why this relationship was not 
found in this study but it is hypothesised that the measurement of error/near misses 
may need to be further refined in future research.   
Taken together, the results from Studies 2 and 3 support Schneider’s (1990) 
argument that measuring the climate of an organisation requires a strategic focus. 
These studies also verified the research conducted by Neal et al. (2000) who found 
that a specific climate for safety was more strongly related to safety performance 
than the general climate of an organisation. However, it is acknowledged that the 
scales used to measure the outcome variables, violation behaviour and errors, were 
improved in Study 3 and this may have contributed to the different outcomes. In any 
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case, it does appear that, when safety outcomes are of interest, it is more beneficial to 
measure the safety climate of the organisation rather than the general organisational 
climate. Future research may be able to provide more support for this hypothesis in 
the hospital system by measuring safety outcomes and both organisational climate 
and safety climate in the one study.    
4.7.1 Limitations  
 A major limitation of this study was that the response rate was low at 22%. 
When a high proportion of the sample do not respond, researchers must be cautious 
about generalising from the results (Neuman, 1997). In addition, if non-respondents 
differ from those who responded, low response rates can create bias and weaken 
validity (Neuman).  
 It is anticipated that the sensitive nature of this research may have contributed 
to this low response rate, even though respondents were assured of the confidentiality 
of information. The use of scannable questionnaires may also have contributed. 
These forms require numbering and a bar code to appear on each page of the 
questionnaire to enable the scanner to read the information. Although this increases 
the accuracy of data entry and respondents cannot be traced by this numbering, 
respondents may not feel confident enough to reveal such sensitive information if 
they believe there is any possibility of being identified. In fact, one questionnaire was 
returned with this numbering cut off and the comment “CONFIDENTIAL HEY?” 
printed next to the removed numbering.  
 This explanation may not account for all non-respondents, however, as this 
same scannable format questionnaire was used in Study 2. The response rate for this 
study was much higher at 63%. It is noted, however, that an extensive promotional 
campaign was conducted by the researcher and the representatives from the hospital 
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districts that participated in Study 2. This was not possible in the hospital district that 
participated in Study 3, although every attempt was made to inform prospective 
respondents of the reasons for the research. In addition, the timing of this study may 
not have been ideal as the researcher is aware of an extensive hospital-wide survey 
being conducted in this hospital district prior to Study 3.    
4.7.2 Conclusion 
 In summary, the model developed from this study explained how safety 
climate and individual factors work together to influence safety outcomes. However, 
the measurement of safety climate did not include work pressure in this population. 
Future research is required to investigate this further as this factor appears in a 
number of surveys measuring safety climate (Flin et al., 2000). As expected, safety 
climate had a direct impact on violation behaviour and strain, violation behaviour 
directly impacted on errors/near misses and willingness to report, and work pressure 
impacted on strain, which in turn impacted on willingness to report.  
 Contrary to previous research, however, the study was unable to support the 
direct impact of work pressure and safety climate on willingness to report, or strain 
on errors/near misses. Further investigation is required to establish whether these 
links do not exist in this population or whether the measuring instruments require 
further refinement.  
 It appears that the results from Study 2 and Study 3 taken together support the 
research by Neal et al. (2000) that it is more beneficial to measure the safety climate 
of an organisation rather than the general organisational climate when safety 
outcomes are of interest. Future research, incorporating a measure of both 
organisational climate and safety climate and the safety outcomes may provide 
additional support in the medical environment.  
                                                     Factors influencing Unsafe Behaviour    146                           
Chapter 5 – General Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction  
This thesis began with a summary of the extent of the problem of hospital-
based errors both in Australia and internationally. It was noted that, although the 
health system delivers safe and effective health care to millions of patients each year, 
it is well accepted that modern healthcare is increasingly complex with inevitable 
risks for patients as a result of this complexity (ACSQHC, 2001b). In fact, research 
indicates that adverse events involving medical errors are a major contributor to 
death and injury in the hospital system (Brennan et al., 1991; Kohn et al., 1999; 
Wilson et al., 1995). Available international data suggest that probably around 10% 
of admissions to hospitals are associated with some form of adverse event and that 
this is likely to be similar in health systems in most developed countries (ACSQHC, 
2001c; Neale et al., 2001; Vincent et al., 2001). 
 Medication errors are recognised as a leading cause of unintended harm to 
hospital patients (Kohn et al., 1999; Wilson et al., 1995). It has been estimated that 
between 10% and 20% of all adverse events are drug related (Bates, 1999). The 
current research focused on the administration stage of the medication process. 
Medication administration is a complex and time-consuming task that forms a major 
part of the nurse’s role (O'Shea, 1999). The complexity of the medication process 
increases the potential for error. If an error occurs, the nurse often assumes or is 
assigned responsibility for the error even though the actions of others involved in the 
system and the system design itself may have contributed to the situation (Wakefield 
et al., 1998).  
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 Errors were defined as the failure of planned actions to achieve their intended 
consequences (Reason, 1990, 1997). Errors can involve the involuntary deviation of 
action from intention (slips and lapses) or the departure of planned actions from 
some satisfactory path towards a desired goal (mistake). Our understanding of human 
functioning and errors has been enhanced by theory development and research in the 
areas of cognitive psychology and human factors. Psychologists investigate mental 
functioning and the possible causes of error at an individual/cognitive level, whereas, 
human factors experts look at the issue of error from a social/organisational 
perspective. The management of error requires both perspectives. For although the 
management of error in complex systems is an organisational task that cannot be 
managed by dealing with psychological issues alone (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998), 
errors by individuals and teams have their roots in human cognitive limitations, 
restricted memory, and information processing capacity (Reason, 1997).  
Analysis of incidents in medicine and elsewhere has led to a much broader 
understanding of accident causation, and a greater appreciation of the complexity of 
the chain of events that may lead to an adverse event (R. I. Cook & Woods, 1994). 
The health care system is now taking advantage of the research carried out in other 
complex industries. Historically, the focus of safety research was the individual, as if 
he or she were the only faulty part of the process (D. J. Anderson & Webster, 2001). 
However, there is now a growing emphasis among safety researchers to look beyond 
the individual contributors to human error to the social and organisational factors that 
influence unsafe behaviour (Lawton & Parker, 1998). These include attitudinal and 
behavioural factors which can lead to the deliberate deviation from safe working 
practices, that is, violation behaviour. Violations were defined as behaviours that 
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involve the deliberate deviation from rules that describe the safe or approved method 
of performing a particular task or job (Lawton, 1998; Reason, 1990).  
 This series of studies used Reason’s (1990) model of accident causation as 
the basis for the search into possible contributing factors to unsafe behaviour by 
nurses during medication administration. Reason’s model has been used throughout 
complex industries to investigate the way in which threats penetrate the extensive 
defensive barriers protecting such industries, and this model has now been adopted 
by health care researchers interested in improving patient safety.  
Reason (2000a) suggested that the human error issue could be viewed in two 
ways: the individual approach or the system approach. The individual approach 
concentrates on the unsafe behaviour, whereas the system approach focuses on the 
human component within complex systems, with less emphasis on the individual and 
more on pre-existing organisational factors that provide the conditions in which 
unsafe behaviour occurs (Reason, 1990). Reason’s model includes the organisational 
context by linking failure in organisational processes to individual actions and, 
ultimately, accidents. Reason (1997) argued that organisational failures contribute to 
accidents by creating the kind of workplace conditions that provoke unsafe behaviour 
by the individual or team, or by creating deficiencies in system defences. 
There is now a substantial body of empirical support from the safety and 
nursing literature demonstrating the impact of individual and organisational factors 
on safety outcomes as proposed by Reason. This research suggests that, although 
human decisions and actions play a leading role in nearly all accidents, identifying 
human error as the ultimate cause of a system failure is of limited use unless the 
context in which the error occurred is well understood (McCarthy et al., 1997).  
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 The current research used the technique called structural equation modelling 
to operationalise Reason’s theory by developing a model linking organisational and 
individual factors to unsafe behaviour in the hospital system. The principal objective 
of structural equation modelling is to fit the hypothetical model to a set of sample 
data and examine how well the model fits the data. If the fit is adequate, the model 
supports the hypothesised relation among variables (B. M. Byrne, 2001). 
Study 1 in the series investigated the impact of organisational issues on 
procedural violations by nurses in rural and remote areas. The aim of Study 1 was to 
identify organisational factors that create conditions wherein violation behaviour is 
more likely to occur. The variables measured in this study were Level of Knowledge, 
Reference Material, Workload, Expectation by Doctor, and Violation Behaviour. The 
results indicated that Violation Behaviour was directly influenced by Level of 
Knowledge, Expectation by Doctor, and Workload. In addition, two indirect 
pathways were found, that is, Expectation by Doctor mediated between Workload 
and Violation Behaviour and between Reference Material and Violation Behaviour. 
The hypothesised direct relationship between Reference Material and Violation 
Behaviour was not supported in this study. The model accounted for 23% of the 
variance in Violation Behaviour and 22% of the variance in the mediating variable, 
Expectation by Doctor. In addition to testing the conceptual model in this study, a 
cross-validation analysis was carried out by randomly splitting the dataset into two 
parts. This analysis indicated that the causal structure was equivalent across the two 
samples. A comparison was also made between models for rural and remote 
communities to investigate the possible contributing factor of isolation as a 
moderating variable. The results of this analysis suggested that there was no 
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difference between the rural and remote samples. Therefore, subsequent studies 
included only rural communities.  
 Study 2 expanded on the first study by including individual factors, that is, 
Individual Morale, Individual Distress, and Quality of Work Life, and more 
organisational factors, that is, a measure of Organisational Climate. The instrument 
used to measure these factors was a validated instrument widely used in public sector 
hospitals in Queensland. The Violation Behaviour scale was modified in this study to 
include only those violations originating with nurses rather than behaviours not 
directly under their control. That is, it excluded doctors’ behaviours. In addition to 
violation behaviour, another measurement of unsafe behaviour, medication errors, 
was included. The model predicted 7% of the variance in violation behaviour and 
24% of the variance in errors. Contrary to expectations, however, the main 
contributor to errors was violation behaviour, with no direct or indirect input from 
individual factors. This outcome is at odds with well-replicated findings in aviation 
psychology (e.g., Fogarty, 2004).    
 Study 3 again investigated the impact of organisational and individual factors 
on unsafe behaviour, however, in this study, a specific type of organisational climate, 
that is, safety climate, was examined. In addition, the Violation Behaviour and Error 
instruments were modified and improved, for example, the Error scale was expanded 
to include near misses as well as errors. Although individual variables did not impact 
on errors in the previous study, this relationship was tested again as methodological 
issues may have influenced previous results. A new variable measuring reporting 
behaviour was developed and included, as Reason (1997) argued that a reporting 
culture is a crucial component required for a good safety culture. The results of the 
analysis of the measurement model suggested changes to this scale which was 
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renamed Willingness to Report after modifications. The analysis of the measurement 
model for Safety Climate indicated that Work Pressure should not be included as part 
of the measurement of Safety Climate. This variable was excluded from the 
measurement of Safety Climate but included in the structural model as a separate 
factor and was expected to directly impact on Strain and Willingness to Report. As 
expected, the results indicated that Safety Climate had a direct impact on Violation 
Behaviour and Strain, and an indirect impact on Errors/Near Misses through 
Violation Behaviour. Violation Behaviour had a direct impact on Errors/Near Misses 
and Willingness to Report, and Work Pressure had a direct impact on Strain and an 
indirect impact on Willingness to Report through Strain. The hypothesised direct 
relationships between Safety Climate and Willingness to Report, Work Pressure and 
Willingness to Report, and Strain and Errors/Near Misses were not supported by the 
study. The model accounted for 27% of the variance in Violation Behaviour, 61% of 
the variance in Errors/Near Misses, and 20% of the variance in Willingness to 
Report. 
 In summary, the aim of the current series of studies was to identify 
organisational issues in the hospital environment that create conditions wherein 
unsafe behaviours occur. Reason (2000a) argued that it is important to investigate the 
factors that contribute to these unsafe acts. This series of studies has made a start in 
that direction in the rural medical environment by demonstrating the links among 
organisational and individual factors and safety outcomes. It was argued that, in 
order to understand these interactions, a model was required of how the components 
of the system work together to influence outcomes. This research project has 
provided such a model using the technique, structural equation modelling. 
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 Study 1 was a preliminary exploration into this area. Study 2 extended the 
first study by using a validated instrument to measure organisational climate and 
individual variables. This instrument is widely used in public sector hospitals in 
Queensland and, if strong links were found with safety outcomes, would have 
provided a potentially valuable source of information for safety researchers. 
However, the results from this study proved to be disappointing. Instead, the results 
of Study 3 suggested that it may be more beneficial to measure the safety climate of 
an organisation rather than the general organisational climate, as this measure was 
able to provide stronger links among factors, and predict a higher percentage of the 
variance in the safety outcomes. These results are encouraging; however, it is 
acknowledged that future research is required to refine the measuring instruments 
and to validate the current results using a larger sample of respondents.  
5.2 Implications 
 Leape et al. (1995) argued that the concept of system failures as underlying 
causes of unsafe behaviour has not been widely accepted in the medical environment, 
although accident causation is more likely to be prevented by changing the system 
rather than the individual. The usual approach to reducing the frequency of errors in 
medicine has been to find and punish the individual considered responsible for the 
unsafe behaviour (Leape, 1994). Reason (1994) suggested that this approach leads to 
interventions, such as retraining or disciplinary action, that may be ineffective when 
dealing with a well-qualified and highly motivated work force such as in the medical 
environment. This approach isolates the person and the unsafe behaviour from their 
system context and has little or no remedial value (Reason, 1994, 1997).  
 Organisations that follow the above approach tend to direct most of their 
management resources at trying to make individuals less fallible (Reason, 1997).  
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However, blaming individuals for incidents that are not due to negligence or lack of 
care has not helped to improve the health system or ensure that lessons are learned 
when things go wrong (Leape, 1994). A more holistic management approach is 
required that aims at several different areas, that is, the individual, the team, the task, 
the workplace, and the institution as a whole (Reason, 2000a). Interventions in this 
case are based on the assumption that, although we cannot change the human 
condition, we can change the conditions under which humans work.    
The results of the current research support this view and suggest that it would 
be more beneficial for safety researchers to engage in a systematic organisational 
diagnosis, rather than providing interventions at an individual level. The practical 
implication of safety research is predominantly concerned with highlighting courses 
of action that will reduce the risk of incidents. In recent years there has been a move 
away from relying on retrospective analyses of accidents and incidents, towards a 
more proactive approach (Flin et al., 2000). These more predictive measures enable 
the monitoring of the safety condition of an organisation so that remedial action can 
be taken prior to an incident occurring (Flin, 1998).  
The current research also highlights the role of geographical context, a factor 
which often fails to receive adequate recognition. The rural and remote area nurses 
who participated in these studies often work under constraints that are not found in 
larger, urban health centres (Hegney et al., 1997). The lack of availability of doctors 
in some areas is foremost among these constraints. This shortage of doctors in rural 
Australia is a widely recognised problem in the health sector. As in other developed 
countries, there has been plenty of discussion in this country on the impact of this 
shortage on the health system, especially in terms of availability of services and the 
need to introduce an advanced practice role for nurses (G. Byrne, Richardson, 
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Brunsdon, & Patel, 2000; Caplin-Davies & Akehurst, 1999; Hegney, 1998). What 
also needs to be acknowledged, however, is the impact that this shortage has on work 
practices. Given the longevity of the doctor shortage problem and the improbability 
of this issue being solved in the near future, nurses should be given specific advice 
on how to handle the kinds of situations that are highlighted in this series of studies.  
In 1997, the Queensland Government changed the Regulation in rural and 
remote areas in an attempt to deal with the issue of unavailability of doctors and the 
practice by nurses of carrying out procedures without approval. This change allows 
rural and remote area nurses who have undergone additional training to administer 
and supply restricted and controlled drugs, as listed in a drug formulary, without the 
need to contact a doctor. This change is a step in the right direction. However, at 
least at the time of the first study in this series, there were few registered nurses who 
had attained this rural and isolated practice endorsement. Perhaps the reasons for this 
low level of endorsement need to be investigated further to ascertain what is 
happening in the system to prevent nurses from taking advantage of this opportunity.  
In summary, research such as the current project is able to identify underlying 
contributing factors, indicate the strength of the relationships among the various 
elements, and illustrate how the various parts of the system link together to influence 
outcomes. By identifying which elements are important by the use of structural 
equation modelling, this research provides the basis for predicting unsafe 
organisational conditions. Because the antecedents of unsafe behaviour are under 
varying degrees of organisational control, management will be able to decide where 
remedial action is best directed, thus aiding in the design of suitably targeted 
intervention programs to reduce unsafe behaviour and adverse incidents.   
                                                     Factors influencing Unsafe Behaviour    155                           
5.3 Methodological Issues and Future Research 
Several methodological issues are present in the current series of studies and 
will need to be addressed in future research. These limitations suggest ways in which 
the research can be extended and validated and do not reduce the importance of the 
aims of this series of studies.  
The most obvious methodological issue is the use of a cross-sectional design. 
As noted by Rundmo (2001), cross-sectional studies are not able to conclusively 
identify causes of risk behaviours or other antecedents to safety. Future researchers 
would be advised to conduct longitudinal studies in this area as this would provide 
further validation of specific relationships.  
In addition, the use of structural equation modelling does not fulfil the strict 
experimental conditions necessary for inferring cause. The purpose of this modelling 
technique is to compare the fit of models. If the theoretical model does not deviate 
significantly from the data, the model is said to be consistent with reality. Rundmo 
(2000) argued that this gives support to the causal relationships specified in the 
theoretical model. Loehlin (1998) also argued that a strict or narrow definition of 
cause is not necessary in path models. He believes the “essential feature for the use 
of a causal arrow in a path diagram is the assumption that a change in the variable at 
the tail of the arrow will result in a change in the variable at the head of the arrow, all 
else being equal, that is, with all other variables in the diagram held constant” (p. 4). 
The use of unidirectional arrows in the hypothesised models in the current series of 
studies is supported by theoretical arguments suggesting temporal ordering of the 
variables.    
The use of self-report measures for all variables is also a methodological 
issue in this research as these measures may not correspond with objective measures 
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of performance. For example, self-reported errors may not reflect the actual number 
of errors in the workplace. However, using objective measures of unsafe behaviour 
may also be problematic as research suggests that information derived from incident 
reporting systems in the medical environment cannot yet be considered a reliable 
index of the true rate of incidents (e.g., Stanhope et al., 1999). In support of self-
report measures, a number of studies have demonstrated that a correlation does exist 
between safety measures and objective indicators of safety performance (e.g., 
Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 1980, 2000). In addition, theoretical descriptions 
of the links between attitudes, intentions, and behaviours also lend support to the use 
of self-report measures in safety research (Ajzen, 1991; Fogarty & Shaw, 2003). 
Models developed using an exploratory approach, as in the current research, 
should be considered as a tentative solution because re-specifications of the model 
may be based on circumstances relating uniquely to that particular data set (Hoyle, 
1995). This series of studies was unable to support a number of hypothesised 
pathways, for example, the link between work pressure and safety climate, individual 
factors and errors, and safety climate and willingness to report. These links have 
previously been found in other research (e.g., Dugan et al., 1996; Edmondson, 1996; 
Flin et al., 2000; Fogarty, 2004) and further investigation is required to determine 
whether the relationships do not exist in this population or whether the measuring 
instruments require further refinement.   
The results of Studies 2 and 3 support the argument that the measurement of 
the climate of an organisation requires a strategic focus (Neal et al., 2000; Schneider, 
1990). That is, when safety outcomes are of interest, it is more beneficial to measure 
the safety climate of the organisation rather than the general organisational climate. 
Future research is required in the hospital system to verify this finding by measuring 
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safety outcomes, and both organisational climate and safety climate in the one study. 
Cooper (2000) suggested that, because safety climate is a sub-feature of 
organisational climate, it is appropriate to compare the results of existing 
organisational climate measurement instruments with those obtained from safety 
climate measuring instruments.  
Future research is also required to establish whether these findings can be 
generalised to other hospital environments. This research was carried out 
predominately in rural public sector hospitals. However, this is a diverse population 
as is highlighted in Table 5.1, which outlines the key demographic and sampling 
details for each study.  
Table 5.1 
Key Demographic and Sampling Details for the Three Studies 
 
Demographic/Sampling 
Details 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
 
Sample Size 
 
N = 652 
 
N = 176 
 
N = 106 
 
Site 
 
 
Rural/remote 
Queensland 
 
11 Rural 
Hospitals 
 
1 Rural Hospital 
 
Registered Nurses 
 
76% 
 
77% 
 
93% 
 
Permanent Full-Time 
 
46% 
 
36% 
 
32% 
 
Permanent Part-Time 
 
38% 
 
48% 
 
47% 
 
Modal Age 
 
40 to 49 years 
 
41 to 50 years 
 
31 to 40 years 
 
Years of Service 
 
84% > 10 years 
56% > 20 years 
 
59% > 10 years 
22% > 20 years 
 
73% > 6 years 
20% > 20 years 
 
Response Rate 
 
38% 
 
63% 
 
22% 
 
The information presented in this table emphasises the differences between the three 
study populations and the samples drawn from them. For example, the samples were 
drawn from increasingly homogeneous populations with decreasing levels of age and 
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experience. This introduces potential bias in the generalisability of results and 
potential confounders, particularly age and experience levels. Results from these 
studies should be treated with caution until future research explores these issues 
further.    
Coyle et al. (1995) found that safety climate factors are unstable across 
organisations. It may be that safety climate factors are not only organisation specific 
but also hospital specific. Future research may be able to establish which factors are 
important to the safety climate of different types of hospitals and whether these 
factors generalise across different regions, for example, when comparing small rural 
hospitals with large metropolitan hospitals, and public sector hospitals with private 
sector hospitals.  
Another issue that needs consideration in future is that the measurement of 
error is confounded by the lack of agreement among healthcare workers as to what 
constitutes an error (A. F. Cook et al., 2004). In addition, because errors are 
unintentional behaviours, individuals are not always aware that they have made an 
error, especially if it takes the form of a memory lapse. These facts are particularly 
relevant, for example, when considering a “wrong time error”. Is this always an error 
or could it sometimes be a violation of procedures? The qualitative comments by 
nurses in the current research seem to suggest that giving a medication at the wrong 
time is common practice and, rather than an error, is more likely to be a deliberate 
action. This fact does not rule out, however, that memory lapses do occur. This 
confusion as to what we are measuring will need to be considered in future research. 
The inclusion of “near misses” in Study 3 (i.e., I gave, or very nearly gave, the right 
drug at the wrong time) has helped to make it clearer that this is a mistake rather than 
a deliberate action. However, perhaps including the word “mistakenly” in all items in 
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the scale (i.e., I mistakenly gave, or very nearly gave …) will clarity further what the 
items are measuring.   
The current research was deliberately narrow in focus and did not look at a 
number of issues that could be investigated in future projects. Clearly, medication 
administration is a complex process involving multiple interactions among patients, 
nurses, doctors, pharmacists, management, and the healthcare system itself 
(Wakefield et al., 1998). This series of studies touched on the effect that some parts 
of the system have on safety behaviour, however, undoubtedly other factors greatly 
impact on clinical practice. For example, how do patient characteristics such as the 
complexity and seriousness of the illness, language and communication skills, and 
personality factors impact on medical personnel’s ability to provide safe healthcare? 
What about aspects of the work environment such as the design, availability, and 
maintenance of equipment, staffing structures and levels, administrative and 
managerial support, and the use of locums? Individual factors, such as personality 
and experience, also influence outcomes. For example, risk is attached to being 
nervous and unsure, as well as to being overconfident and arrogant (Vincent et al., 
1998). Other issues that were not included in this research include diagnostic errors, 
calculation errors and mathematical skills, the impact of shift rosters, confusion due 
to similarity of medication names and the quality of prescriptions, and the reciprocal 
relationship between organisational and individual variables. In addition, the issue of 
self-presentation of respondents was not investigated. Therefore, the inclusion of a 
social desirability measure may be an important addition in future research when 
dealing with such sensitive issues as violations and errors, and the willingness to 
report this unsafe behaviour.     
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5.4 Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this series of studies give encouraging support to the benefits 
of proceeding with further investigations of the impact of organisational and 
individual factors on unsafe behaviour in the medical environment. These studies 
have attempted to further safety research and aid in the prediction of unsafe 
behaviour in this environment. The usefulness of the modelling technique used in 
these studies is that it enhances the ability to target incident prevention. This 
technique could form part of a proactive management tool as suggested by Coyle et 
al. (1995) whereby the antecedents of unsafe behaviour are identified and targeted 
for intervention. It is hoped that these findings can be used and expanded upon in 
future research to increase knowledge of the factors influencing violations and errors, 
and in so doing, contribute to a safer healthcare system.  
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Appendix A 
AUSTRALIA  
Dear Participant 
 
Thanks for taking the time to read this letter. We hope that you will be able to help us with our 
research into the practice of rural and remote nurses with regard to medication administration and 
supply.  
 
“What do I get out of it?” you ask.  
• Firstly, a free cuppa using the enclosed teabag! 
• Secondly, your input may change medication policies making them more relevant to your work 
context, and ensuring the safety of yourself and your patients. 
 
What do we get out of it? 
• A correct picture of what rural and remote area nurses are actually doing with regard to 
medication practice. 
• ‘True’ data, including your practical suggestions to guide amendments to the Health (Drugs & 
Poisons) Regulation 1996. 
 
If you would like to assist us with this research we ask that you follow the instructions below, using the 
enclosed materials: 
 
Step 1 Please take the time to read the Plain Language Statement before deciding whether to 
participate.  Keep this Statement as a record of how to contact us in future. 
 
Step 2 Make a ‘cuppa’ with the teabag provided and take a ‘breather’ while completing the 
enclosed questionnaire. It should take you approximately 20-30 minutes to complete.  
Please remember that the aim of the study is to find out what your current medication 
practices are, not what you understand the correct practice should be.  However, there 
are no right or wrong answers.  As the Plain Language Statement says, all your 
responses will be kept confidential.  If you need more space to answer a question, please 
feel free to attach additional pages with the extra information. 
 
Step 3 Once you have completed the questionnaire, please return it in the reply paid envelope 
within two (2) weeks. 
 
If you have any queries, please don’t hesitate to contact us using the details below.  We look forward to your 
response, and thank you for your assistance with this study. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Desley Hegney RN PhD 
 
Contacts 
Prof. Desley Hegney  Ph. 07 4631 5456 Email: hegney@usq.edu.au 
Ms Christine McKeon  Ph: 07 4631 5458 Email: mckeon@usq.edu.au 
Ms Lisa Raith   Ph: 07 4631 5458 Email: raith@usq.edu.au 
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Plain Language Statement 
 
The University of Southern Queensland (USQ) has been successful in obtaining funding from the 
Queensland Nursing Council (QNC) for a research project that will investigate the administration and 
supply of controlled and restricted medications by rural and remote nurses. Our aim is to provide a 
benchmark with which to measure practice at a later date, which will indicate the impact of 
amendments to the Queensland Health (Drugs & Poisons) Regulation 1996, such as the EN 
Medication Endorsement and the Rural and Isolated Practice Endorsement for RNs. All enrolled and 
registered nurses from rural and remote areas will be eligible to participate. 
 
We ask you to participate in this important study so that Queensland will have the information on 
which to base future policy. It is therefore important that your responses are based on your current 
medications practice, rather than what you understand the correct practice should be. Your 
participation will involve the completion of the enclosed questionnaire.  
 
To ensure absolute confidentiality, each questionnaire has been coded. These coded questionnaires 
have been sent by USQ to the QNC who have agreed to post the questionnaire to you by matching 
each code with a name. Only the QNC will hold the names, addresses and their codes - USQ does not 
have access to your name or address details.  Three weeks after the first mail-out of the 
questionnaire, USQ will notify the QNC of the code numbers of the questionnaires not returned to us. 
The QNC will then post a reminder package to these people. If you do not wish to participate in the 
study, then please ignore this reminder notice.  
 
Should you wish to withdraw from the study at any time, USQ will notify the QNC of your name and 
they can advise us of your code.  We can then remove your questionnaire from the study. 
 
When the questionnaires are returned to USQ, the data will be analysed by the Project Team. Your 
comments will be kept completely confidential, with no identifying information appearing with them. At 
no time will the QNC have access to any information that could identify your survey responses. We 
guarantee that any comment made about Queensland Health will not be passed onto Queensland 
Health in a way that could identify the nurse or the facility making the statement. All of the 
questionnaires will be kept in a locked filing cabinet at USQ for a period of five years, after which they 
will be shredded and disposed of as confidential waste. 
 
The research team, led by Professor Desley Hegney, Chair of Rural Nursing, comprises a range of 
professionals, including Dr Jennifer Watson, Dr Ashley Plank (Senior Lecturer in Statistics – USQ), Ms 
Christine McKeon and Ms Lisa Raith (Psychologists/Research Assistants). 
 
If you have any questions with regard to this project please feel free to contact Professor Desley 
Hegney on the number listed below. Participation is completely voluntary. You should understand that 
your decision to participate in this study will not affect your future prospects of employment in any way. 
If you wish to participate could you please return the enclosed questionnaire in the reply-paid 
envelope provided in this package. Return of the completed questionnaire provides your consent to 
participate in this study. Please retain this Plain Language Statement for future reference. 
 
 
Any questions with regard to this project may be directed to: 
Professor Desley Hegney, Chair of Rural Nursing, University of Southern Queensland, Department of 
Nursing, Toowoomba QLD 4350. Telephone: 4631 5456; Fax: 4631 5452; Email: hegney@usq.edu.au 
 
Ms Christine McKeon or Ms Lisa Raith, Research Assistants, Centre for Rural and Remote Area 
Health, University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba QLD 4350. Telephone: 4631 5458; Fax: 
4631 5452; Email: mckeon@usq.edu.au or raith@usq.edu.au   
 
 
Any concerns regarding the project implementation may be directed to: 
The Secretary, Human Research Ethics Committee USQ or telephone (07) 4631 2956. 
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